Borderlands of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries

Guest Editor: **Thomas Kühn**

Introduction

Maps

Articles

Books

Review Essay

Unearthing the Ottoman Origins of Nation States in the Middle East

Aykut Kansu
Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913
Leiden: Brill Press, 2000

Introduction

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Borders, frontiers, margins and peripheries catch the imagination. These are the zones of fusion and transition, where hybridity is the norm and orthodoxy the exception. State law is often subordinate to customary law, official religion yields to mysticism and schism, languages multiply, and from the central government's perspective, 'civilisation' gives way to 'savagery'. If one is looking for resistance to the centralizing initiatives of the modern state, frontier-lands provide the obvious focus. These observations hold particularly true for the Ottoman 'long nineteenth century' era of reforms (1780s – 1910s). It was at this time that many of the most remote lands nominally under Ottoman sovereignty first came under direct rule through the modern rational institutions of the *Tanzimat* state.

It comes as no surprise to see Ottoman studies moving from the imperial and provincial capitals to more remote zones. This collection of essays provides wonderful evidence of this trend. Together they span the westernmost reaches of the Balkans to the south-eastern extremity of the Empire in Yemen. This is not to suggest that the authors treat Albania, Macedonia, Baghdad and Yemen as frontiers in some common sense of the term. Indeed, in some respects the Balkan lands were the very opposite of the remote Arab provinces. Macedonia became Ottoman territory in the fourteenth century, Albania in the fifteenth. Natives of both regions had enjoyed access to the very highest levels of Ottoman government, and the regions themselves had a continuous history of Ottoman rule and subordination to the fiscal demand of the state. Not so in Baghdad or Yemen, where Ottoman rule came much later and was never well established.

Yet by the late nineteenth century, these disparate territories shared certain important features. They were frontier lands, in the sense that they represented boundaries between the Ottomans, Habsburgs, and newly independent Balkan states; between the Ottomans, the Persians, and the Arabian Peninsula; and the Ottoman frontier on the Indian Ocean. These 'outposts' posed a high risk of breaking away from the control of the central government: Albania and Macedonia to nationalist movements, Baghdad and Yemen to British imperial designs in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The Ottomans applied themselves with great vigour to retain these threatened territories through administrative measures. And between the 1870s and the 1910s, the relations between these frontiers and the Ottoman state underwent major changes. It is impossible to determine if the institutions of the late Ottoman state were proving more or less viable through these case studies. What is clear is that each generated a complex history of accommodation and resistance that is as much a part of the history of the *Tanzimat*, Hamidian and Young Turk eras as the better-known history of the Ottoman central lands.

The authors have drawn on a combination of Ottoman and European archival sources, inspired in every case by cutting edge scholarship from both the Ottoman and extra-Ottoman fields. They are themselves marking out new boundaries in Ottoman studies that should prove very fruitful for future researcher.

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Map of Yemen

G. Wyman Bury, Arabia Infelix or the Turks in Yemen [sic!], London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1915, between pages 20 and 21.

Map of the Balkans

Reference TBD

An Imperial Borderland as Colony: Knowledge Production and the Elaboration of Difference in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1914

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In the second half of the 19th century competition among imperial powers in Europe and Asia for spheres of economic and political influence around the world reached an unparalleled degree of intensity. Historians of the Middle East have rightly argued that the Ottomans Empire of this period was one of the prime targets of European imperialists who brought parts of the Ottoman domains under the formal colonial occupation of Britain, France, Italy or Russia and sought to carve up the rest into spheres of 'informal' imperial domination. However, focusing on the Ottoman presence in Yemen between 1872 and 1914 this paper argues for a more complex trajectory of 19th- and early 20th-century imperialism and colonialism in the Middle East, demonstrating that while facing these encroachments the Ottoman government was at the same time one of those powers that sought to subjugate the local population through the practices of colonial rule. In conquering southwest Arabia the Ottoman government sought to protect its southern flank against the designs of the European Powers, who following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 considered the Red Sea region an increasingly important area of imperialist expansion. Ottoman colonialism in Yemen shared important characteristics with its European counterparts, most particularly the legitimating concept of a civilizing mission. Yet it differed from British, French or Japanese forms of colonialism in that it was not based on the construction of racial hierarchies. Reflecting the place of the late Ottoman Empire in international politics and the empire's internal dynamics its most prominent feature was the unresolved tension between efforts at integrating the local inhabitants into an emerging community of Ottoman citizens and *culturally* sanctioned strategies of exclusion that were to ensure the continuity of Ottoman rule.

In a series of campaigns between the late 1840s and the early 1870s Ottoman military forces conquered large parts of southwest Arabia.[1] By 1873, soldiers and administrators had taken substantial steps towards organizing these territories as the new Province of Yemen (*Yemen vilayeti*), thereby continuing efforts of the central government to extend its control over the empire's Arab borderlands between the Fizzan and the Shatt al-'Arab. In addition to introducing "elements of the modern Ottoman state created by the *Tanzimat*"[2] these efforts included a process that has been recently identified by Ottoman historians as the *discursive* creation of difference, that is, the attempt to legitimate Ottoman rule by representing the local peoples as 'backward' and 'primitive' and thus in need of being 'uplifted' through the practices and institutions of the modern state. This process integrated a particularly Ottoman form of the civilizing mission as a key aspect of Ottoman governance of the empire's borderlands during the Hamidian and Second Constitutional periods (1876-1918).[3] However, the case of Ottoman Yemen sheds light on something that has been largely overlooked, namely the fact that the elaboration of a *rule of difference* was a crucial factor that enabled the imperial government to uphold its rule over some of these borderlands. This mode of governance was premised upon the distinctly modern assumption that a conquered population could be governed effectively if 'accurate' knowledge about their culture informed the strategies of the powers that be. It is the contention of this paper that this form of governance together with the categories of knowledge that were meant to sustain it constituted a colonial regime that displayed strong parallels to the ones we observe in parts of other modern empires. At the same time, however, I show that this regime emerged also against

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the background of an older Ottoman imperial legacy and within the specific context of Ottoman domestic politics marked by the complex transformations of government agencies and society from the early 19th century. Here, I argue, that through prolonged power struggles with local opposition movements and intense competition with other imperial powers in the region the Ottomans came to elaborate a form of governance in Yemen that relied critically on the creation and reproduction of difference: as we shall see, soldiers and administrators adapted modes of taxation, the judicial system, and military recruitment to what they perceived as the 'customs and dispositions' (*'adat ve emzice*) of the local people and in so doing confirmed and fixed the latter's cultural 'inferiority.'

The broader purpose of this paper is, therefore, to study Ottoman rule in Yemen within the context of 19th- and 20th-century colonialism and imperial expansion. In so doing, I propose a new approach to the history of the Ottoman Empire of this period. The scholarly literature usually portrays the Ottoman Empire during the last 120 years of its existence as the victim of European colonialism and imperialist expansion without exploring whether the Ottoman government at the same time might have pursued colonialist projects of their own. By suggesting that this Ottoman rule of colonial difference[4] in Yemen came to demarcate an entire province as an imperial borderland I also argue against the view that in the 19th and early 20th centuries "[w]e are dealing with an Ottoman imperialism without colonies but one which generated, in certain places and at certain times, colonial situations."[5]

The Ottoman Politics of Difference

The specificities of the Ottoman context meant that the boundaries that were thus established between the conquerors and the local population were markedly different from those that have been studied in the context of British, French, or Dutch colonial rule in West Africa, South- and Southeast Asia during this period. To be sure, in the case of Ottoman Yemen, too, creating difference meant leaving the normalizing project of the modern state incomplete in an attempt to uphold the rule of the conquerors over the local people. In other words, modern state practices and institutions that theoretically were to be applied throughout the Ottoman Empire with a view to creating a population of loyal citizens – for instance, census, cadastral surveys, conscription and a standardized judicial system – were eventually not implemented in Yemen for fear of provoking opposition to a degree that might jeopardize Ottoman rule over southwest Arabia. However, unlike western or Japanese colonial rulers Ottoman officials in southwest Arabia viewed culture, not race as the principal marker of difference: local 'backwardness' and 'savagery' were not perceived as innate, and immutable, but rather as a condition that could be overcome through the imposition of those norms of governance, education, and religious practice that the *Tanzimat* state defined as civilization.[6] Also, creating difference cannot be thought of as exclusion from liberal citizenship rights not least because for most of the period under study the autocratic regime of Sultan 'Abdülhamid II (r.: 1876-1909) denied these rights to the empire's population in general. Put differently, concepts of difference and citizenship that undergirded the elaboration of empire in, say, French West Africa, British India or the Dutch East Indies do not explain what these categories meant in the Province of Yemen. The case of Ottoman Yemen, therefore, requires us to think colonial difference differently.

The Ottoman politics of difference sought to achieve control over the indigenous population and, hence, to maintain Ottoman rule by organizing key dimensions of governance such as the creation of administrative divisions, tax collection, forms of conflict resolution or the recruitment of administrative and military personnel according to knowledge about local culture. Among the central elements of this knowledge were the notion that the locals were strongly attached to the

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shariʿa for resolving conflicts, that 'tribal leaders' and descendants of the Prophet Muhammad held the most prominent positions of authority in local society and that sectarian affiliation was perhaps the single most determining factor for people's political behavior. It was these politics of difference then that were instrumental in the making of the local elite that would take the reins of power after the Ottoman withdrawal in 1919. They were, therefore, critical in laying the foundations for the emergence of an independent Yemeni state during the inter-war period.

Territorial and Economic Expansion and Administrative Reforms

By 1870 Ottoman control of southwest Arabia hardly extended beyond a few coastal strongholds like Hudayda that had been seized from the 1849 onwards. By contrast, the highland regions east of the coastal plain (*Tihama*) were under the control of a number of local lords. Probably the most powerful among these were the *amir* of ʿAsir, the rulers of Jabal Rayma and of Jabal Haraz in the central mountain region between the Tihama and Sanʿa and the *amir* of Kawkaban northwest of Sanʿa. It was a series of military operations conducted by an Ottoman expeditionary force under Ahmed Muhtar Pasha between 1871 and 1873 that led to the disempowerment of these local lords and to the creation of the new *Yemen vilayeti*. With Sanʿa as its capital the new *vilayet* included the sub-provinces of ʿAsir, Hudayda, Taʿizz, and Sanʿa. Both imperial correspondence and the official account of the 1871-73 campaign (Ahmed Rashid's *Tarih-i Yemen ve Sanʿa),* suggest that the Ottoman government decided to re-conquer southwest Arabia for strategic and economic reasons. These, in turn, were connected to the larger context of the reforms that were meant to bring about an imperial revival under the auspices of the *Tanzimat*. By occupying the Yemeni highlands the government sought to create a buffer zone in order to prevent the British from extending their sphere of influence from the hinterland of Aden towards the Hijaz.[7] Securing control of the Holy Sites of Mecca and Medina had always been a crucial element of the Ottoman dynasty's politics of legitimacy. It had become even more important from the reign of Sultan ʿAbdülʿaziz (1861-1876) onwards when the rulers began to stress their role as caliphs and the Islamic character of the empire as part of their efforts to create a political climate of unity and cohesion against both external European encroachments and internal secessionist movements at home. At the same time, since the central government was always in need of funds to pay for an expanding bureaucracy, infrastructure and army under the auspices of the *Tanzimat*, seizing control of the rich agricultural areas in Lower Yemen and the northwestern highlands meant a substantial increase in tax revenues.[8] Finally, adding an estimated three million people[9] to the sultan's subjects must have seemed to military planners an important expansion of the pool of conscripts for the imperial army.

The conquest of Yemen should be seen as an example of what Louise Young with reference to the early imperialist projects of the Meiji regime in Japan has termed expansion 'in self-defense.'[10] Very much like the Japanese conquest of Korea and Taiwan in the late 19th century the conquest of Yemen was intended to make the empire safer against the encroachments of its European rivals and to enhance its position in the southern Red Sea region that since the opening of the Suez canal in 1869 was increasingly turning into an area of intense imperial competition. Like other modern imperial powers of the time, the Ottomans represented the subjugation of the local peoples as a mission to 'civilize' an indigenous population that was perceived as being culturally inferior to the conquerors. What distinguished the Ottoman civilizing mission was the singular notion that 'civilizing' the locals also meant turning them into good Muslims. In other words, local forms of Islam, particularly the Zaydi form of Shiʿism, were viewed as an important aspect of local backwardness and cultural inferiority.[11]

Moreover, a crucial characteristic of Ottoman ideas about 'civilizing' the population of southwest Arabia, in the early 1870s at least, was their inclusiveness. While its western counterparts integrated racial hierarchies into the institutional set up of the modern state 'civilizing' the indigenous population in the context of Ottoman Yemen meant turning them into loyal Ottoman citizens through the institutions and the homogenizing practices of the modern state.

There is evidence that Ottoman officials, encouraged by what had been a series of quick and decisive victories over many of the local rulers, were quite obviously convinced that this process of integrating local populations into the Ottoman state would be completed within a relatively short period of time. For instance, they created all those administrative structures in the new *vilayet* that, theoretically at least, could be found in every province of the empire. It was Muhtar Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman expeditionary force and first governor-general of Yemen, who emphasized in a report to the Grand Vizier from January 1873 that he had turned the Province of Yemen into an imperial province like all the others.[12] Similarly, while Ahmed Rashid represented the local population as culturally inferior to their conquerors he did not speak in favor of creating governmental structures that would formalize these perceived cultural hierarchies. More important, the fact that the new province was represented by two deputies in the first Ottoman parliament of 1876-78 is yet another indication that the government intended to treat the local population on the same footing as citizens from other parts of the empire.[13]

Throughout the 1870s, however, agents of the imperial government encountered serious opposition to their efforts at establishing key-elements of direct rule over the newly conquered province, which included the secular *nizamiye* court system and, more importantly perhaps, a level of taxation clearly above those that the local people had known under previous regimes.[14] Opposition was particularly strong among parts of the 'tribal' confederations of Hashid and Bakil in the highlands to the north of San'a and took the form of prolonged armed confrontations between these communities and Ottoman military forces. It was in response to these developments that senior Ottoman officials moved away from earlier perspectives on governing Yemen. Local power equations, they realized, made assimilation in the projected form unrealistic. Yemen, as an imperial borderland, quite obviously could not be governed like more central sections of the empire such as parts of Anatolia or the Bilad al-Sham where government influence was much stronger. Initially, these arguments were made primarily by the then governor-general of Yemen, Mustafa 'Asım Pasha, who called for the creation of a form of governance that would be in accordance with the 'customs' and 'dispositions' of the local population. Early examples of this new approach were the extension of forms of indirect rule to several local power-figures, who were appointed district governor (*kaymakam*),[15] the scaling down of the newly-introduced *nizamiye* court system, and the creation of locally recruited military units who were issued 'native-style' uniforms.[16] In the course of the 1880s decision-makers in San'a and Istanbul decided to postpone the introduction of key-elements of the *Tanzimat* state, such as census and cadastral surveys as well as conscription and the *nizamiye* court system until a time, as the official newspaper *San'a* put it in 1881, when the local people might "genuinely partake of the lights of civilization."[17]

Thus, faced with the realities of rule over an imperial borderland Mustafa 'Asım and many of his successors as *Yemen valisi* came to insist that the 'un-civilized' had to be ruled differently from the people in more developed parts of the empire until government-sponsored reform had moved them up the civilizational hierarchy. In so doing they adopted views very similar to those held by 19th-century British liberal imperialists such as John Stuart Mill. It is critical to note that both Mustafa 'Asım and Isma'il Hakki Pasha, his successor as governor-general, invoked the example of British governmental practices in India when they called for the introduction of a form of

indirect rule among the tribes of 'Asir and the recruitment of local infantry units that would be outfitted with native-style uniforms.[18] By adapting administrative structures and governmental practices to what they perceived as local conditions Ottoman administrators sought to maintain control over the recently conquered province. The idea was to identify the 'keys' to local society, as it were, its underlying principles and mechanisms of power.[19] These were then to be drawn upon with a view to elaborating a form of governance that would make Ottoman domination acceptable to the indigenous population and, thus, more secure. However, since they viewed the indigenous population as 'backward' and 'un-civilized' these adaptations formalized and reproduced perceived cultural hierarchies and created the effect of distancing the local peoples from their conquerors. What we observe, then, during the first two decades after the creation of the new Province of Yemen is a shift from the merely discursive creation of difference vis-à-vis the local population to the translation of these perspectives into an actual rule of difference.[20] It was during the following decades, till the eve of World War I that the contours of this rule of difference would be elaborated primarily through the conflicts between the Ottoman government and its local rivals, the Zaydi Imams and various European imperial powers.

Tax revenues and the local shari'a

It was largely the imperial attempt to extract as much tax revenues as possible from local farmers and also extortion on the part of individual officials that increased the following of several Zaydi Imams among the population of the northern highlands. Seizing not least upon the issue of taxation, they called for armed resistance to the Ottoman government on the grounds that it did not uphold the Sacred Law (*shari'a*) and, therefore, did not exert legitimate rule.[21] In the process, the Imamate and its idiom of a righteous order, embodied in the term *shari'a*, became a powerful platform from which to articulate opposition to Ottoman rule. This 'comeback' of the Zaydi Imams who since the 1840s had almost become *quantité négligable* in local politics, gathered momentum from the early 1880s.

Due not least to the serious challenge that the Imams began to pose to Ottoman rule over the northern highlands, administrators came to elaborate — in Brinkley Messick's words — "… a locally tailored shari'a politics of their own to counter that of the imams."[22] In so doing they sought to appear as legitimate Muslim rulers to the local population. It seems that it was in this context that governor-general Osman Nuri Pasha abolished the remnants of the *nizamiye* court system in 1887 and had them replaced entirely with *shari'a* courts.[23] However, government correspondence suggests that decision-makers in San'a and Istanbul viewed local attachment to the *shari'a* as a sign of backwardness.[24] Upgrading the *shari'a* courts was, therefore, a way of trying to appear legitimate to the 'un-civilized.'[25]

However, it was not only the Zaydi Imams who posed a challenge to Ottoman rule in Yemen. Since the mid-1870s imperial competition in the southern Red Sea region had greatly intensified. As a result, not only Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire but also Italy, and, to a lesser extent, France competed for spheres of influence in this area and from the Ottoman point view for the loyalty of the local population. A memorandum that was drawn up by Mehmed Ziya, a former district governor (*kaymakam*) in the southern coastal region of Yemen, in 1891 provides a good example of how seriously some officials took this issue.[26] During the two decades since the creation of the province, he claimed, the Ottomans had managed to alienate the local people through their methods of rule to a degree that the latter would refer to officials as "Christians" (*nasrani*).[27] According to Mehmed Ziya, this state of affairs threatened the Ottoman presence in Yemen because it made the local people highly receptive to the overtures of both the British and the Italians.[28] The reform measures that the former *kaymakam* proposed to address this situation,

such as the exiling of all 'tribal' leaders as a precondition for carrying out census and cadastral surveys and, hence, for determining more equitable tax rates,[29] do not contain any reference to the notion of governing in accordance with the *shari'a*. However, Mehmed Ziya's memorandum does raise the question of whether a failure on the part of the Ottoman government to come across as righteous Muslim rulers would lead locals to transfer their loyalties to the British, French, or Italians. In turn this question, too, we may argue, probably motivated Ottoman '*shari'a* politics' in Yemen.

Another, related dimension of the Ottoman quest for a form of governance that would draw on 'local' mechanisms of power was the assumption that local jurists, who were often descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, commanded great respect and influence in local society. Co-opting these *'ulama* in the hope that they would influence local inhabitants in favor of the government became an important priority within the broader attempt to make Ottoman rule acceptable to the indigenous population. Consequently, a substantial number of these legal scholars, who were often from an urban elite background, found employment in the Ottoman judiciary of the *Yemen vilayeti*. In fact, the personnel files of these employees that are kept at the Archives of the Mufti of Istanbul (Müftülük Arshivi) almost read like a 'who-is-who' of Yemen's prominent *'ulama* families.

In this connection it is interesting to note that whereas many of the jurists that are on record in the Müftülük Arshivi rose eventually to the rank of district judge (*kaza na'ibi*), they were almost never posted outside the Province of Yemen. Even if we take into account that many of them might have been reluctant to serve in places that were far away from their home province, the most plausible explanation for this practice appears to be that these men were useful to the government only as 'locals,' i.e., in the specific social setting where they could perform what was - according to administrators' perceptions - their characteristic role in local society. The very idea of establishing a 'School for Tribes' ('*Ashiret Mektebi*) in the 1890s followed, I would argue, the same logic of seeking to fix, contain, and order the local that was considered 'un-civilized' and 'troublesome'. The Istanbul-based *'Ashiret Mektebi* trained the sons of 'tribal leaders' from the Albanian-, Kurdish-, and Arabic-speaking parts of the empire for careers as civil servants, teachers, and military officers in their *home provinces*. The idea was to educate the 'natural leaders' of these local societies to be loyal, reliable servants of the government.[30]

Thus, it would seem that this perspective on local society accounts for the fact that the careers of officials from Yemeni elite families were so different from those of many of their peers from the Bilad al-Sham who often served outside their home provinces, including in departments of the central government in Istanbul or even in the Ottoman foreign service.[31]

The Da''an Agreement

Ottoman attempts to elaborate a form of governance in Yemen that would facilitate the ordering of the 'local' culminated in the political arrangements ushered in by the Da''an agreement that the government concluded with Imam Yahya in 1911. The agreement brought to an end more than two decades of armed conflict between government forces and supporters of the Imam and his predecessors. To an important degree, the accord recognized Yahya as an autonomous ruler under Ottoman sovereignty and established an Ottoman-Imamic condominium over the Zaydi-populated parts of the Yemen *vilayeti*. In this area justice was to be administered exclusively according to the Zaydi version of the *shari'a* with the judges being appointed by the Imam. Moreover, only taxes that were sanctioned by the *shari'a* were to be levied.[32] Further, against the principle of equality of all religious groups throughout the empire as laid down in the Ottoman

constitution, the Jewish community in the area under the Imam's jurisdiction was to be accorded the status of *dhimmis* or subordinate protected people in accordance with the *shari'a*.[33]

While with the Da''an agreement the Ottoman government accepted some of the most important political demands of the Imam, these new arrangements were clearly in keeping with government efforts to order, manage, and contain local society, carrying farther than before the formalizing of difference and the distancing of the soldiers and administrators from outside the province from the indigenous population. This is reflected in statements by high-ranking officials and in the Istanbul press, who referred to the new political arrangements and previous autonomy schemes as colonial and sometimes likened them to forms of indirect rule in parts of the British Empire.[34] There is evidence that a partition of the Province of Yemen along sectarian lines, into Shafi'i and Zaydi populated districts, had been discussed in government-circles since the 1890s.[35] Government correspondence suggests that already by the 1870s sectarian affiliation was one of those categories of knowledge through which officials sought to make sense of local society.[36] The fact that the Da''an accord reorganized the administration of the *Yemen vilayeti* along sectarian lines and not, as was supposedly the case in the British protectorates in the Aden hinterland, according to 'tribal' affiliation illustrates that by 1911 senior Ottoman bureaucrats and military officers had come to consider sectarian affiliation the most important category of knowledge for understanding the political dynamics of Ottoman Yemen.

These perspectives were certainly shaped through the conflict between the Ottoman government and supporters of the Imam. For instance, when in 1898 a number of tribal groups sided with the Imam even though their leaders had for a long time been allies of the government the then governor-general, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, remarked that among the Zaydis in Yemen attachment to the Imam — in other words: sectarian affiliation — was stronger than 'tribal' loyalties.[37] One of the key-factors that fueled this conflict was the quest of the Hamidian regime for Sunni-led Islamic unity under the sultan-caliph which often had aggressively anti-Shi'i overtones: decision makers in Istanbul and San'a perceived the Zaydi Imams as rival claimants to the caliphate and, therefore, as a threat to the regime's legitimacy that had to be eliminated – through cooptation if possible, by force if necessary. Ironically, it was, therefore, the very quest for Islamic unity that contributed in no small measure to the making of the rule of difference in Yemen. At the same time it is possible to argue that this focus on sectarian affiliation in connection with officials' perspectives on local society was also informed by forms of sectarian politics in Ottoman Lebanon and other parts of the empire, which emerged not least as a result of European imperial influence.[38]

Rule of Difference

Thus, in the Ottoman as well as in the British, French or Dutch colonial context, the rule of difference served the same purpose, namely to secure the conquerors' domination over a conquered territory and its population. Yet in the context of Ottoman Yemen difference was conceived in ways that differed considerably from how it was understood among the protagonists of these western European colonial powers. Amongst the latter, the difference between the European conquerors and indigenous peoples were believed to be permanent and unbridgeable. These notions of 'essential' difference became increasingly influential towards the end of the 19th century and drew primarily on racial theories that placed different groups and races in a hierarchy of progress that in turn was critical to policy formation within the colonies.[39] Ottoman writers and bureaucrats, by contrast, never abandoned the idea that their rule of difference in Yemen was only temporary. Most of them conceived of the hierarchies that supposedly separated them from the

local people in cultural, not in racial terms. These cultural hierarchies, so the argument ran, would eventually be erased once the government's civilizing mission was accomplished.[40]

In the context of French West Africa or British India the boundaries that were established through the rule of difference by and large separated citizens from subjects. With very few exceptions they kept the local population outside the confines of the nation to which the conquerors belonged and denied them the political rights that the latter enjoyed as citizens of France or the United Kingdom.[41] In the context of Ottoman Yemen, however, these distinctions are not easily made. For one, the peoples in the newly conquered territories in southwest Arabia acquired Ottoman nationality upon the creation of the *Yemen vilayeti*. Also, during both constitutional periods (1876-78 and 1908-18, respectively) the province was granted parliamentary representation even though the imperial government considered its local population 'uncivilized' and culturally inferior. At the same time, however, the absence of census, cadastral surveys, land registration, conscription and the *nizamiye* court system meant that the local people were clearly outside what from the government's perspective constituted the realm of civilized Ottoman citizens. Thus what characterized the Ottoman rule of difference in Yemen were not so much a dichotomy of citizens versus subjects but rather a hierarchy of citizens that assigned the local people the status of Ottomans of a lesser kind. It is this particular integrative exclusion that I have tried to describe elsewhere as 'colonial Ottomanism.'[42]

But did the fact that Yemenis were considered outside this realm and subject to the rule of difference lead to concrete forms of exclusion and disenfranchisement for the local population compared to other subjects in the more 'developed' parts of the empire? As we have seen there is evidence that the career perspectives of members of the local elites were far more limited than those of their peers from, for instance, the Bilad al-Sham. Also, it appears that the people of the *Yemen vilayeti* were at a disadvantage in matters relating to taxation and to the administration of justice. For instance, after governor-general Osman Nuri Pasha ordered the dismantling of the remaining *nizamiye* courts in 1887 the local Ottoman judiciary no longer included a court of appeal. Thereafter, all appeals had to be referred from the local *shari'a* courts to the office of the *Sheyhü l-Islam* in Istanbul. Government correspondence suggests that this arrangement caused immense discontent among the local population because it often took years before a case would be heard and brought to a conclusion.[43]

Throughout the period under study tax collection in most parts of the province took the form of military expeditions that would often force the rural population at gun point to pay. While many observers identified this demonstration and use of force on the part of local administrators and military commanders as one of the key reasons for wide-spread opposition to the imperial government, there is evidence that officials sought to justify this approach with reference to the supposedly lower civilizational status of the local population. In 1888, for instance, Tevfik Efendi, a former director of finances (*defterdar*) of the *Yemen vilayeti*, argued in a memorandum to the Council of Ministers that tax collection through tax collectors and gendarmerie, which he described as the standard procedure in other provinces, was impractical in Yemen so long as the local people had not been brought into the 'realm of civilization' (*daire-i medeniyet*).[44] The idea that ruling the 'uncivilized' necessitated a degree of state violence that would not be acceptable towards the more 'developed' peoples of the empire was even more clearly expressed in another memorandum drawn up at about the same time. Its author, an official in the governor-general's secretariat, went so far as to maintain that an armed confrontation in the context of tax collection was inevitable since not giving the tribesmen the opportunity to show resistance before paying up would be against their code of honor.[45] As early as 1875 the then governor-general, Mustafa

'Asım Pasha, had argued along similar lines, claiming that it was essentially the demonstration of superior force that was most likely to ensure the loyalty of the 'natives.'[46]

By the time the Da''an agreement was concluded, a series of large-scale uprisings led by the Zaydi Imams had greatly reinforced the notion among high-level Ottoman bureaucrats that Yemen was quite unlike any other part of the empire and more difficult to govern. By contrast, European colonial approaches towards managing 'savage' peoples appeared to be successful as the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1898 or the British experience in the hinterland of Aden seemed to confirm.[47] However, as we have seen, by this time Ottoman rule in Yemen was already based on a form of governance that relied critically on the formalization of perceived cultural hierarchies and, hence, the creation and re-production of difference. The regime that the Ottomans had come to institute in the context of competition with both their local opponents and rival imperial powers was colonial in all but name. The Da''an autonomy agreement allowed the Imam to consolidate his position against his local rivals and to launch his bid for the creation of an independent Yemeni state in the aftermath of World War I. In that sense, the Ottoman politics of difference contributed in no small measure to laying the foundations for the political order in southwest Arabia during the inter-war period.

Conclusions

I have argued that the Ottomans sought to sustain their presence in Yemen between the early 1870s and 1918 through a rule of colonial difference that shared many characteristics with European or Japanese colonial regimes in various parts of the world but differed from these in crucial ways. As we have seen, the specific shape of governance was due to Yemen being an imperial borderland where the Ottoman government faced competition not only from local leaders but also from various European Powers. A crucial element of the Ottoman rule of difference in Yemen was connected to the view among senior officials that maintaining the imperial presence in southwest Arabia made imperative the adaptation of key-institutions and practices of the *Tanzimat* state to local conditions. Quite obviously, local power equations left the government no other choice. This was not specific to Yemen. As recent work by Huri Islamoğlu and Eugene L. Rogan demonstrates, this institutional flexibility occurred in many parts of the empire where the imperial government sought to tighten its grip on local society during this period. However, what set Yemen apart from many other provinces was the degree of these 'adaptations.' In certain parts of the Bilad al-Sham, for instance, the government was indeed able to implement census, conscription, land registration or the *nizamiye* court system. By contrast, none of these institutions and practices could be introduced anywhere in the Province of Yemen, including in Hudayda and its environs where Ottoman rule had been reestablished as early as in 1839 – at a time when the government moved towards exercising more direct rule over parts of the Bilad al-Sham and present-day Iraq.

The government's precarious position in southwest Arabia, which seemed to necessitate this approach, was due not least to the fact that Yemen was geographically and historically a borderland of the Ottoman Empire. Both the terrain of the province itself but also its distance/remoteness from the capital Istanbul and the major areas of recruitment of the imperial army in Anatolia and the Bilad al-Sham made it very difficult for the government to project its power effectively in this part of the empire – despite steamships, the telegraph, and the Suez Canal. Yemen was indeed – as a senior official put it in 1910 – the empire's "south pole." More important perhaps was the fact that most of the region had not been part of the Ottoman Empire since the 1630s when the Qasimis, a local dynasty of Zaydi imams, had brought to an end the first period of Ottoman rule in Yemen. Following the expulsion of the Ottomans the Qasimi rulers

established an independent polity that was to last for the next two hundred years and that was not even nominally under Ottoman suzerainty. As a result, and very much in contrast to what occurred in Egypt or the Bilad al-Sham during this period, Yemen did not experience the emergence of a local Ottoman elite.[48] At the same time, particularly in the highland regions the population retained a strong memory of the period before the advent of Ottoman rule and, in the form of the Zaydi imamate, an alternative concept of legitimacy and authority. In the end, this notion of order proved immensely effective in galvanizing discontent with Ottoman rule into a powerful resistance movement. For these reasons, too, the agents of the imperial government found it extremely difficult to find acceptance for the institutions and practices of the *Tanzimat* state in this particular part of the empire.

Yemen being an imperial borderland in the geographical and historical sense we have to distinguish Yemen's continuing status as a borderland *within* the Ottoman Empire between 1872 and 1918. This status was formalized and confirmed through a specifically Ottoman rule of colonial difference and that produced the peculiar effect of what I would term 'an imperial borderland as colony.' As two crucial factors that accounted for the further elaboration of difference in Yemen and the fact that the province remained a borderland we have identified the competition with local leaders and various European Powers that the Ottomans were facing. As I have argued above, the granting of parliamentary representation in 1876-78 to members of the local elites might have reflected the hope on the part of the imperial government that the assimilation of the indigenous population would be accomplished within a short period of time. However, it is possible that this move was also motivated by the concern to ward off British designs on southwest Arabia. After all, in Rashid's view the conquest of 1871-73 had occurred just in time to prevent what seemed the imminent risk of the European Powers occupying Yemen. Thus, allowing a recently conquered province to be represented in the Ottoman parliament can be interpreted as a signal to both the British and the local elites. To the British it was meant to demonstrate that the Ottoman government was serious about reclaiming Yemen as an integral part of the empire and thus to give symbolic force to what had been made clear through the fait accompli of military occupation. To the local elites it might have been meant as a signal that they would be offered more of a stake in the Ottoman state than they could ever expect under British rule. When constitutional government was finally reinstated in 1908 the influence of both local leaders and European Powers in the region was arguably greater than ever before during the preceding thirty five years. This might explain why again parliamentary representation was granted to the local elites.

Finally, the Ottoman rule of difference in Yemen was also shaped by a number of factors that in turn reflected the particular position of the Ottoman Empire as an object of European imperial designs and encroachments. Among these we might mention the serious financial constraints that the government was facing as a result of its indebtedness to European creditors, and which limited its capability to project power in southwest Arabia. Similarly, the aggressive drive towards Islamic unity which alienated large parts of the Yemeni population was in many ways an attempt to achieve internal cohesion at a time when the Ottoman state was facing growing pressure from without and from within. Thus it is tempting to view the Ottoman rule of difference at one level as a political strategy of an embattled imperial power that tried everything to hold on to a dependency while its basis of power was unraveling under the pressure of its rivals. In its attempt to carefully balance unity and difference the imperial government was not so different from the French government in the 1950s that experimented with the introduction of an imperial citizenship in order to perpetuate its rule in West Africa, while at the same time maintaining a rule of difference.[49]

[1] I have discussed the idea of an Ottoman colonialism in Yemen in a number of talks and conference papers; for instance "An Ottoman Colony on the Arabian Peninsula? The Province of Yemen, 1872-1919," presented at the Department of History, SOAS on 12 January 1998. Parts of this essay draw on Thomas Kühn, "Empire Building and Islam: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1872-1919," *Items & Issues* 3, No. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 2002), 20-22. Earlier versions of this essay were presented on November 18, 2002 under the title "Empire in South-West Arabia: Ottoman Colonial Modernity and the Making of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, 1872-1934" at the Department of History, Yale University and on November 25, 2002 under the title "An Imperial Borderland as Colony: Knowledge Production and the Elaboration of Difference in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1914" at the Annual Meeting of MESA in Washington, D.C. For incisive comments on the idea of an Ottoman rule of colonial difference the author wishes to thank his fellow participants at a Middle Eastern Studies Ph.D. dissertation-writing workshop held at NYU on March 3, 2003. Thanks are also due to Bernard Haykel (NYU) and Jens Hanssen (University of Toronto) who read earlier versions of this paper but who are of course in no way responsible for possible mistakes. The SSRC IDRF and the American Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT) fellowship programs have provided funding for this research.

[2] See Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire. Transjordan, 1850-1921*, Cambridge 1999, 12 and, for an overview of these government efforts, 1-20.

[3] See, for instance, Christoph Herzog, "Nineteenth Century Baghdad Through Ottoman Eyes," in *The Empire in the City. Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber, Beirut, Würzburg 2002, 325; Thomas Kühn, "Ordering Urban Space in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1914," in Hanssen, Philipp, and Weber, *Empire*, 342-346; see also Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *American Historical Review*, 107.3 (June 2002), 768-796.

[4] The term "rule of colonial difference" was coined by Partha Chatterjee; see idem, *The Nation and Its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton 1993, 16.

[5] See "Introduction: Towards a New Urban Paradigm," in Hanssen, Philipp, and Weber, *Empire*, 8.

[6] See, for instance, Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton 1993, 18-22; Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize. The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930*, Stanford 1997, 78; Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, Cambridge 1994, 52-59.

[7] Ahmed Rashid, *Tarih-i Yemen ve San'a* [History of Yemen and of San'a], 2 volumes, Istanbul 1291h./1875, vol. 2, 256-258.

[8] Rashid, *Tarih*, vol. 2, 259, 361-355.

[9] Rashid, *Tarih*, vol. 2, 355, put the population of the new Province of Yemen at 2,25 million people. Since the Ottomans never carried out a census in this part of the empire population estimates varied greatly, sometimes reaching 4 or even 6 million inhabitants; see Idris Bostan, "Muhammed Hilal Efendi'nin Yemen'e Dair İki Layihası," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 3 (1982), 313, fn. 15.

[10] Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1998, 23.

[11] Rashid, *Tarih*, vol. 1, 275, 281, vol. 2, 253-256.

[12] Bashbakanlık Arshivi, Istanbul [= BOA]/Irade-Meclis-i Mahsus 1922, doc. 1.2, *layiha*, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha to Grand Vizier, 10 Kanun-i sani 1288/22 January 1873, 7-8.

[13] Jon Mandaville, "Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey: Ottoman Experience in Yemen," in *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*, ed. B.R. Pridham, London, Sydney 1984, 21.

[14] BOA/Sadaret Mektubi Mühimme Kalemi [= A.MKT.MHM.] 486-18, doc. 22, governor-general of Yemen, Mustafa 'Asım Pasha, to Grand Vizier, 15 Temmuz 1292/27 July 1876. It appears that the *nizamiye* courts were opposed for a variety of reasons. For instance, since they were supposed to replace forms of conflict resolution that had been mediated by 'tribal' leaders and/or local jurists the new courts threatened the position of these individuals in local society. Moreover, the fact that they applied criminal justice not according to the *shari'a* but according to the secular Ottoman criminal code rendered them unacceptable to many pious Muslims who perceived them as an infringement of their notion of a righteous order associated with the term *shari'a*. [Does that make sense?]

[15] See, for instance, the appointment of a certain Shaykh Fa'iz to the post of *kaymakam* of the Beni Shahr district in 'Asir; BOA/Irade-Dahiliye 64188, doc. 1.2, commission for the selection of district governors (*kaymakamların intihab komisyonu*) to Grand Vizier, 31 Temmuz 1295/12 August 1879.

[16] See Thomas Kühn, "Clothing the 'Uncivilized': Military Recruitment in Ottoman Yemen and the Quest for 'Native' Uniforms," in *Costume and Identity in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann, Istanbul (forthcoming).

[17] "Yemen Kavanin-i 'Atika ve Cedidesi," *San'a*, 40, 1 Temmuz 1297/13 July 1881, 2. It is clear from government correspondence from the 1880s and early 1890s that officials did not view the local population as having reached a high enough level of civilization to be 'ready' for conscription, census or cadastral surveys; see BOA/Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı [= Y.MTV.] 17-16, doc. 2, report, General Staff to Palace, 21 Rebi'ü l-ahir 1302/7 February 1885; BOA/Y.MTV. 46-119, commission of general military inspection (*teftish-i umumi-i 'askeri komisyonu*) to Palace, 19 Teshrin-i sani 1306/1 November 1890, 4; BOA/Yıldız Perakende Evrakı, Umum Vilayetler Tahriratı [= Y.PRK.UM.] 25-24, governor-general of Yemen, Ahmed Feyzi Pasha, to Palace, 24 Ağustos 1308/5 September 1892.

[18] See, for instance, BOA/Yıldız Esas Evrakı [= Y.EE.] 1-5, doc.2, Isma'il Hakki Pasha to Ministry of War, 11 Mart 1296/23 March 1880; BOA/Y.MTV. 8-26, doc. 3, Ministry of War, commission of military inspection (*teftish-i 'askeri komisyonu*) to Palace, 12 Kanun-i evvel 1297/24 December 1881, 1. BOA/Irade-Dahiliye 50932, doc. 3.2, governor-general of Yemen, Mustafa 'Asım Pasha, to Grand-Vizier, 20 Mayıs 1292/1 June 1876.

[19] There is, of course, no question of viewing Ottoman conceptions of 'the local' in the Province of Yemen as objective renderings of local realities or as mere inventions. It is, therefore, a central aspect of my research to explore how these conceptions were elaborated in a context that was shaped by the interaction of Ottoman officials with the local population and the inter-state competition that pitted the Ottoman Empire against its European rivals. In many ways, however, these two levels of interaction were connected and cannot be thought of as separate.

[20] To be sure, these differentiating practices were not unique to Yemen. As, for instance, Huri Islamoğlu and Eugene L. Rogan have demonstrated 'negotiation' and the readiness to adapt administrative blueprints to the realities of local power equations were part and parcel of attempts on the part of the imperial government to tighten its control over outlying parts of the empire. However, while at least in parts of the Bilad al-Sham provinces, for instance, census, cadastral surveys, conscription, or the new judicial system were implemented, none of this was ever achieved throughout the *Yemen vilayeti*. Cf. Rogan, *Frontiers,* 1999, 90-92, 184-187, 214-215. See also Huri Islamoğlu, "Property as Contested Domain: A Reevaluation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858," in *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East*, ed. Roger Owen, Cambridge/Mass., 2000, 3-61; Huri Islamoğlu, "Modernities Compared: State Transformations and Constitutions of Property in the Qing and Ottoman Empires," in *Shared Histories of Modernity in China and the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Huri Islamoğlu, Peter C. Perdue, Leiden 2001 [= *Journal of Early Modern History,* 5.4 (2001)], 353-386.

[21] See, for instance, Hans Kruse, "Takfīr und Ğihād bei den Zaiditen des Jemen," *Die Welt des Islams*, XXIII-XIV (1984), 447-448, 452-453.

[22] Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State. Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1996, 50-51.

[23] See also Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, London 1998, 51-52.

[24] See, for instance, BOA/Y.PRK.UM. 11-44, governor-general of the *Yemen vilayeti*, Osman Nuri Pasha, to Palace, 7 Mart 1304/19 March 1888. Thus what we observe is a tendency to 'localize' the *shari'a*, i.e., to view it as a quintessential element of local culture that was considered backward and inferior.

[25] These views, however, differed considerably from those of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha who in 1873 was intent on establishing the *shari'a* in Yemen as part of an Ottoman civilizing mission; see, BOA/Irade-Meclis-i Mahsus 1922, doc. 1.2, *layiha*, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha to Grand Vizier, 10 Kanun-i sani 1288/22 January 1873, 7-8. By contrast his superiors in Istanbul at the time considered adherence to the *shari'a* an integral part of local custom; cf. BOA/Irade-Meclis-i Mahsus 1705, doc. 5, no date. The considerable fluidity of Ottoman categories of knowledge on local society is an important point that I will explore in greater detail in my future work on Ottoman Yemen. Also it is interesting to see that the same Osman Nuri Pasha who viewed local attachment to the *shari'a* courts in Yemen as a sign of backwardness seems to have been convinced of the 'civilizing' influence of the *shari'a* courts in the Hijaz, see Deringil, *Domains*, 51-52. So far I have not come across Ottoman officials expressing this view with regard to the Province of Yemen for the remaining decades of the Ottoman presence.

[26] See BOA/Y.PRK.UM. 22-93, *layiha*, former *kaymakam* of Mukha (Mocca), Mehmed Ziya, to Palace, 27 Mayıs 1307/8 June 1891. The fact that copies of Mehmed Ziya's memorandum can be found in two other sections of the BOA (Y.EE. 9-12, doc. 1 and Shura-yi Devlet Belgeleri [= SD] 2261-17, doc. 20) suggests that it was widely circulated within the imperial government.

[27] BOA/Y.PRK.UM. 22-93, *layiha*, former *kaymakam* of Mukha, Mehmed Ziya, to Palace, 27 Mayıs 1307/8 June 1891, 1.

[28] *Ibid.*, 3.

[29] *Ibid.*, 4.

[30] For furher details on the *'Ashiret Mektebi* see Eugene L. Rogan, "*Ashiret Mektebi*: Abdülhamid II's 'School for Tribes' (1892-1907)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28 (1996), 83-107.

[31] See, for instance, Jens Hanssen, "Practices of Integration - Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire," in Hanssen, Philipp, and Weber, *Empire*, 72-73.

[32] The Arabic and Ottoman-Turkish versions of the Da''an agreement are reproduced in BOA/Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları [= MV.] 158-38.

[33] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution. The Young Turks, 1902-1908*, Oxford 2001, 298.

[34] According to Baldry, in the winter of 1908/09 the then grand-vizier Kamil Pasha was prepared to "discuss the possibility of autonomy 'on colonial lines'" for the Zaydi populated regions of the province with a delegation to be sent by Imam Yahya; see John Baldry, "Imam Yahya and the Yamani Uprising of 1911," *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli*, 42 (1982), 428. Sa'id Pasha, *Sa'id Pasha'nın Hatiratı,* 2 volumes, Dersa'adet, 1328/1911-12, vol. 1, 369-371; see also Isma'il Subhi, ed., *Salname-i Servet-i Fünun. Üçüncü Sene. 1 Mart 1327'den 28 Shubat 1327'ye*

kadar vakayiʻi muhtevidir, Istanbul, no date, 415. To be sure, the regulations of the Daʻʻan agreement provided for a greater presence of Ottoman government agencies in highland Yemen than would have been the case in territories under indirect rule in British India or Nigeria.

[35] Plans to partition the Province of Yemen along sectarian lines into Zaydi and Shafiʻi districts had been proposed for example by Sayyid Fadil Pasha, a Hadrami leader who advised the Sultan on Arabian affairs during the 1880s and 1890s, see BOA/Y.EE. 5-22, undated note by the palace secretariat [probably around 1890]; see also BOA/Y.EE. 8-20, doc. 2, Divisional General (*ferik*) Ferid Pasha's *layiha*, no date [probably drawn up in March 1907], 2 and a memorandum by the Austro-Hungarian Semitist Eduard Glaser, BOA/Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı [= Y.A.HUS.] 511-69, doc. 4, Glaser to Grand Vizier, 4 May 1907.

[36] See, for instance, BOA/Irade-Dahiliye 60761, doc. 1, governor-general of Yemen, Mustafa ʻAsım Pasha, to Grand Vizier, 15 Kanun-i evvel 1292/27 December 1876.

[37] See BOA/Y.MTV. 194-72, doc. 2, governor-general of Yemen, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, to Grand Vizier, 8 Eylül 1315/20 September 1899.

[38] See Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 2000, 7-10, 160; Isa Blumi, "The Social Parameters of Identity: The Role of Education in Albanian Identity Formation," in *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World*, ed. Ali Caksu, Istanbul 2001, 227, 230, 232.

[39] See the references under fn. 7.

[40] See Thomas Kühn, "Ordering the Past of Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1914," *Turcica*, 34 (2002) (forthcoming).

[41] Conklin, *Mission*, 74, 102-106; Metcalf, *Ideologies*, IX-X.

[42] See Kühn, "Ordering the Past of Ottoman Yemen."

[43] See, for instance, BOA/YEE 8-20, doc. 2, Divisional General (*ferik*) Ferid Pasha's *layiha*, no date [probably drawn up in March 1907].

[44] BOA/Irade-Meclis-i Mahsus 4087, doc. 3, former *defterdar* of the Province of Yemen, Tevfik Efendi, to Council of Ministers, 11 Shubat 1303/23 February 1888, 1.

[45] BOA/YEE 8-25, *layiha*, Shükrü Efendi to Palace, 10 Ramazan 1304/2 June 1887.

[46] BOA/Irade-Dahiliye 49751, doc. 6, governor-general of Yemen, Mustafa ʻAsım Pasha, to Grand Vizier, 2 Teshrin-i evvel 1291/14 October 1875, 2.

[47] See Kühn, *Urban Space*, 342-345. As we have seen earlier, already in the late 1870s Mustafa ʻAsim Pasha had spoken in favor of modifying Ottoman provincial administration in Yemen by explicitly referring to British administrative practices in India as a model to be emulated. However, Mustafa ʻAsım had wanted to introduce a colonial administration *à l'anglaise* only in the *sancak* of ʻAsir, whereas Ottoman officials during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) recommended this form of governance for the entire Province of Yemen; see, for instance, ʻAbdülgani Seni: "Her Valinin Derece-i Salahiyeti bir mi Olmalıdır?" [Should Every Governor-General be Invested with the Same Degree of Authority?] *Mülkiye*, 12 (1 Kanun-i sani 1325/14 January 1910), 34-38. This, too, gives us a sense of the degree to which the distancing of the local population from the officials from outside the province had progressed. How is this point demonstrated? Not clear. [What do you mean?]

[48] For this process see Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman Elites in the Middle East and North Africa (1700-1900)," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas*, eds. Ilan Pappé and Moshe Ma'oz, London 1997, 145-162.

[49] See Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940. The Past of the Present*, Cambridge 2002, 40-49.

Beyond the Margins of the Empire: Searching the Limitations of Ottoman Rule in Yemen and Albania

Isa Blumi[*]

Most studies on the formation of modern states, or more specifically, on the fall of multi-national empires, look at how reforms were imagined from the imperial center.[1] Almost all of these studies come to the conclusion that these imperial projects failed or succeeded according to the relative extent to which reforms were implemented.[2] While such studies play an important foundational role in the study of empires, their decline, and the creation of successor nation-states, they do not capture the complex ambiance of the period, or the intricacies of centerperiphery relations. The Ottoman Empire provides an important, but not unique, example of this late nineteenth century phenomenon.[3] An interesting way of demonstrating how the projection of Ottoman rule failed to materialize at the end of the 19th century is to focus on Istanbul's efforts to rationalize the regional economies of far off Yemen and Northern Albania. As in all modern empires, Istanbul was seeking to rein in regional economies, centralize their productive output and maximize much needed tax revenues. But instead of simply reviewing the institutions that implemented these economic reforms or profile those individuals who were so enthusiastically creating them, this paper will explore how a segment of the local population reacted to such ambitions. More specifically, it will trace how local merchants dealt with the changes in the world's cultural, economic and geopolitical order through economic and social practices that were to be deemed "illegal" by the states instituting these dramatic changes.
My conclusions have some comparative currency for our understanding of today's conflicts in areas experiencing equally traumatic and revolutionary economic and social change. To give an example, the nature of local efforts to survive the transformations of the period between 1870-1910 through smuggling networks, led to the development of a new political dynamic in these areas. This dynamic determined the fate of the entire region (some communities proved able to translate their relative economic strength into politically viable units of action).[4] In other words, communities able to adjust economically to the transformations also proved highly assertive in regards to projecting their collective political and identity claims in a matter that is often interpreted in contemporary parlance as "ethnic-nationalism."

What is of imminent importance to this discussion is the imperial context in which the period is situated. It is clear that the process of reform that swept not only the Ottoman Empire, but the whole of Europe (and as a consequence most of the world) had a tremendous impact on how we, in a self-professed "post-colonial" world, have studied the social and economic changes that occurred in places like Northern Albania and Yemen.[5] It is clear with hindsight that the largely globalizing ambitions of European/Ottoman reformers were constituted in localities like the vilayets of Ishkodra and Yemen through a variety of (often unsuccessful) impositions of imperial power. This power was expressed ideally through economic and fiscal mechanisms meant to maximize the economic performance of the territories. There is no doubt that such "reforms" became part of the daily vernacular of Ottoman bureaucrats and, in the process, left their traces in the archival records they left behind. That the ambitions of Ottoman reformers are reproduced prolifically in the resources historians have at their disposal does not necessarily mean, however, that we can assume these reforms were actually implemented.[6]

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Much of my interest in smuggling is determined by how locals in both Yemen and Northern Albania adapted to administrative changes which corresponded to new internationally imposed boundaries we find popping up at the time. This is a phenomenon unique to the period between 1878-1912 and corresponds nicely with my emphasis on observing dramatic change through a local perspective. A good way to do this is to study the relationship between an Ottoman state seeking to integrate what were now boundary areas in need of greater imperial military and administrative attention and an increasingly threatened merchant community whose livelihoods were irrevocably changed as a result of these new boundaries.

The Syntax of Territoriality

The creation of externally imposed boundaries in these territories was determined by a new era of diplomacy, which in itself represented an important innovation to how the state and its constituents would interact and harness the productive capacity of all of the modern world's tools of governance. The issue of boundaries proves particularly interesting here for it is in this decisively modern diplomatic field (informed by the "social sciences") that local perceptions of space and value, so vital to the effective functioning of any local economy, are categorically denied. One of the more remarkable effects of the modern imperial state and its changing imperial boundaries was that it often criminalized certain kinds of transactions and production patterns that were quite normal prior to the delineation of these borders.

Maps of Africa, Asia and the Balkans in particular began to take on a new form, shaped by modernist notions of social order based on a scientific understanding of race, ethnicity and faith. For the *vilayet*s of Ishkdora and Kosova, color-coded ethnic and sectarian maps segregated and, in a deterministic manner synonymous with the modern world, informed how the great powers would reconstitute state boundaries.[7] Much like with the Arabian Peninsula, technological and diplomatic changes in the world transformed much of Northern Albania into a strategic space of imperial contest by the middle of the 19th century. Northern Albania's economic lifeblood relied on the use of vast expanses of largely barren and highly seasonable landscapes to sustain flocks of sheep and proto-industries in wool, weaving and leather goods. After the Berlin Congress in 1878, these waterways, mountain passes and highland pasturelands became new sites of confrontation between Great Power interests (in this case those of Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and Britain) and thus attained new value to imperial administrators bent on building military outposts and "economically developing" areas of "unused" land along the Empire's frontiers.

What is ultimately at issue here, therefore, is an imperial context that was clearly working against a reality far removed from idealized visions of the world. It was assumed that these reforms could be implemented. Local conditions, however, required specific attention that was impossible from an Istanbul-based ministry because no one in the capital understood these areas. At another level, the ability to manage imperial policy by locally-based administrators was particularly difficult because of the underlying precept of "progress" and "modernity" being imposed from afar. As will be made clear below, the ideal economic policy that sought to enhance state revenues promoted by Istanbul-based bureaucrats simply could not be implemented as envisioned on the ground. As a result of conflicting administrative realities between the provinces and Istanbul was an inconsistent policy towards the economic (let alone political) development of Albania and Yemen. Istanbul, often not willing to concede its ideal and theoretically "sound" policy towards development and economic order ultimately hampered efforts by locally-based administrators to adapt to indigenous economic practices that always tried to circumvent state control. How this translated into the persistence of a fragmented Ottoman society with regards to who would benefit

from state reforms can be explored through a brief history of how the "illegal" trade in commodities such as, salt, rifles and political support from those conducting this trade, reflected the nature of economic relations in these two rapidly changing regions.

Little has been written about the powerful, most often family-based, networks of traders/transporters in these two areas. Despite their obscurity in the secondary literature, one can immediately find traces of them when investigating economic activities in, for instance, Northern Albania in both Turkish and Albanian archives. It is known that these Gheg Albanian families like the Bushatis, Saraçis and Çobas maintained long-distance trade links for centuries, connecting Shkodër and Ulqin (the port to the North of Lake Shkodër in Northern Albania), with Egypt, Malta, Tunisia and the Aegean Islands.

It is the activities of these commercial networks that make the Hamidian era such a dynamic period in Ottoman history and Shkodër itself was transformed as a result. The first consideration to keep in mind in this regard is the creation of the Montenegrin state in 1878. After much fighting and diplomatic gamesmanship, Ulqin, the other key port to the region's economy and the only one with open access to the Adriatic, was handed over to Montenegro. How this impacted trade on both sides can be best observed through the salt trade. After the Berlin Congress, the salt trade in Ottoman Shkodër was still formally centralized in the city's market where all legal transactions had to take place. This regime of formal control would, in fact, intensify during the reign of 'Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) and become a veritable obsession after 1908 with the Young Turk government. The logistics of the salt trade made it, at least in theory, easy to monitor as far as all transactions taking place in the market were concerned. There was a special alley in the Northwest end of Shkodër's central bazaar where the millions of kilograms of salt processed by Shkodër was supposed to be sold. Located on a continuation of Sokaku i tyfekçijve (weapons' street) the transactions were kept under close observation by both Ottoman officials and European "public-debt" officials who roamed the market during the credit crisis from the 1880s onwards.[8] It becomes clear upon researching the books of merchants, however, that trade between locals (Albanians and Slavs) no longer took place exclusively in market. To circumvent the increasingly intrusive inspections of a variety of customs officials and bureaucrats that raised the cost of their product, local merchants during the early 1880s developed alternative ways of supplying their long-term customers inland. According to the records, there was a system of distributing the salt to customers that did not need to go through the monitored market at all. Salt was unloaded from the port in Ulqin (now in Montenegrin hands) and transported by smaller boats from the Montenegrin shore of Lake Shkodër to waiting buyers inside Ottoman territory. This smuggled salt was immediately auctioned off to regional traders who frequently came to Shkodër to restore stocks for their own distribution networks. These regional traders would pick up the salt at a previously arranged area outside the market (often even beyond the city's limits as customs officials often guarded access roads). According to the records available, this salt "for locals only" was selling at rates considerably (*ma shume ygjyz*) below those available in market.[9]

These transactions were done of course without any official "knowledge" and represented the first stage of the smuggling process in Northern Albania during the tumultuous Hamidian years. Again, we know much of how this parallel economy worked through correspondence between local merchants.[10] In this connection it is crucial to note that despite the dramatic cartographic changes in the region, with Montenegro's independent state swallowing whole areas of Albanian-populated territories, the local merchant communities adapted. In this early period, the creation of a sovereign state out of formally Ottoman territory led to the establishment of a new route through which the Shkodër trading families could supply their customers. The trip the product

itself took had, in fact, not changed, but the internationally enforced boundaries in the area cut through these old routes, rendering any trade (and its potential tax revenue), in theory at least, legally inaccessible. That such trade was now supposed to be regulated and taxed as imported goods, was meant to encourage the redirection of shipments to Ottoman ports like Shkodër/Scutari or Durres further south.

The evidence presented above through reading through a small fraction of company records of, for instance, the Bushati and Saraçi families suggests that much of the transactions since the 1880s were taking place outside the market in this matter. What the transactions between Albanian traders outside Ottoman control also suggest is that there were at least two tiers of prices operating in Northern Albania, one that appeared in Ottoman books and another that had far more mobility and was often significantly lower than the Ottoman/European taxed equivalent. This has potentially important consequences to how we understand the political economy of the Ottoman Empire. If a second tier of prices existed, as I suggest, our conventional way of studying the economic history of the Balkans (and the Arabian Peninsula) would have to be changed.

Local Power: Articulated Adaptation in Smuggling

Let us now explore how this dynamic played itself out on the opposite ends of the Ottoman Empire. The amount of unmonitored traffic that went across their shared boundaries in the mountains down to Lahej in British occupied Yemen and ultimately Aden in Southern Arabia was a great concern to both the British and Ottoman Empires in the period between 1880-1907. How these modern empires perceived the type of economic traffic passing through these areas is indicative of an imperial mentality that was shared by all empires at the time. Administrative planners in Istanbul, Paris, and London assumed that imperial boundaries were to be fixed by treaties and as suggested in their cartographic representation, should be binding.[11] Locals, whether Albanian traders or Yemeni shepherds (i.e., the imperial subjects), would now have to live according to how the borders appeared on the map. So-called "tribal codes," and familial claims to pasture land once considered the most important currency of daily life in highland Yemen and Albania were now considered defunct. The creation of "state" boundaries, which would be 'policed' to prevent "illegal" use of these resources and the "illegal" entry/exit through these boundaries, as well as efforts to tax all "cross-boundary" trade represented a significant shift in how the state and local communities interacted. The nature of this change, while quite complex, can be summarized by noting how Albanian-speakers living along the newly created frontiers of Serbia/Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire had to often "choose" with which state to assert their loyalties (something that previously had little meaning in these regions) and more importantly, seek formal economic support. As I have recently demonstrated elsewhere, these communities not only manipulated the dynamic such boundaries created in regards to state administration of the regional economy, but were empowered by their relative importance to maintaining political (and economic) stability to the now strategically key region. This calculus is in itself an indication that things changed as a result of the new frontiers and local communities were forced to adjust to but not necessarily fold under such changes.[12]

Both along the Montenegrin and British Aden boundaries, as agreed by all states involved, elaborate regimes of boundary surveillance, customs controls and ultimately, "defense-networks" were erected.[13] The regulations concerning these networks of customs posts and garrisoned troops that fill the Ottoman archives did not only have meaning on paper. For locals who were suddenly faced with states that sought to enforce notions of territoriality alien to them and on which they were never consulted, these boundaries often constituted a threat to their interests. In

the *sancak* of Ta'izz in southern Ottoman Yemen, for instance, there were numerous examples of clashes taking place between the British, the Ottomans and locals as trade between Aden, the surrounding areas and Ottoman Yemen grew with the opening of the Suez Canal. This heavy traffic became a question of security for the two empires fixated on making territorial claims, and the long process of delineating the boundaries would take years (1872 to 1905) to terminate.[14]

What is again important here is that locals in the Albanian Alps and the region between Ta'izz and Lahej in Yemen actively challenged these imperial conceptions of territoriality by simply continuing with their economic lives only now adjusting to the realties of the new boundaries. When, for example, Ottoman and British troops in Yemen were charged to "secure" the boundaries of the respective empire that would entail restricting such traffic. Arresting those conducting "illegal" practices like "smuggling" or "illegally" crossing a territory without proper documentation, inevitably led to heightened tensions. For a group of Yemenis who were chased down by Ottoman troops as they "illegally" crossed into Ottoman territory from Aden in December 1905, the whole concept that they could no longer conduct trade with Hudayda itself seemed criminal.[15]

More critically, and as in the creation of mafias in the Balkans today, whose strength is largely based on their capacity to control "illegal" trade, a new dynamic was created in the process of modern state reforms, over which the state does not necessarily have any significant control .[16] .. In this case the concern shared by all powers in Shkodër and Yemen over the unmonitored traffic between frontiers would result in administrative adjustments,[17] which in turn created new economic spaces and opportunities for locals who could make the necessary counter adjustments.[18] These new spaces would ultimately, , transform the region's political, social, and of course socio-economic dynamic, determining the process of nation-building that transpired in the twentieth century.

Periods of Adjustment along the Frontiers

The dire conditions in Northern Albania after the mid-1880s at least, were largely a result of the dramatic forced movement of large numbers of Albanians from areas handed over to Serbia (the Ottoman province of Nis) and to a much lesser extent at this time, Montenegro (Ulqin). Crop production dropped dramatically and due to a large loss of land, as mentioned earlier, winter pasture became harder to find.

Factors such as these cause what I would term *periods of adjustment*, within which, locals must adapt to the conditions that arise and living conditions worsen. When these changes occur, a sort of reshuffling of local society takes place: a new economic and political order needs this transition period to articulate itself as something coherent and, ultimately, gets the historian's attention. Beyond respecting the local perspective when writing regional economic history, it is important to note how much these taxation schemes undermined Ottoman authority. These tax policies depended on the assumption that the borders could be policed and that officials would be loyal in their enforcement. Technological deficiencies aside, there is another important factor in these early years of the modern project that explains the success of smuggling. For both Yemen and Northern Albania, the Ottoman Empire's immediate neighbors - Britain and Montenegro - actively encouraged smugglers to pass through their territories.[19]

Much as old trade routes continued to be of considerable importance, despite the new boundaries, highland communities now straddling these borders would also make interesting adjustments that

reflected the immediate economic transformations created by the boundary. The border area around Tuz, located to the North-East of Lake Shkodër, became a key economic center for much of the Hoti, Gruda and Kelmendi hinterland area. According to sources, smuggled goods from Bar and Ulqin made their way to Ottoman territory through this fast developing border town rather than through Shkodër whose roads and ports were being increasingly guarded by European customs officials.

Importantly, the big Shkodër merchant families were not part of this new smuggling boom town/valley for reasons discussed below. As a result, many of the products traditionally sold exclusively at port towns began to be sold at lower prices by new merchant elites being created in and along the boundary of the new state of Montenegro. This phenomenon poses an interesting question about the impact of boundaries and needs to be fully studied throughout the Ottoman Empire. While more research still needs to be done, it is clear from Ottoman archives that rivalries were developing among those involved in the local economy of Tuz, leading to interesting and very subtle interchanges between the states involved, their corrupt officials and locals.[20]

As indicated by Franciscan priests working in the area of Tuz, large blocks of salt were always visible in shady shops filled with smuggled Italian wine, guns, ammunition and Russian canned meats. Clearly these imported goods were still being shipped in, but it appears that new suppliers were feeding the highland regions. Again, two things are important to understand here. There was a shift of power in the local economy, new relationships were being created around these new trade routes and it appears that Shkodër was becoming isolated from areas traditionally resourcing the city for trade. Networks operating inside Montenegro, which was expanding its trade with Serbia and Austrian-held Croatia, were now almost exclusively supplying Western Kosova, Yeni Pazar and the Malësore. This suggests that new players were becoming involved at the expense of the older ones. Moreover, it seems that as a result of the new borders, Ottoman aspirations to control the region's economy were exasperating the isolation of this part of the empire, resulting in sociological changes that would forever change the region.

Similarly, in the border area between Lahej and Ta'izz in Yemen there is evidence that the new boundaries and their increased policing by the British and the Ottomans after 1904 led to a rise of a new economic elite that had strong links with what would later be the ruling class of an independent Yemen dominated by Imam Yahya. This merchant elite who maintained a foothold in a series of strategic posts linking Ta'izz, Mukha and various Red Sea ports made their fortunes by controlling lucrative smuggling routes that were used not least for the shipment of salt, whose prices were skyrocketing in the first decade of the 20th century due to Ottoman isolation and blocked off ports.[21]

Here, the strategies of the British and Italians to economically strangle the Ottomans out of Yemen explain a lot about how successful or unsuccessful state-building projects can be. While by the 1890s, Prince Nicholas I and the Ottoman State were eager to "downsize" the Albanian trading magnets, in Yemen, Britain after 1904 actively sought to influence life in Ottoman Yemen by granting exclusive and very lucrative access to the outside world. These same privileges transformed political life in Yemen as power shifted to merchants who became chief claimants to both the imamate and post-Ottoman Yemen.[22] What happened with the trade in salt, therefore, can be considered symbolic of the general contingencies of regional trade, which at this time made it impossible for Istanbul to confine economic activity to regulated channels. The fact that British agents in Aden and more and more trade through the Eastern regions of Hadramawt were

bringing smuggled salt, along with weapons and gold into Yemen suggests that the Ottoman Empire was incapable of dealing with the aspirations of its imperial rivals and the economic rewards of supplying the persistent demand for access to the outside world.

Conclusion: A Failure of State

A number of factors assured that the devolution of empire would take the turn it did in the Hamidian period. Both cases suggest that there are dramatic consequences to the integration of modern notions of territoriality and the centralizing mission of the late 19th century Ottoman Empire, not only to the present conditions of the inhabitants, but also to their future capacities to adjust to developments. It was clear that the ambitions of Istanbul's bureaucratic elite could not correspond on the ground in two of its provinces, resulting in the extensive development of a complex parallel economy, which specifically sought to avoid state-building measures.

Part of the problem clearly arose when the Ottoman State attempted to impose a system of regulations that required an extensive bureaucracy that it simply could not provide. In the end, due to lack of manpower and the invariable sophistication of local populations, imperial reformers endangered their ability to maintain any meaningful presence in their distant territories. The more successful examples of imperial rule are considered a success when administrators incorporated locals who at times demonstrated a willingness to play the role of the imperial intermediary. More often than not, unfortunately, including locals and allowing for local knowledge to dictate the nature of economic policy clashed with the imperialist ambitions of modern men running modern states. For the Ottoman Empire, failed by a world filled with enemies and a largely understaffed and often incompetent bureaucracy, its hold on Northern Albania and Yemen proved to be the lingering reminder of failed ambitions and in the end, a significant drain on its limited resources.

The documents of Ottoman bureaucrats would disguise the realities the best they could. Their trade data were always precise and took on the appearance of order. But the level of smuggling taking place beyond the control of Istanbul fueled political and social forces that would at a later stage ignite the regions into zones of war and ultimately, territorial conquest by neighboring, newly formed nation-states. The Balkan Wars of 1897 and then 1912-1913 as well as the Italian-Ottoman War of 1911 provide good examples of this process.

What all this means is that we historians must be very cautious when we study state records. It is clear from my work in a variety of archives that Ottoman officials were not familiar with the areas they were administrating and were clearly shut out of the business of the street so to speak. Ottoman state records may not, therefore, be the best source for economic historians eager to study local economic life and may be misleading for those seeking more micro-causalities to the devaluation of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman officials lacked the kind of intelligence-gathering resources and networking that the Catholic Church and the Austrian-Hungarian consul, for instance, appeared to have in Northern Albania. That the Church and the Austro-Hungarian consul had much more reliable sources of information, attests to the fact that both entities largely supported the "parallel" activities out of which local life arose. Ottoman records contain relatively little of this type of information beyond the exposition of its repression of locals (arrests, confiscation, troop movements). This suggests that the Ottoman Empire was truly an occupying entity with little or no long-term capacity to maintain control of these border areas.

[1] The author would like to thank the staffs at the state archives in Albania (AQSH), The Public Record Office, Kew (PRO) and The Prime Minister's Archives in Istanbul (BOA). Funding for research has been provided by the SSRC IDRF and Near and Middle East Dissertation Fellowship programs and the Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Fellowship

[2] Çağlar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire" in *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires*, eds. Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, Boulder 1997, 30-44.

[3] For the Italian case and a good survey of the larger theoretical context of the time, see Pietro Pezzino, *Il paradiso abitato dai diavoli: societa, élites, istituzioni nel Mezzogiorno contemporaneo*, Milan 1992, 96-102.

[4] I outline this process for the Southern Albanian frontiers in respect to the emergence of education during the same period in Isa Blumi, "Teaching Loyalty in the Late Ottoman Balkans: Educational Reform in the Vilayets of Manastir and Yanya, 1878-1912" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, XXI.1/2 (October 2002), 15-23.

[5] For an excellent study on this process see Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," *American Historical Review*, 100.4 (1995), 1034-60.

[6] For an early example of Ottoman notions of their imperial duty to reform highland Yemen see the enclosed letter written by the Ottoman Embassy in London and sent to the Foreign Office there. PRO/FO 78/2754, 28 January 1874 [76].

[7] See for instance the ethnographic maps drawn up by various cartographers in Lumo Skëndo [Mid'hat Frashëri], *Albanais et Slaves* (Avec Neuf Cartes), Lausanne, 1919.

[8] See for example, reports from the Austrian consul in Northern Albania in 1901, T. Ippen who notes the strong role French traders cum customs inspectors play in the regulation of the local market. AQSH F.143.D.33.f.11-14, dated Scutari 17 May 1901.

[9] See the correspondence between a local employee of the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Shkodër and Catholic priests who then reported back to their Archdiocese; AQSH F.143.D.32.f.12-32, dated variably between March 1883 and January 1886.

[10] Examples of this correspondence have been collected in Hamdi Bushati, *Shkodra dhe Motet: Traditë Ngjarje Njerëz*, 2 volumes, Shkodër 1998, vol. 2, 451-54.

[11] An important contribution to this aspect can be found in Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan eds., *Border Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on Frontiers*, Lanham, MD 1994.

[12] For elaboration, consult, Isa Blumi, " Contesting the Edges of the Ottoman Empire: Rethinking Ethnic and Sectarian Boundaries in the Malësore, 1878-1912," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35.2 (May 2003), 237-256.

[13] See William N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After*, London 1938, 162, 192, 221; see also the extensive reports presented to the Porte by Yusuf Ziya Pasha, BOA/Yıldız Esas Evrakı [= Y.EE.] 7-23. Compiled by Istanbul on 24 Ramazan 1303/27 June 1886.

[14] For full details consult Isa Blumi, "Reconsidering the Social History of Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1918" in *New Research Agenda in Saudi and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives on the XXth C.*, eds. Robert Vitalis and Madawi Al Rasheed, London 2003 [forthcoming].

[15] There are frequent reports of communities that had previously been allies and were now at odds with each other, providing an opportunity for Ottoman officials to pit those local communities against one another. See for example, BOA/Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı [=Y.A.HUS.] 501/27, dated 3 Safer 1324/30 March 1906.

[16] They work by basically excluding those who cannot pay the "fees" needed to access the untaxed goods whose supply they control.

[17] See BOA/Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları [= MV.] 22/58, 10 Zilka'de 1304/July 1887 on a discussion taking place within the Istanbul-based Council of Ministers (*meclis-i vükela*) about recent cooperation with Serbia to stop cross border raids.

[18] For an argument as to how this impacts communal identities see Peter Wade, *Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Colombia*, Baltimore 1993, 29-37, 54-59.

[19] In Yemen, Britain was eager to supply factions willing to fight against the Ottoman army during an eventual war and seemed content with maintaining open transport routes to assure when such contingencies arose, they would be ready. On details of British shipments of money and weapons by both land and sea, consult PRO/War Office [= WO] 95/163825, 18 October 1915, Report from Political Resident, Aden, D.G.L. Shaw, Major-General to Residency, Cairo, "The War: Egypt, Turkey."

[20] For how one Franciscan priest described this changing order of local life to an Austrian official, consult AQSH F.887.D.126.f. 21, dated 24 April 1892.

[21] For the emerging urban elite in Ta'izz who would later form alliances with Imam Yahya, see Isa Blumi, "To Be Imam: Empire and the Quest for Power in Ottoman Yemen during World War I," in *Ottoman Civilization*. Vol. 1, eds. Halil Inalcık, Stanford Shaw et al., Istanbul 2000, 134-153.

[22] In a revealing if poorly analyzed study of Italian activities in Yemen, Marco Lenci demonstrates the extent to which Italian pressure on Ottoman officials to grant special trading rights to merchants originating from Italian-governed Assab and Massawa is indicative of this approach. See Marco Lenci, *Eritrea e Yemen: Tensioni italo-turche nel mer Rosso, 1885-1911* Milan 1990, 71-84 and 127-141. I outline these points in regards to the impact British support had on Muhammad Idrisi's capacity to attract Zaydi supporters in Isa Blumi, *Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen, 1878-1918,* Istanbul 2003, chapters 3 and 4.

A Break in the Storm
Reconsidering Sectarian Violence in Ottoman Macedonia during the Young Turk Revolution

By Ryan Gingeras[∗]

During the spring of 1908, Mantush Hussein and Osman Hasan were found dead and their houses burned to the ground in a village located near Üsküb (or Skopje), the contemporary capital of the Republic of Macedonia. According to one gendarmerie report, the two men had previously stolen some cattle from the neighboring Macedo-Bulgarian village of Kozbunar and were most probably the victims of an act of vengeance.[1] Seven days later, a party of Macedo-Bulgarians was ambushed in the valley of Shipkovitza, leaving four dead. Recognizing the men as inhabitants of Kozbunar, local gendarmes attributed the murders to Albanians avenging the attack on Mantush Hussein and Osman Hasan.[2] Later that year, a soldier native to the town of Tikvesh (contemporary Kavadarci in the Republic of Macedonia) stabbed a young Christian boy to death after refusing to pay his bar tab. Five days later, the soldier's father was found murdered in his garden, leading the Muslims of the town to close their shops and remain indoors for fear of a massacre.[3] Each of these acts of murder and carnage represents the violent current running through Ottoman Macedonia during the turn of the century. For the investigating gendarmes and their superiors, the crimes committed were the result of inherent sectarian tensions found throughout the region. However, when assuming a broader focus, this spiral of violence reflects the instability and dissonance that accompanied the transformation of many of the Ottoman borderlands during the last century of the empire's existence.

During the first decade of the 20th century, a growing crisis in the Macedonian provinces of the Ottoman Empire (namely the *vilayet*s of Üsküb/Kosova, Manastır, and Selanik) had all the makings of Mount Lebanon between 1840 and 1860 or Eastern Anatolia during the 1890s. With the decline of law and order, paramilitarism was rampant as the Great Powers of Europe, as well as the new Balkan states, actively intervened on the behalf of the warring factions. As a result of these internal and external pressures, the Ottoman central government seemed increasingly unable to stem the tide of violence and integrate the Macedonian hinterland into the "reforming" imperial state. In the summer of 1908, the Young Turks, a group of dissident army officers, presented themselves as the solution to the disorder and instability in the empire. While predicated upon a political philosophy formulated outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire, the Revolution of 1908 directly addressed the affairs of the Ottoman state through the mobilization of its citizenry, which in the context of Macedonia meant its Muslim population. In this regard, it is essential to understand the provincial politics of Ottoman Macedonia in order to comprehend the bedrock of popular support of the Young Turk movement.

The goal of the following paper is to provide a brief case study of intercommunal violence in Ottoman Macedonia during the year 1908 and the relationship between the growing opposition to Sultan 'Abdülhamid II (r.: 1876-1909) and Muslim Macedonians from whence the Committee for Union and Progress sprang. This work is by no means meant to be a comprehensive study of the Macedonian Muslim community and its interactions with Ottoman society as a whole. Rather it is my intent to render a better understanding of the Muslim experience in Macedonia within the context of the two most dominant sources of conflict in the region: intercommunal violence and

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the Ottoman modernization movement. By simultaneously confronting these local and imperial sites of tension through the lens of multifarious Muslim combatants, a more refined, complex understanding of Macedonia's place within late Ottoman history will emerge.

I have knowingly left many issues unaddressed in this paper. Moreover, through the use of Western gendarmerie reports, I acknowledge that the imperial Ottoman voice has been noticeably left out of this discussion. Yet it is my hope that this piece may serve as a point of departure for further work on both the evolution of Muslim societies in the Balkans as well as popular involvement in the Young Turk movement.

Roots of the Conflict

The roots of the Macedonian conflict, or indeed civil war, can be traced to the transformation of the Ottoman state during the late 19th century. In the aftermath of the *Tanzimat* reforms of 1839-1876 and the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, provincial politics in the southern Balkans attracted greater attention in both Istanbul and among the European Powers. Viewing the region as an economic and strategic site of expansion, the Great Powers took a growing interest in the issues of ethno-national "restoration" among the Christian peoples of Macedonia. Conversely, the Sublime Porte found itself on the defensive, promising greater administrative and civil reform in the region under the rule of religious equality. As a contest not restricted to the chambers of power, this imperial conflict assumed concrete dimensions in both town and country throughout the European provinces (*vilayet*s) of the Ottoman Empire. As part to an effort to redefine the relationship between state and society, the imperial center also endeavored to strengthen its control over its periphery through the introduction of new imperial courts and taxation methods. Particularly important in this regard was also the establishment of new imperial and foreign (often ecclesiastical) institutions of learning in the southern Balkans, which emerged as an important battleground of loyalties and ideas during the second half of the 19th century.

The provincial politics of Macedonia was further altered at the turn of the century with the proliferation of permanent, armed bands (or *çetas*) throughout the region. Historically, brigandage had been an endemic problem in the Balkans since the 18th century, yet was devoid of any nationalist ideology.[4] However, the nationalist 'paramilitary' groups of the late 19th and early 20th centuries represented a newer, more articulate medium of resistance to imperial centralization. Among the largely Christian intelligentsia who comprised the leadership of the various nationalist movements, the *Vûtreshnata Makedonska Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia* (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), or the VMRO, was the model subversive organization in the southern Balkans. Founded in 1893, the VMRO, a group comprised largely of Ottoman citizens, undertook a guerrilla campaign in an effort to agitate the Exarchist population towards the goal of creating an autonomous, "Christian" province out of the Macedonian and Thracian *vilayet*s. The VMRO's initial separatist campaign proved unsuccessful with the failure of the Illinden Uprising of August 1903, which led to the physical devastation of their base of support in the *vilayet* of Manastır. In the aftermath of the uprising, multiple 'paramilitary' groups arose among the Christian factions throughout the provinces, each attempting to partition the Macedonian countryside along sectarian lines. With the exception of certain Macedo-Bulgarian groups aligned with the VMRO, these bands were largely raised and funded by each of the neighboring states.[5] In response to this rise in internal unrest, Russia and Austria-Hungary proposed a program of gendarmerie and judicial reform to the Sublime Porte in 1904. Under the so-called Mürzsteg reforms, Ottoman security forces were reorganized and supervised by Italian, British, French,

Russian and Austro-Hungarian officers based in respective "zones" throughout Macedonia. However, by 1908, little progress had been made in stemming 'paramilitary activity.'[6]

January to July 1908: Reconsidering Sectarian Violence

Between 1 January and 31 July 1908, there were 976 acts of violence in Macedonia, a sum nearly surpassing the total number of casualties for the whole of 1907.[7] Of this number, 224 involved Muslims (either as victims or as assailants). While representing more than half the population, "Muslim crimes" equate to only 23 percent of the total crimes committed (See Table 1).[8] Considering the prominent role Muslims would take during the Young Turk revolt that summer, the seeming passivity of this segment of the Macedonian population is curious. Were Muslims, as the numbers suggest, largely passive during the conflict? Recent historiography has yet to reach a consensus on this point.[9] To unravel this disagreement, I believe one must look closely at the gendarmerie reports of the period.

Table 1: Casualties, January-July 1908

Perpetrators	Total numbers of Muslim victims
"Bulgarian" (Exarchist)	38
"Greek" (Patriarchist)	7
"Serb" (Serbian Orthodox)	1
Unknown	62
Muslim	21

Victims	Total numbers of murders committed by Muslims
"Bulgarian" (Exarchist)	78
"Greek" (Patriarchist)	11
"Serb" (Serbian Orthodox)	6

Total number of casualties during January-July 1908 (all parties): 976 (1123 including engagements between security forces and native combatants).

From their consular offices in Üsküb, Manastır and Selanik, European officers sent out monthly reports, compiled by the local gendarmerie, cataloguing the crimes committed in their respective *vilayet*s. Their bulletins consist of a paragraph of opening remarks, followed by an index of crimes committed during the calendar month with the crimes being categorized according to the ethnic affiliation of the persons involved. We are also provided with a list of crimes committed by unknown perpetrators and casualty lists of actions between bands and security forces. In the descriptions of some crimes, the perpetrators are specifically identified by name. In most cases however, acts are simply attributed to a specific ethnic group. In general, the crimes listed include murder, assault, arson, kidnapping and theft. Some descriptions are accompanied by anecdotes related to the crime, down to the number of stab wounds a victim received. Others give no such information. While thorough, these reports cannot be read uncritically. In addition to the errors that "creep in", the imperial interests of Western gendarmes and consuls do underlie many of their observations.[10] It is also unclear to what degree the ethnic categorization used in these reports can be trusted, since European observers were reliant upon local interlocutors who may have had their own political agendas. Nonetheless, these police records provide a valuable "on the ground" account of the violence afflicting Macedonia during this period.

According to British police records, of the 132 known acts of inter-communal violence that involved Muslims, 107 also involved Macedo-Bulgarians. The remaining 25 are consigned to intra-Muslim disputes or Muslim clashes with Greek or Serbian bands. Considering the inherent factionalism of the violence in Macedonia, why would Muslim "hostility" appear to be directed against one group and not more dispersed among the various competing groups?[11] It is here that the details of the gendarmerie reports provide a clearer picture of the sectarian violence.

In surveying the general scale of 'paramilitary activity,' dramatic differences in the nature of the atrocities carried out in Macedonia surface. Over the course of the first seven months of 1908, both Greek and Macedo-Bulgarian *çeta*s launched several large-scale attacks on enemy villages, often leading to a general massacre of the inhabitants. While the majority of such occurrences concerned Greek raids on Exarchist villages, such as the assault on Dragosh in Manastır, there is only one report of such an assault on a Muslim village.[12] During the course of 1908, there is not one reported case of an attack on a Christian settlement by a large Muslim force. In every case of murder and assault by a Muslim party, the victims were few in number. In most cases, the perpetrator acted alone or with few accomplices. The only incidents of large-scale Muslim actions emerge in instances of brigandage, kidnapping or blood feuds.[13] However, this does not mean that individual Muslims did not take part in such large-scale attacks. In several accounts, gendarmes report that Muslims in Manastır and Selanik *vilayet*s were actively aiding Greek paramilitary actions against Macedo-Bulgarian settlements.[14] In a memorandum to Ambassador O'Conor, a British gendarme quotes an Italian officer from Ohrid to the effect that despite the small number of Greeks in the area, allied Muslim and Patriachist paramilitaries in the town had committed themselves "to the decimation, if not the extermination," of the Macedo-Bulgarian population in the *kaza* (county).[15]

In a conflict generally considered by contemporary historians to be sectarian in nature, this alliance between Muslims and Greeks seems contrary to expectation. Why would Muslims choose sides in a conflict between two paramilitary groups that seemed to be exclusively Christian? The answer I believe lies in the complexities of politics and society of southern Manastır and western Selanik. According to contemporary reports, the population of southern Macedonia was largely divided between Muslims and Exarchist Christians, with only a small Greek minority.[16] It was in the environs of Ohrid and Manastır that the VMRO found its traditional base among the Macedo-Bulgarian community since the end of the 19th century. During the Illinden Uprising of 1903, Greeks and Muslims bore the brunt of the VMRO insurgency. In the aftermath of VMRO's defeat, Greek and Muslim notables banded together in opposition to the Exarchist takeover.[17] However, this coalition of Muslims and Greeks should not be viewed as an enterprise of two equal partners. While acting as guarantors of security for both Greeks and Muslims in the region, the government in Athens employed these collective bands to promote their own nationalist vision of a Hellenic Macedonia. In this regard, one must distinguish between the immediate political interests of Muslims in Manastır and Selanik and the long-term political goals of their Greek patrons in Athens. Muslims, it appears, were ready to form alliances across sectarian lines in the face of a shared threat to the status quo. At the same time, however, they seemed to have taken less of an interest in the fighting in northern Üsküb since most clashes there were confined to exchanges between Serb and Macedo-Bulgarian forces. Both of these theatres of action reveal Muslims to be less driven by any innate hostility towards Christian groups, but more concerned with maintaining the post-Berlin Conference "status quo". Muslim involvement in the violence plaguing Macedonia must therefore be understood as the product of several conjectural factors and not as an element of some innate sectarian conflict.[18]

The intercommunal violence played itself out very much in a provincial setting, with families, neighborhoods, villages and districts pitted against one another. From what can be gathered from the documents, since most acts are reported without stating the identity of perpetrators and victims or without giving an explanation for the crime, it appears that most killings or assault were acts of personal vendetta. Again, the majority of crimes concerning Muslims involved Macedo-Bulgarians. In most incidents, the assailants either knew their victims or they were acting out of revenge for crimes previously committed by a neighboring group as was the case with the deaths of Mantush Hussein and Osman Hasan. Of the remaining crimes committed in Macedonia, whether acts of theft and kidnapping (of which there were only seven) or intra-Muslim disputes, the causes were most certainly provincially rooted. Given the economic hardships of the period, such crimes would not have been uncommon for most of the Ottoman Empire regardless of the local religious or ethnic divisions.[19]

Considering the currents within this intercommunal struggle, how did the violence facing Muslims influence their decision to support the Committee for Union and Progress's revolution? The answer I believe is closely connected with the issue of physical insecurity in the Macedonian provinces. In addition to cataloguing the crimes committed in the region, British consuls frequently commented on the failure of the Mürzsteg reform program.[20] In this connection, they mentioned the already existing tension over the possibility of invasion and partition and the fact that local Muslim inhabitants were categorically against the idea of Christian gendarmes (be they foreign-born or locally recruited) administering justice in "a Muslim land".[21] This prejudice towards "foreign" influence did not exclude the machinations of the Porte, who labored unsuccessfully to impose new imperial courts under the aegis of modernization. This can been seen in the fierce resistance to centralized forms of justice in the town of Debra in western Manastır.[22] Adding to the decline of security was also the gradual decay in the morale and effectiveness of the Ottoman military presence in Macedonia. As Istanbul struggled to keep account of expenses, soldiers in the Ottoman Third Army in Macedonia often went unpaid. This problem became especially acute in 1908, leading to a mutiny of troops based in Üsküb in late May.[23] To complicate things further, a fresh wave of recruits took their post in the spring of 1908, adding to the disarray in the ranks (since units had to be reorganized) and military ineffectiveness (since units were often inexperienced or insubordinate).[24] These difficulties confronting the army must have been more than apparent to the Muslim population of Macedonia (especially since so many officers and men were themselves natives of the region). All of these contemporary dilemmas helped to exaggerate such locally perceived problems as corruption and incompetence among some Ottoman provincial officials.[25]

In this light, the relationship between the Committee for Union and Progress and the local Muslim population of Macedonia in the spring of 1908 takes on greater definition. As an organization comprised of individuals who were well familiar with the activities of Christian paramilitaries, the CUP saw the "band" as the only viable tool for asserting themselves upon the Macedonian political landscape.[26] In the absence of a functioning system of law and order, the Young Turks presented themselves as a fresh response to the violence in the countryside. Through such individuals as Ahmed Niyazi, himself a native of Macedonia, the CUP was able to take deep roots in the provincial Muslim community.[27] Above all, CUP agitation consistently pandered to anti-modernist and anti-Western sentiments of the population. While the CUP press in Europe strongly supported the concept of the equality of all religious groups within the Ottoman Empire, the focus of CUP propaganda towards Muslims in Macedonia centered on ending Christian band activity, restoring law and order through the re-imposition of *shari'a* law (as opposed to more recent secular forms of law) and thwarting further European penetration into the region.[28] In this regard the Young Turks made a conscious attempt to gain popular support

under terms set by provincial Muslims. In the absence of reprisals against Christians and the cooperation between Muslims and Greeks, sectarianism did not prove to be a central factor in sustaining mass support for the CUP revolt. Rather, security and the assured return of more provincial forms of justice and administration resonated far more strongly among the population.[29]

July to December 1908: Peace and Its Limits

On 25 July, two days after 'Abdülhamid II conceded defeat to the CUP and reinstated the constitution of 1876, Ahmed Niyazi returned to his native Resna, a small market town in central Manastır. He was greeted there by the leaders of several Patriarchist and Exarchist bands, who were taking part in the general festivities in the town. After swearing an oath of allegiance, the former adversaries marched together to Manastır on the orders of the CUP Central Committee.[30] In Ohrid, the scene of much bitter sectarian fighting, Muslim and Macedo-Bulgarian bands, as well as the local bishop and *kaymakam*, celebrated together in the town square.[31] Even Jané Sandanski, one of the leaders of the VMRO, partook in the carousing in the crowded cafés of Selanik along with hundreds of Ottoman soldiers and nearby inhabitants.[32] This scene was not uncommon for most of the Ottoman Empire.[33] The celebrations marking the beginning of parliamentary rule continued well after the revolution took effect in Istanbul.[34] For many in Macedonia, the conflict was finally over.

By all accounts, the CUP took swift control of the running of provincial affairs.[35] In the first days of the constitutional order, CUP officers made it clear that they would not tolerate the resumption of violence by any party. A week after this proclamation, the Committee hanged three Muslims suspected of robbing and killing two Christians in southern Manastır.[36] In one interesting episode, a renegade army officer by the name of İsa Bey was paraded through the streets of Üsküb while townspeople, both Muslim and Christian, and CUP officials humiliated him.[37]

In the weeks and months that followed, the Committee's effort to end intercommunal conflict yielded mixed results. With the issuing of a general amnesty for all combatants in the area, hundreds of people surrendered to the authorities.[38] Between August and October, a total of 53 murders were reported for the entire region (only nine were reported in the last week of July).[39] Of this number, only six were attributed to Muslims.[40] This is a dramatic drop when we consider the fact that 187 persons were killed in Macedonia during the month of July alone. Even after the completion of the Ottoman parliamentary elections on 8 November, the number of persons killed in Macedonia did not exceed 37, again a significant drop from the previous year.[41]

Nonetheless, it is evident that discontent with the new order was already palpable in the fall of 1908. Acts of violence did gradually increase between Greeks and Macedo-Bulgarians a month after the Young Turk Revolution.[42] There is also some evidence of sectarian tension between Muslim and Christians. In an article printed in the *Times* of London, the author states that some of the local Muslims of Üsküb viewed the CUP clique as "a set of pretentious young fellows with newfangled ideas" and were only waiting for the time to "restore the *status quo.*"[43] In a letter signed on the behalf of 3,000 people in the town of Shtip in the province of Üsküb, Christians asserted that the election laws were decidedly in the favor of Muslims in their district. Alluding to the unfair zoning practices of the CUP, the letter states that only remote "Turkish villages" were selected as polling centers, many of which were the scenes of past atrocities.[44] By far the most serious cause for concern was the state of CUP relations with the Albanian Muslim population of

neighboring Kosova. It is clear that the local population had considerable reservations about the goals of the Young Turks (specifically about the principle of Muslim/Christian equality).[45] One expression of this discontent occurred in October in Prizren. According to the British Consul in Üsküb, a riot nearly ensued after some local Albanians had demanded the expulsion of a local CUP official. With the arrival of imperial troops the tensions soon subsided.[46] Nonetheless, this event was an early sign of bad times to come in Kosova.[47]

The provincial affairs during the year 1908 demonstrate that Muslims were by no means only passively involved in the inter-communal violence in Macedonia. Yet, their participation in this violence was not of a sectarian nature in the sense that they would have targeted the local Christian communities in general. Instead, the focus of Muslim participation in the events of 1908 was informed by the complex power configuration in this particular part of the Ottoman Empire. While these local pressures may have led Muslims to seek alliances across sectarian lines, the origins of the conflict in Macedonia must be sought outside its immediate borders. As in the cases of intercommunal conflict in Mount Lebanon and Eastern Anatolia, local tensions in Macedonia were manifestations of a broader discontent with the centralization efforts of the Ottoman government and the imperial designs of the European Powers. It is clear that in tailoring their political agenda to the concerns of the local population CUP officials recognized Muslim misgivings with the direction of Ottoman reform and their fears of partition by the Balkan neighbors. As a result, the support garnered by the Young Turks for their July revolt was only attained through moderating their political agenda for the empire, all the while guaranteeing an end to violence. By the end of 1908, this renegotiation of Macedonia's provincial politics already showed signs of strain.

Above all, the year 1908 sheds light on the centrality of the Macedonian conflict to the politics of the Ottoman center. The "Macedonian Question" represented more than yet another supposed "cancer" on the Sublime state. In many ways the final act in the Ottoman reform movement, the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), was itself a product of the Macedonian conflict. One must remember that it was from Manastır and Selanik, and not from Paris, that the Young Turk Revolution was launched. It was an enterprise undertaken by officers and notables who were at the very least familiar with, if not native to, Macedonia and had an acute awareness of the popular dissatisfaction with the Hamidian order. It was their local knowledge that allowed them to exploit the anxieties of Muslim Macedonians as a springboard to power.

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[1] For the remainder of the paper, I will use the term "Macedo-Bulgarian" to refer to those inhabitants of Macedonia who professed an allegiance to the Bulgarian Patriarch (otherwise known as the Exarchist Church), which separated from the Greek Patriarchate at the end of 19th century.

[2] Public Record Office, Kew/Foreign Office [= PRO/FO] 571/535, No. 17817, 25 May 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey. For further examples of revenge killings see P.O. 571/535, No. 14326, 27 April 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 14313, 27 April 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.

[3] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 42604, 7 December 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey. This event occurred in October 1908.

[4] See Fikret Adanır, "Heiduckentum und Osmanische Herrschaft," *Südost-Forschungen,* 41.1 (1982), 43-116.

[5] Generally speaking, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece took an active role in promoting their respective irredentist agendas by raising bands among the various Christian peoples of Ottoman Macedonia. While some of the paramilitary groups comprised Ottoman citizens, many paramilitary groups consisted of adventurers from outside Macedonia. This was especially the case for Bulgarian, Greek and Serb *çeta*s. However, many formations raised by VMRO's successor organizations were entirely made up of Ottoman Macedo-Bulgarian citizens.

[6] For further information on the Mürzsteg reform period, see Steven W. Sowards, *Austria's Policy of Macedonian Reform,* Boulder 1989.

[7] See the addendum attached to Haus-, Hof- und Staats-Archiv, Vienna [= HHStA], Civil Agent Oppenheimer to Minister Aerenthal, Solanika, 18 April 1908, No. 46.

[8] Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, Princeton 1995, 136.

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[9] Fikret Adanır, "The Macedonians of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Formation of National Elites: Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940: Volume IV*, eds. Andreas Kappeler et al., Dartmouth 1992, 181; Shükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*, Oxford 2001, 221-222.

[10] PRO/FO 371/535, No. 42604, 7 December 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 371/535, No. 24022, 13 July 1908, Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.

[11] Austro-Hungarian documents further demonstrate this slant towards a Muslim/Macedo-Bulgarian conflict during the two years leading up to the Young Turk Revolution. See HHStA, [Civil Agent Oppenheimer] Solanika, 18 April 1908, No. 46.

[12] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 6330, 24 February 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 2892, 27 January 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey. The attack on the Muslim village in the *kaza* of Radovishta in Üsküb actually took place on 24 December 1907.

[13] Act of robbery PRO/FO 571/535, No. 22226, 29 June 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; act of revenge and brigandage PRO/FO 571/535, No. 17817, 25 May 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; act of brigandage PRO/FO 571/535, No.14326, 27 April 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; act of brigandage PRO/FO 571/535, No. 30954, 7 September 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.

[14] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 14313, 27 April 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 22226, 29 June 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; HHStA, [Civil Agent Oppenheimer] Solanika, 17 June 1908, No. 47; PA XXXVIII/409, Salonika, 16 June 1908, No. 81; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 17817, 25 May 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 26955, 4 August 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 6330, 24 February 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey. In this last report, Consul Heathcote in Manastır reports that seven Muslims were reported to have shipped arms to Greek bands in Macedonia.

[15] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 492, 6 January 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey. The reporting agent however cautions that the Italian officer was a man of "questionable repute."

[16] Henry Noel Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and their Future*, London 1906, 191.

[17] Fikret Adanır, *Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908,* Wiesbaden 1979, 217-222.

[18] For contemporary commentaries on Balkan sectarianism, see George Kennan's prologue in *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan*, Washington 1993, 11-13.

[19] See Donald Quataert, "The Economic Climate of the 'Young Turk Revolution' in 1908," *The Journal of Modern History*, 51.3 (1979), 1152.

[20] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 24022, 13 July 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 14313, 27 April 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, 6 January 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.

[21] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 30968, 7 September 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.

[22] PRO/FO 294/38, No. 1, 10 January 1907, "Albanians: Debra, Turkish action against, General condition of Albanian Sanjaks in this Vilayet."

[23] Akyut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey,* Leiden 1997, 82.

[24] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 22226, 29 June 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 26955, 4 August 1908, Sir Nicholas O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.

[25] E.F. Knight, *Turkey: The Awakening of Turkey and the Turkish Revolution of 1908,* Boston 1910, 138.

[26] Glen W. Swanson, "Enver Pasha: The Formative Years," *Middle Eastern Studies,* 16.3 (1980), 195-197; Charles Roden Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution*, London 1909, 135. In this regard, members of the Young Turk leadership, such as Bahaeddin Shakir and Ahmed Rıza, were mistaken in their appraisal of Muslim support in Macedonia. In *Preparation for a Revolution*, Shükrü Hanioğlu, in drawing on CUP correspondence, attempts to portray such acts as brigandage and kidnapping as representative of counter-insurgency by Muslims. However, it is clear that high-ranking Young Turk officials were more interested in coding Muslim violence in the same key as Christian paramilitaries to warrant the creation of an armed wing of the CUP. Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, 242-254.

[27] "The Turkish Army Officers," *The Times* (London), 24 July 1908; Knight, *Awakening of Turkey*, 136-137; Kansu, *Revolution*, 90-91. The case of Ahmed Niyazi and his campaign to raise Muslim supporters for the Young Turk revolution remains an under-studied theme in the history of the Young Turk movement. Despite his commitment to CUP reform, it is unclear to what extent his connection with conservative Muslim notables was decisive in marshalling popular support during the summer of 1908.

[28] Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, New York 1998, 237; Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, 225.

[29] PRO/FO 571/535, No. 30155, 31 August 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/535, No. 30954, 7 September 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; "The Young Turk Movement," *The Times* (London), 21 July 1908. This can also be seen in the mass demonstration on the parts of Muslim notables in the Kosovar town of

Firozovik (contemporary Ferizaj), an event hijacked by CUP officers. Despite the anti-Western, anti-Christian overtones of the statements issued by the crowd, the demonstration did not result in sectarian violence.

[30] Knight, *Awakening of Turkey*, 196.

[31] "Incidents in Macedonia," *The Times* (London), 12 August 1908.

[32] PRO/FO 254/46, 23 July 1908, Walter Heathcote to G.H. Barclay; "Situation in Salonica," *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 7 August 1908; Knight, *Awakening of Turkey*, 211.

[33] For a more complete survey of the reaction to the revolution see Kansu, *Revolution*, 101-113.

[34] However, in such places as northern Albania, CUP officials compelled locals to celebrate the new order. According to many reports, many in the region little understood the changes, which had occurred. See PRO/FO 571/353, No. 30968, 7 September 1908, Sir. G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912*, Princeton 1967, 344.

[35] Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, 279.

[36] PRO/FO 571/353, No. 30954, 7 September 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey. According to Hanioğlu, such incidents occurred often in contradiction to the justice officials appointed by Istanbul. See Hanioğlu, *Preparation*, 280.

[37] "Confidence of the Young Turks," *The Times* (London), 15 August 1908. However, according to this article, CUP efforts to punish wrong-doers began to relax as time passed.

[38] Douglas Dankin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913*, Thessaloniki 1966, 381.

[39] PRO/FO 571/353, No. 30954, 7 September 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/353, No. 33228, 26 September 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/353, No. 34303, 5 October 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/353, No. 37945, 2 November 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/353, No. 42604, 17 December 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey. The tabulation of the number of casualties for August was somewhat problematic. Despite an initial report of seven deaths, the number was later revised up to twenty-one.

[40] PRO/FO 571/353, No. 37945, 2 November 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey; PRO/FO 571/353, No. 42604, 17 December 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey. Although each of the acts was committed against Christian groups (Serb, Macedo-Bulgarian, Greek and Vlach), in each case the perpetrator was found. None of the reports indicate that they were the acts of an organized band.

[41] Dankin, *Greek Struggle,* 386.

[42] The main threat to the peace between the Exarchist and Patriarchist camps emerged in connection with questions concerning the reallocation of churches in the three *vilayet*s. See PRO/FO 571/353, No. 36119, 19 October 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.

[43] "Confidence of the Young Turks," *The Times* (London), 15 August 1908.

[44] "A resolution of the first meeting of the citizens from Shtip, held on September 13th, 1908, protesting against malpractices during the elections to the Ottoman Parliament," in *Macedonia: Documents and Materials*, Sofia 1979, 561-562.

[45] "Attitude of the Albanians," *The Times* (London), 15 August, 1908; "The Young Turks: A Campaign of Education," *The Times* (London), 4 September 1908. Kansu, *Revolution*, 111.

[46] PRO/FO 571/353, No. 36119, 19 October 1908, Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.

[47] While the discontent found in Northern Albania and Kosova between 1909 and 1912 has received considerable scholarly attention, little has been written on the state of Ottoman Macedonia, let alone Muslim society in Macedonia, during the Second Constitutional period.

Corruption and Limits of the State in the Ottoman Province of Baghdad during the Tanzimat

Christoph Herzog[*]

The Ottoman reform period – or *Tanzimat* – has received mixed praise, both at the time and by historians of the 20th century. However, there is no doubt that in the decades between 1840 and 1870 the outlook of the Ottoman Empire changed profoundly. The broad trajectory of this change has been described in general terms as a policy of centralisation.[1] This also meant an expansion of the state bureaucracy and the attempt to control aspects of daily life, which were previously beyond the limits of the state. As such this development was in tune with the general trend in the societies of western and central Europe. All of them, since the end of the 18th century at least, witnessed a dramatic increase of state bureaucracy.[2]

In the sphere of international relations, however, the *Tanzimat* period was characterised by the final and irrevocable failure to establish the Ottoman Empire as a peer to the European powers. In the economic field this development was accompanied by a thorough failure to "modernise" the Ottoman economy according to standards of industrialised societies and to effectively establish "modern" methods to control state revenues and taxes. This is what may be termed "the failure of Ottoman modernisation." It should be pointed out, however, that no ethical or moral value should be attached to the concept of modernisation. In this context it merely defines the ability of a political system to survive within the ever-expanding reach of the system of nation states emerging in Europe during this time.

In an attempt to explain this failure scholars have adopted two different approaches, that we may term the "internal" and the "external" explanation. Put simply, the internal explanation blames in one way or another Ottoman society for the failure of Ottoman modernisation while the external explanation holds European colonialism/imperialism or the so-called "world-economy" responsible. While in principle it is an undue oversimplification not to look at both internal and external factors, it may be heuristically helpful to concentrate on one single issue before attempting its re-integration into the whole historiographic picture.

It is in this framework that I propose to explore the phenomenon of corruption in the Ottoman provincial administration of Iraq. Corruption, in the historical context of the late Ottoman Empire has hitherto not been systematically dealt with, although it arguably constituted an important factor in the failure of Ottoman modernisation.

Corruption as a historical phenomenon is a problematic issue to deal with – from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. After decades of relative neglect it emerged as an important subject of political science only during the late 1980s and the 1990s.[3] In 1997 the guest editors of the special issue on corruption of the periodical *Crime, Law and Social Change* noted "the paradox of the coexistence of an inconclusive dispute about definitions and a consensus on the severity of the phenomenon"[4] – an observation that seems still to be valid. There has been a

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considerable amount of discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of various definitions of corruption, that cannot be dealt with extensively in this essay. At the core of the problem obviously lies the fact that corruption "essentially denotes deviation or perversion from some ideal state or natural condition, and scholars appear to have different notions of what that condition is."[5] It has been proposed to distinguish between the following six widespread definitions of corruption[6]

1. "deviation from behaviour in the public interest"

2. "behavior that deviates from legal norms"

3. behavior that deviates "not only from written rules, but also from norms or moral standards sanctioned by the public"

4. a co-phenomenon to patrimonialism "as juxtaposed against the concept of rational-legal administration"

5. the "use of market mechanisms, rather that a mandatory pricing model, to allocate goods"

6. "the perversion of agency relationships that constitute democracy."

It is clear that each of these definitions has its trade-offs of advantages and disadvantages. I will skip this discussion[7] and content myself with the proposition that in order to apply this concept to the case of the late Ottoman Empire phenomena such as nepotism, clientelism or patronage should be excluded from the definition of corruption as they are closely linked to the Weberian concept of patrimonialism and were key elements of the structure of the Ottoman (as well as of any other pre-modern patrimonial) state.[8]

On the other hand, "corruption with theft",[9] i.e., bribery, embezzlement, blackmailing etc. was in principle as unacceptable in patrimonial systems as it was in rational-legal ones. The fact that it is often extremely difficult to make a clear distinction between a gift and a bribe and the fact that the Ottoman ruling elite sometimes practised "corruption with theft" very openly, does not - in my view - justify the conclusion that there existed no cultural notion of "too much" in the Ottoman case, even if one admits that what was too much depended often on the political context. The assertion that "members of the ruling class who were in power appropriated whatever wealth they could, without any sense of corruption or greed, but rather out of a sense of entitlement"[10] may be somewhat simplistic even if it is coupled with "a corollary that can best be described as *noblesse oblige.*"[11] As the importance of the complimentary notions of justice (*adl*) and oppression (*zulüm*) in the Ottoman political language seems to indicate, there must have existed a rather complex cultural code of appropriation and misappropriation.[12] The campaign against bribery (*rüshvet*) played an important role in the *Tanzimat*, even if it seems to have been a complete failure.[13]

If the theoretical premises for the study of corruption in the Ottoman context are not easily defined, the practical difficulties for studying Ottoman corruption prove to be even more difficult to deal with: As corruption is - almost by definition- something clandestine, in many cases it may not have found its way into the documents of the Ottoman state archives. There are some exceptions, notably when investigations (*tahkikat*) against officials were opened. However, very

often these investigations did not lead to tangible results, especially when they were directed against high-ranking officials.

Ottoman corruption, however, is quasi omnipresent in contemporary European sources, e.g. in travelogues or consular records. Frequently concrete cases are presented along with a general turcophobic bias that the British resident in Baghdad in the mid-19th century, Colonel A. Kemball, described as the "proverbial improvidence and mismanagement of Turkish Officials."[14] Moreover, misinformation, ignorance of local affairs, political calculation and - of course - personal involvement in corruption by consular agents and other European residents are possibilities to be reckoned with.[15] Yet, given the relative paucity of sources on corruption, they nevertheless have to be considered a valuable resource that cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, when accusing Ottoman dignitaries of corruption European observers do not in most cases reveal their sources of information, so that we sometimes have to conclude that they were just repeating publicly available rumours. However, I tend to believe that these rumours concerning the honesty or dishonesty of high-ranking Ottoman officials were not altogether unreliable. I would propose it to be practically reasonable from a historian's point of view to regard these accounts as basically reliable so long as we do not have evidence to the contrary.

There is another point in support of this argument that deserves to be mentioned: The famous *serasker* Namık Pasha (1804-1892) who twice was appointed *vali* of Baghdad was probably one of those top-level Ottoman administrators and politicians that were most disliked by European observers. In the wider European public his name was closely linked to the incidents of Jidda in 1858 where more than twenty Europeans were massacred by a mob incited by local notables and Ottoman officials.[16] Although he was never proven to have been personally involved, Namık Pasha - the then governor of Jidda - was widely considered to be politically responsible for the outrage and was accused of obstructing efforts to punish the culprits. While European observers repeatedly denounced Namık Pasha as a religious fanatic when he was serving as governor-general of Iraq they never - as far as I can tell - blamed him to be corrupt. In fact, Namık seems to have been one of those Ottoman dignitaries who managed to amass a fortune without resorting to forms of corruption. If the accusation of corruption had been a *topos* or a standard element of the way in which European observers represented Ottoman officials they disliked, Namık Pasha would have been an obvious target.

The fact that in his case the accusation of corruption is missing shows, I suggest, that it was not used indiscriminately in contemporary European sources. On the other hand, a caveat is in order here: European brokers residing in Baghdad were not only playing an active role in the political corruption within the province. Apparently, they were also often involved in such dubious business practices that they embarrassed the British consul more than once.[17] Thus, travellers and authors of travelogues who formed their opinions on the honesty or dishonesty of Ottoman officials by drawing on the accounts of these European residents may have been thoroughly misguided.

Corruption among Ottoman officials was certainly not limited to the provincial administration in borderlands of the Empire. Yet if we consider the often precarious nature of Ottoman rule in those regions the generally accepted de-legitimising effect of political corruption may have been more severe in its consequences on political and administrative stability. The province of Baghdad never belonged to the heartland of the Ottoman Empire. Conquered only under Sultan Süleyman Kanuni in the mid-1530s it was lost again to the Safawid Shah 'Abbas in 1623 and re-conquered by Murad IV in 1638. The struggle with Persia over this region continued under Nadir

Shah in the 18th century. Even the second treaty of Erzurum that the Porte concluded with Iran in 1847 did not put an end to incidents on the border. The *timar* system was never introduced in Baghdad and until the *Tanzimat* the province continued to be a *salyane* province that was paying no regular taxes but an annual lump sum to the government in Istanbul. Population density was low, most of the inhabitants being tribal or of tribal origin. The more powerful tribes represented a serious counterweight to Ottoman military, administrative and fiscal control. Moreover, a substantial percentage of the Arab population of Iraq was Shiite. For them the legitimacy of the Sunnite Ottomans was rather doubtful. The conversion of Mesopotamian tribes to Shiism was a recent phenomenon that continued during the 19th century.[18] Implementing a policy of centralisation in such a borderland province must have been seriously hampered by the presence of high-ranking officials who on the one hand represented the administrative and military authority of the Ottoman state on the spot and were seeking to secure an extra income for themselves on the other.

In light of my earlier argument on corruption I suggest a preliminary table of corrupt and non-corrupt provincial administrations in Baghdad during the roughly forty-one years from 1831 to 1872, i.e., from the governorship of the first post-Mamluk *vali* in Baghdad, 'Ali Rıza Pasha to the dismissal of the famous Midhat Pasha. During this period eleven different *vali*s were appointed in the *vilayet* of Baghdad. One of them, Namık Pasha, was appointed twice, so that we have to count twelve. Whenever a new *vali* was appointed he would bring in a whole entourage of new officials while many of the old ones were dismissed from their posts. Thus, we are dealing with twelve different provincial administrations in Baghdad during the forty-one years from 1831 to 1872. Of the eleven *vali*s five were credibly reported to have been corrupt. Another three of the remaining six pashas were admitted to be honest while for the remaining three I was unable to find any clear evidence. Following the principle of *in dubio pro reo* I assume them to have belonged to the group of non-corrupt officials. Thus, of eleven pashas five appear to have been corrupt and six honest. However, of these eleven *vali*s four were reported to be unable to control their corrupt high-level subordinates. Among them was Midhat Pasha, who otherwise was considered honest and 'Abdi Pasha (i.e., 'Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, later *serdar-i ekrem*), who belongs to the group of officials I was unable to classify. That means that of the twelve administrations under eleven different *vali*s from 1831 to 1872 seven may be regarded to be corrupt at the top level (which means either the *vali* himself or his high level administration or both) while three were regarded as honest. No information concerning the conduct of the remaining two administrations could be found. As a result, they too were put into the category of "honest" officials.

Vali	Alleged Corruption[19]
'Ali Rıza (1831-1842)[20]	+*
Necib (1842-1849)[21]	+
'Abdi (1849-1851)[22]	? *
Vecihi (1851)	?
Namık (first tenure, 1851-1852)	-
Gözlüklü Reshid (1852-1857)[23]	-
Ömer Lütfü (1857-1859)[24]	+
Mustafa Nuri (1859-1861)[25]	+*
Ahmed Tevfik (1861)	?
Namık (second tenure, 1861-1868)	-
Takiyeddin (1868-1869)[26]	+
Midhat (1869-1872)[27]	-*

When we put the corrupt Ottoman provincial governments that were in charge of the Province of Baghdad between 1831 (excluded) and 1872 on a time axis, it would appear that out of 41 years, Baghdad passed roughly 28 years under a corrupt administration while for 13 years the administration was viewed both willing and able to check corruption. This corresponds approximately to a ratio of two thirds to one third. At the same time I am acutely aware that neither the table nor the calculation are watertight. In fact, they offer not more than a provisional outline for further discussion.

As far as I can see, it was only in two cases that the Ottoman central government in Istanbul opened investigations (*tahkikat*) on the charge of corruption against *vali*s of Baghdad: in the cases of Necib Pasha after his dismissal in 1849 and of Mustafa Nuri Pasha in 1861. In both cases the investigations did not lead to tangible results.[28] The *tahkikat* against Necib Pasha, which included his sons (among them the later prominent mayor of Istanbul (*shehremini*) "Sağır" Ahmed Shükrü Bey), were apparently dropped in 1851 after Necib had died a rich man in Istanbul. Those against Mustafa Nuri and his deputy (*kethüda*) and son-in-law dragged on for a while but apparently did not lead to a conviction. Mustafa Nuri received a high pension (*mikdar-ı vafi ma'zuliyet maashı*) after his deposition in 1861.[29] Even Mustafa Nuri's *kethüda* who was commonly considered to have been mainly responsible for the corruption of Mustafa Nuri's administration escaped punishment and was appointed governor of a sub-province (*mutasarrıf*).[30] It is true that Mustafa Nuri never got another post in the Ottoman administration until 1877 when - shortly before his death - he was appointed a member of the Ottoman senate (*meclis-i ayan*).[31] This, however, might have been due to his old age and to the fact that after the death of Sultan 'Abdülmecid in 1861 he apparently lost some of his former influence within the palace.

Trying to quantify corruption is extremely problematic as figures, due to the clandestine nature of the process, are normally unavailable. However, there are some figures available, which were provided by the French consul in Baghdad, Veimars, and others.[32] They are about the administration of Necib during the financial year corresponding to 1845, the last before he received the province as a tax farm much in the fashion of the traditional *salyane*.

Although these figures cannot be verified they may be realistic. They indicate that the revenues of the province of Baghdad amounted to roughly 23 million piasters and that Necib Pasha put an additional three to three and a half million piasters in his own pocket. That would correspond to a percentage of about 13 to 15 percent. Given the fact that Necib was generally regarded as an extreme case this percentage may represent the upper limit rather than the average of Ottoman high-level corruption in the province of Baghdad. However, one has to keep in mind that we are talking about the amount pocketed by the highest Ottoman official only. There were, of course, many more pockets of Ottoman officials and intermediate tax farmers to be filled, so we can easily guess that an over-taxation of fifty percent or more may not have been exceptional. On the other hand there are reports by the British resident to the effect that it was only after Necib took the province of Baghdad as a tax farm for allegedly 50,000 purses (i.e., 25 million piasters) that he considerably increased his rapacious manoeuvres.[33]

What were the most frequent acts of corruption reported in connection with upper level administrators in Baghdad? By far the most profitable and easy one seems to have been to charge an extra "gift" for farming out the right to collect taxes. Another one seems to have been to blackmail tribal *shaykhs* for large amounts in cash and kind (especially valuable horses). If the *shaykhs* did not comply the *vali* threatened to support a rival. This practice tended to be especially

harmful as it easily led to tribal unrest with potentially disastrous economic consequences. The tribal uproar that contributed to the dismissal of Necib is said to have been partially caused by this kind of tribal politics.

If we consider the fact that one of the consequences of political corruption is its de-legitimising effect on the political system in which it occurs the legitimacy of the Ottoman administration in Mesopotamia appears in a rather unfavourable light. It must not be forgotten that - considering the high percentage of tribal and Shiite population - the legitimacy of Ottoman rule in this area was not very well founded anyway.

A case in point is the - mainly Sunni - town of Tikrit on the Tigris. We know that during most of the 19th century the town had to pay a tax known as *khuwwe* that was traditionally levied by the powerful Arab tribe of the Shammar.[34] In addition the local residents were taxed by the Ottomans. It is only from the state-centric viewpoint of political history that one may regard the *khuwwe* as illegal and the money including the surplus for several corrupt officials that had to be given to the Ottomans as a legal tax.[35] From the viewpoint of the Tikriti taxpayer, the difference cannot have been that substantial. Under these circumstances the *Tanzimat* rhetoric according to which the sultan did care for the welfare and prosperity of his subjects remained little more than an unfulfilled promise. Moreover, against powerful tribes the Ottoman state was unable to sustain a monopoly of violence. In some way and depending on the perspective (taxpayer) and the time (i.e., during roughly 28 out of the 40 years from 1831 to 1871), the Ottomans then were but one of several groups trying more or less effectively to extort money.

The existence of high-level corruption in 19th century Ottoman Iraq during the *Tanzimat* marks an internal border within the state apparatus that does not coincide with the notion of a dichotomy between local (or peripheral) and central powers. None of the *Tanzimat-vali*s in Baghdad had local roots. All of them belonged to the upper echelons of the Ottoman state bureaucracy. In the case of Iraq it is obvious that this state was not able (or not willing) to efficiently control the drain of scarce resources into the pockets of some of its elite members. While the results of this paper must be regarded as preliminary, they nevertheless raise some questions of general interest for the study of 19th century Ottoman history. First, we have to ask whether the issues discussed here were specific only to Iraq or whether it can be verified that severe high-level corruption was indeed a widespread phenomenon in Ottoman provincial administration during the *Tanzimat*. If that was indeed the case, corruption could turn out to be one of the key factors in the failure of Ottoman modernisation, reflecting the central government's inability to rein in high-level bureaucrats and to rationalize the exploitation of the empire's provinces. In this case documentation from the Ottoman state archives concerning fiscal matters during the *Tanzimat* should be regarded with even greater reservation as to their factual value as they are today. Finally, the existence of widespread high-level corruption might also add a new perspective to our understanding of the cultural rift that the *Tanzimat* arguably brought about within Ottoman society. The lack of legitimacy of the new *Tanzimat* order might turn out to have been less due to any form of Islamic conservatism but rather to the mishandling and misappropriation of resources by parts of the state elite.

[1] E.g. Stanford J. Shaw, "Local Administrations in the Tanzimat," in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, Ankara 1992, 33-49.
[2] For an overview see Lutz Raphael, *Recht und Ordnung. Herrschaft durch Verwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt 2000.

[3] Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, "New Avenues in the Study of Political Corruption," *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 27 (1997), 169-183.

[4] *Ibid.*, 182.

[5] Thomas D. Lancaster and Gabriella R. Montinola, "Toward a Methodology for the Comparative Study of Political Corruption," *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 27 (1997), 188.

[6] The following is based on Lancaster and Montinola, "Toward a Methodology," 188-190. For a slightly different classification cf. e.g. Thomas Heberer, *Korruption in China. Analyse eines politischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Problems*, Opladen 1991, 15-20.

[7] For a discussion cf. Lancaster and Montinola, "Toward a Methodology" and Heberer, *Korruption in China*.

[8] A discussion of the "patrimonial household" as one of the key models of the Ottoman state can be found in Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, Princeton 1980, 30-39.

[9] Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny, "Corruption," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (August 1993), 601.

[10] Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State. The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, New York 1991, 56.

[11] *Ibid.*, 57.

[12] For *zulüm* cf. Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı Hukukunda Zulüm Kavramı. Deneme*, Ankara 1972.

[13] For a first assessment of bribery in the Ottoman context cf. Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Rüşhvet (Özellikle Adlî Rüşhvet)*, 2. baskı, Istanbul 1985. This study also includes a chapter on the *Tanzimat* era.

[14] As quoted by his successor Colonel Herbert; Public Record Office, Kew/Foreign Office [= PRO/FO] 195/949, No. 6, 27 April 1870, Herbert to Elliot.

[15] E.g. cf. the remarks of Charles MacFarlane on this point in his *Turkey and its Destiny*, London 1850, vol. 1, 178.

[16] On this affair cf. William Ochsenwald, *Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908*, Columbus 1984, 141-152.

[17] PRO/FO 195/318, No. 78, 6. Dezember 1848, Rawlinson to Stratford Canning.

[18] Cf. Yitzhak Nakash, "The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shi'ism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 26 (1994), 443-463.

[19] Explanation of symbols: -: *vali* reported non-corrupt; +: *vali* reported corrupt; ?: no information on corruption of *vali* available; *: subordinates reported corrupt.

[20] James B. Fraser, "Memorandum on the Present Condition of the Pachalic of Bagdad and the Means it Possesses of Renovation and Improvement." [1834], in *Precis Containing Information in Regard to the First Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia [...] Between AD 1646 and 1846 [...]*. Calcutta: Foreign Dept. 1874, xxxii; Keiko Kiyotaki, "Ottoman Land Policies in the Province of Baghdad, 1831-1881," Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1997, 56; Austen Henry Layard, *Autobiography and Letters From His Childhood Until His Appointment as H.M. Ambassador at Madrid*, ed. William Bruce, London 1903, vol. 1, 345.

[21] PRO/FO 78/777, No. 223, 19 July 1849, Stratford Canning to Palmerston.

[22] William Kenneth Loftus, *Travels and Researches in Chaldaea and Susiana,* London 1858, 11 and 108.

[23] *The Times* (London), 2 July 1856; Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir 13-20*, ed. Cavid Baysun, 3. baskı, Ankara 1991, 34.

[24] Archive Diplomatique de Nantes: Constantinople D (Bagdad 1859-1868), No. 132, 12 October 1859, Tastu to Thouevenel; Archive Diplomatique de Nantes: Constantinople D (Bagdad 1859-1868), No. 138, 6 December 1859, Tastu to Thouevenel.

[25] PRO/FO 195/676, No. 14, 5 June 1861, Kemball to Bulwer; MacFarlane, *Turkey, vol. 1*, 178.

[26] Archive Diplomatique de Nantes: Bagdad (consulat) A 45, No. 4, 17 February 1869, Rogier to Bourée; Lamec Saad, *Sechzehn Jahre als Quarantänearzt in der Türkei*, Berlin 1913, 49f.

[27] Archive Diplomatique de Nantes: Constantinople D (Bagdad 1869-1877), No. 11, 27 September 1871, Guys to de Vogué; Archive Diplomatique de Nantes: Bagdad (consulat) A 45, No. 5, 16 July 1872, to Comte de Vogué; Public Record Office: FO 195/949, No. 2, 20 March 1871, Rassam to Elliot; Bernhard Stern, *Jungtürken und Verschwörer. Die innere Lage der Türkei unter Abdul Hamid II. Nach eigenen Ermittlungen und Mittheilungen osmanischer Parteiführer*, 2. ed., Leipzig 1901, 130.

[28] Relevant documents in the Bashbakanlık Arshivi, Istanbul include (for Necib Pasha): Irade - Meclis-i Vala 4890, 5488, 12183 and Irade - Meclis-i Mahsus 918, 986, 1174 (for Mustafa Nuri Pasha).

[29] Ahmed Lûtfî, *Vak'a-Nüvis Ahmed Lûtfî Efendi Tarihi*, vol. 10, ed. M. Münir Aktepe, Ankara 1988, 31.

[30] Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, tr. Nuri Akbayar, Istanbul 1996, vol. 4, 1038.

[31] *Ibid.,* vol. 4, 1275f and Sinan Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922). Prosopografîk Rehber,* Istanbul 1999, 110.

[32] Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris: CCC, Bagdad, No. 110, de Veimars to Guizot, 29 April 1846.

[33] PRO/FO 195/334, No. 7, 11 March 1850, Kemball to Stratford Canning.

[34] Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, *Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Golf durch den Hauran, die syrische Wüste und Mesopotamien*, Berlin 1900, vol. 2, 216.

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[35] Cf. Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Scocpol, Cambridge 1985, 169-191.

Unearthing the Ottoman Origins of Nation States in the Middle East

Aykut Kansu
Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913
Leiden: Brill Press, 2000. 441 pages + Apendix, Bibliography, and Index.

Kemal Karpat (editor)
Ottoman Past and Turkey's Today
Leiden: Brill Press, 2000. 281 Pages + Index.

Reviewed by Ryan Gingeras.[1]

The last decade of scholarship has ushered in several provocative works on the period between the end of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of its successor states. Yet many of the most fundamental questions regarding the construction of state ideologies and practices in the Middle East remain contested. The two books under review, Aykut Kansu's *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913* and Kemal Karpat's collection of essays *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, present the most recent salvo in addressing the formation of the modern Middle Eastern nation-state.

Kansu's work is a continuation of his previous volume dedicated to the politics of the CUP (the Committee of Union and Progress) during the revolutionary of year of 1908. This most recent effort is a meticulous account of the development of the second Ottoman parliament beginning in the days following the Young Turk take over in July 1908 to the ousting of Kamil Pasha's cabinet by the CUP in the winter of 1913. Kansu is most effective in portraying the sheer chaos gripping both the political parties that emerge during this period and the frailty of the state itself. He points out that Unionist sympathizers walked a treacherous line as their attempted to assert themselves as a commanding force in Ottoman political life, all the while abiding by the new parliamentary order. What is still more interesting is the incredulousness and confusion of the opposition, the Liberal party. Comprising the many disaffected elements of the Hamidian '*ancien régime*', Kansu convincingly argues that both the Liberal Union and its successor the Entente Libérale were too disorganized to pose a lasting threat to the CUP's incremental acquisition of power.

Yet Kansu's work falters on several points. Relying largely on contemporary newspapers and travel accounts, the book reads like an unedited chronicle with little analysis of the events or his sources. This lack of critical reading is significant since many of his periodical sources (such as the party organs *Tanin* and *İkdam*, as well as the Western ex-patriot newspaper *The Levant Herald*) often ran highly dubious stories or recycled rumors posted in other Western publications. Throughout this work, the archival voice is disappointingly silent. In framing the goals of this work, Kansu states that the Revolution of 1908 was a "real" revolution aiming to achieve "a liberal democratic regime in Turkey."(p.3) During the course of this work, one receives very little sense of this claim at all. Rather, there is very little sense of an engaged "public" to which the parties actively appealed. In fact, the empire as a whole receives little notice outside of the major internal crises of the period (such as the Albanian uprisings of 1910-12) and the 1912 parliamentary election (which is weakly presented again due to his lack of sources). Without this

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critical reading of the secondary sources or the use of archival materials, it is very difficult to get a real sense of how the provinces responded to or interacted with the party system.

In addressing the historiography of this period, Kansu asserts that the Young Turk period represents a departure from the absolutist reign of the *ancien régime* of Abdülhamid II. In one sense, his work does demonstrate that the rules of the political game in Istanbul had changed with the rise of political parties. Yet his narrative ventures little into the ideological or administrative shifts of the period. Kansu does not discuss the continuation of bureaucratic centralization begun under Abdülhamid under the Young Turks (a theme well developed by historians of the Arab provinces). Moreover, despite his insistent use of the term "Turkey", the development of early Turkish nationalism (either in the form of the Turkist movement or the Turkification policies in the provinces) is noticeably absent from the story. In this regard, Kansu fails to contribute to one of the most key issues of the later Ottoman period. While placing great emphasis on the battle for power between Unionists and the Liberal opposition, Kansu overlooks many of the facets that contributed to the emergence of the successor states of the Ottoman Empire.

It is on this point that Kemal Karpat's *Ottoman Past and Turkey's Today* takes up the challenge. This essential series of essays presents a concise survey of a variety of approaches towards the issue of state and identity building during the 19th and 20th century. Karpat and Zürcher's contributions address the degree to which devotion to Islam, the Ottoman state and Turkishness melded into what is the contemporary identity promoted by the Republic state. In looking at the evolution of the Ottoman state between Tanzimat period and the War of Independence, Karpat's analysis suggests that these three facets are in reality subsets of the Ottoman/Turkish state's will towards an ephemeral notion of modernization. On the other hand, Zürcher emphasizes the salvaging of Ottoman identity by the postwar elite through the promotion of an Ottoman Muslim nationalism. Like Karpat's thesis, Ottoman Muslim nationalism was a "populist" construction designed to encompass modernity and the three "arrows" of Anatolian identity. On a similar note Carter Findley presents an erudite bibliographical essay concerning the synthesis of the Turkic, Ottoman and Western heritage found within state formation on the Anatolian peninsula. By broadening the scope of investigation in terms of time and influence, Findley gives further context to the assertions of Karpat and Zürcher.

The remaining chapters of this volume compliment these pieces through the discussion of more specific examples of the Ottoman legacy in Turkey and other imperial lands. In comparing the age of reform with the 17th and 18th centuries, Haim Gerber's argues that the Ottoman Empire cannot be simply categorized within the "strong state/weak society" paradigm since Ottoman civil society actively contested the state's absolute control in the implementation of law and local administration. While I feel this article is somewhat out of place, it gives scholars some pause in ignoring the pre-Tanzimat period as politically and intellectually stagnant. Mehmet Alkan, Mehmet Genç, Şevket Pamuk, and İnci Enginün respectively excavate Ottoman heritage in Turkish society through the prisms of education, economy and literature respectively. Alkan's article on the continuation of the Hamidian educational structure in contemporary Turkey is particularly compelling, implying the existence of an unbroken link between the modernization efforts of the 19th century with the present day. Lastly, the last three historiographical essays by Fikrit Adanir, Wajih Kawtharani, and Karl Barbir offer an interesting, yet somewhat dismal appraisal of comparative work in the Balkans and Arab lands. Adanir points out that with the exception of some recent publications of a few Balkan historians, the Ottoman Empire continues to be dominated by a bigoted line towards the Ottoman past. While Kawtharani and Barbir's assessment of the historical inquiry in the Arab lands is not as bleak as Balkan historiography,

both contend that recent revisions of Ottoman Arab history remain divided between internationalist historians and those driven by nationalist or religious agendas.

The insights presented by these articles do contribute necessary building blocks towards our understanding of the origins of the modern Middle East. However, the periphery is again largely absent from this work. While I concur that the notion of "Turkishness" was an essential element in the creation of the late Ottoman/early Turkish state, we still have very little idea what Turkishness meant beyond the elite. There is little doubt that there are certain commonalities that Turkish-speakers share in Anatolia. Nevertheless it seems clear that the elites of the turn of the century could only speculate as to how such a geographically diverse population defined itself in relation to the state, religion and ethnicity. Did the Ottoman or Turkish elites, for example, have in mind such groups as Alevis or Kurds of Eastern Anatolia and Arabs of the Hatay region in their conception of Anatolia? Furthermore, Zürcher, Karpat and Findley avoid the issue of popular resistance to the promotion of an Ottoman/Islamic/Turkish identity. The lingering Kurdish question in contemporary Turkey testifies to the pertinence of this issue. While not degrading the quality of their scholarship, or the importance of the "state" in recasting the narrative, the contributions of these scholars must be augmented by case studies based outside of the center. Adanir and Barbir are both justified in calling for continued attention towards the Balkans and the Arab lands, but this must also be extended to Anatolia itself.

Thomas Philipp
Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City, 1730–1831
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, ix + 299 pages

Reviewed by James A. Reilly[1]

This book is a careful account of the ephemeral ascendancy of Acre during the latter part of the eighteenth and first decades of the nineteenth century. Rising from insignificance under the stewardship first of tax-farmer Zahir al-Umar (d. 1775) and then of Ottoman governor Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (d. 1804), Acre briefly became a significant seat of political power and a nexus in the cotton trade between Marseilles and the southern Levant. The book demonstrates that these phenomena were interconnected, with the consequence that Acre's downfall was as swift as its rise. Author Thomas Philipp weaves into his account an explanation not only the particulars of Acre's story, but also a consideration of the story's wider implications. These include analyses of the different power bases of Zahir (a local chieftain who relied on his kinship networks and tribal alliances) and al-Jazzar (a product of the Ottoman system who presided over the last example of a functioning neo-Mamluk political structure in Syria). Philipp also advances an explanation of why it was Beirut, not Acre, which was better poised to dominate the commerce of the Syrian coast in the era of European economic expansion despite Acre's head start. Based largely on Arabic and French chronicles and French archival sources, this book brings to life people, places and events with a sense of their flow and their dynamism. Happily, it combines keen analysis with engaging storytelling and character sketches.

Two aspects of the book that most struck this reader were Philipp's explanation of how and why Acre's rise was a kind of "false dawn" for the more sustained and permanent integration of the Levant into the world economy in the nineteenth century; and his reconsideration of the career and the character of Ahmad al-Jazzar. To take the latter first: Philipp reads the Arabic and the French accounts of al-Jazzar against the grain in order to better explain the life and times of a remarkable figure who most often has been portrayed (if not caricatured) as a representative of the nadir of pre-reform Ottoman rule. Without glossing over al-Jazzar's brutality and cruelty, Philipp succeeds in presenting him as a rational and effective political actor whose initiatives could be understood and explained within the context of his time and place. Perhaps al-Jazzar's greatest political moment came when he led the defense of Acre and turned back Bonaparte's troops in 1799. Ultimately, Philipp argues, al-Jazzar's keen understanding of local and regional politics did not extend to encompass the larger forces at work in the world economy that were undercutting the cotton trade under whose auspices Acre had prospered since the 1750s. The circumstances that allowed Acre to thrive arose due to French demand for Levantine cotton and the paucity (till the 1780s–90s) of easily accessible alternative sources. Once Acre's rulers consolidated political control of the cotton-growing regions around the town and enforced a monopoly on resident French merchants, they had access to resources that enabled him to build up the city and to dominate the coast from Saida to the environs of Jaffa. Acre's cotton-based political economy was the secret of its success but also proved to be its Achilles' heel. Acre's dependence on fickle fortune is demonstrated by its rapid repopulation and depopulation, and by the swiftly changing composition of its confessional communities.

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In one of his most intriguing excursuses, Philipp argues that an incident when Beiruti merchants successfully resisted an attempt by al-Jazzar's successor Sulayman Pasha to collect extraordinary taxes (1811) demonstrates why Beirut, not Acre, was set to become the dominant economic center of the coast. Whereas merchant interests in Acre could scarcely be said to have existed outside the bounds of those who were directly patronized by al-Jazzar and his neo-Mamluk successors, merchants in Beirut were able to assert a collective interest vis-à-vis the Ottoman administration. The emergence of a defined indigenous mercantile interest and voice in Beirut, Philipp argues, helped to ensure the city's later predominance. Although this analysis may read too much into a single incident, it demonstrates Philipp's attention to the interplay among local, regional and international factors in his quest to explain the region's historical trajectory.

The most disappointing part of the book is the relative paucity of material on the internal workings of Acre. There is little here that is comparable to the dense portrayals of urban social networks that have been offered for other Syrian and Palestinian towns such as Nablus, Damascus, and Aleppo. However, Philipp uses this paucity or shortcoming to make an analytic point: unlike these other towns, Acre did not have a long-established urban infrastructure and class structure including a notability who elsewhere could act as repositories of local traditions and tribunes for local interests, and who elsewhere bequeathed to modern scholars voluminous records in Islamic law court records and chronicles. Acre was raw and new, and (unlike another boomtown, Beirut) it did not prosper long enough to develop its own keepers of urban memory and builders of urban institutions. Neither did a group of people emerge in Acre who had a prescriptive or normative claim against the ruler of the day, unlike the dynasties of 'ulama' found elsewhere in urban Syria and Palestine.

In sum, Philipp's book offers something for a wide range of scholarly readers, addressing as it does both specific questions of late-Ottoman political culture, and more general questions of how different regions of the world were affected by the expanding scope of commercial capitalism in the decades prior to the industrial revolution. The case-study of Acre demonstrates that the social and political structures of a given region had a telling impact on its population's interaction with the "big changes" of modern history. Acre now can be added to the list of regions that briefly flourished during a specific political and economic moment, only to be eclipsed when the moment passed. The physical vestiges of Acre's century in the sun – the "traditional walled city of Acre" that is home for many Palestinians as well as a tourist destination in Israel today – ironically were produced by a very modern conjuncture.

Joseph A. Massad
Colonial Effects: the making of national identity in Jordan
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001

Reviewed by John T Chalcraft[*]

Massad's *Colonial Effects* is an excellent and provocative study of the role of law and the military - two key institutions established by colonial power - in the "production of national identity and national culture within Jordan" (p. 1). Drawing on Foucault's analysis of discipline, and Gramsci's notions of hegemony, Massad sets out to demonstrate how military and juridical strategies are generalized across the face of postcolonial Jordanian society. He argues that such means of discipline perform both productive *and* repressive functions, controlling and normalizing habits, rules, gender norms, and cultural practices among the population, and working to reproduce the hegemony of the state and its nationalist ideology.

Chapters one, two and three are devoted to the productive and repressive roles of law, juridical discourse and military practice. In the legal sphere, the author explores how, over matters of space, paternity, territory and gender, "law produces juridical national subjects", enacting "nonessentialist national identities that are deployed, changed and rescinded by the law" (p. 18). We are also given an analysis of how law and national politics map certain spaces onto certain kinds of temporality: hence, the modern is discursively located in men, the public sphere, and the city. Tradition is located in women, the private sphere, the bedouin, and the desert. As for the military, chapter three takes up its "productive role" (p. 101), with extensive work on Glubb Pasha's fashioning of the Arab Legion in Transjordan during the inter-war years and beyond.

The final two chapters are concerned with the more subjective elements in the making and unmaking of identity - in the light of the disciplinary juridical and military practices exposed in the first three chapters. Thus chapter four presents a "thorough history" (p. 165) of the clash between Hashemite and non-Hashemite Arab nationalism in Jordan during the 1950s. It concludes that Glubb's legacy outlived him in ways he would not have anticipated. Chapter five discusses "[t]he geographic and demographic expansion and contraction of Jordan and their impact on the development of a Jordanian national identity", which became "increasingly exclusivist" as the Palestinians came to be defined as 'other' by the Jordanian regime. (p. 222).

Overall, Massad describes how colonial legal and military institutions worked to produce "a Jordanian national identity and national culture that think of themselves in essentialist terms" (p. 277). As he concludes "[l]ike other postcolonial national identities, Jordanian national identity and Jordanian national culture are products and effects of colonial institutions" (p. 277). Thus what had apparently been "anticolonial agency" is in fact "colonial subjection and subjectivation" (p. 278).

This is a potent, suggestive, and original work, based on extensive research including archival material and newspapers. It is a major contribution to the literature on Jordanian nationalism, anticolonial nationalism, and the wider field of postcolonial studies. It will be widely read and stir important debates.

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In conversation with Chatterjee's analyses of anticolonial nationalism, Massad shows how military and other practices create "new cultural norms [which] are modern inventions dressed up in traditional garb to satisfy nationalism's claims of a national culture for which it stands" (p. 7). "This new culture", he notes, "is not so much *traditional* as it is *traditionalized*" (p. 7). In other words, in Massad's hands, all that is supposedly authentic and 'traditional' about Jordanian national identity is transformed into a structural feature of a thoroughly modern nationalism. Here Hobsbawm and Ranger's 'Invention of Tradition' meets Foucault. Even Jordan's 'national dish' - *mansaf* - turns out to have been largely an innovation of colonial trade relations in the inter-war years. Glubb's Bedouin were in fact "bedouinized" according to Glubb's idiosyncratic ideas about Bedouin identity.

Most importantly, *Colonial Effects* raises fundamental questions about the status of anticolonial nationalism as an oppositional project. Massad grants that such nationalism did oppose colonial rule and 'colonial racial hierarchies' (p. 277) by appropriating colonial discourse. But, and the distinction is compelling, "[i]ts subsequent refusal . . . to question colonial modes of governance and the very precepts of colonial epistemology . . . meant its abdication of agency to colonial law and discipline" (p. 277). In fact, writes the author, "instead of understanding their anticolonial nationalism as a *strategic* essentialism to fight colonial power, anticolonial nationalists mistook their nationalism for an absolute essence" (p. 277).

In a distant echo of the way Marx's bourgeoisie ceases to be progressive after 1848, so too does Massad's nationalism change its ontological status in the 'historical moment' after independence, becoming thereafter a form of colonial subjection.

Here I want briefly to discuss further the status of the subject, the status of disciplinary practices, and their mutual interactions - which in *Colonial Effects* are not entirely clear. Certainly, Massad builds on a Foucauldian model. Discourse and human subjects are produced; habits, rules, norms, gender-values are inscribed in the workings of institutions; a colonial 'epistemology' is enacted in juridical and military practice which permeates national culture. Independently, it would seem, of subjective orientation, essentialism is inculcated into Jordanian national identity. Massad's post-independence men and women, Hashemite and anti-Hashemite, come across as fatally repressed and produced as subjects operating within a pre-given discursive framework. But through much of the work, I wanted to hear more about how the manifestly subjective orientations to which we are treated - including women's activism, the plots of nationalist officers, Glubb Pasha, the otherizing of the Palestinians, King Husayn's strategizing, and above all 'essentialism' in identity formation - are precisely related to the disciplinary practices so privileged in the argument.

To consider one or two examples: first, whereas the 'death of the author' in Foucault makes no distinction between colonizer and colonized, in Massad there is arguably a contrast between the theoretical status of postcolonial Jordanian subjects and that of Glubb Pasha. Glubb's subjectivity, his personal preferences, his idiosyncratic views, his "assiduous efforts" (p. 221) emerge with some clarity and with some causal status in the narrative. He is apparently, at least to some degree, endowed with the creative power of an active subject. It is Glubb who lays down the institutions to whose disciplines postcolonial Jordanian subjects are condemned to be subject. But if Glubb can create such institutions then why not King Husayn? Why not nationalist officers or female activists, or workers? Why is Glubb's agency so special? And if Glubb is merely reproducing in the colony metropolitan institutions, then this needs further explanation and clarification. For we learn a great deal - over scores of pages - about Glubb's personality, his psychology, even his laughter as he leaves Jordan for the last time. As we hear, Glubb "left an

indelible mark on every aspect of life in Jordan" (p. 162). In short, there is an impression that one, white, male, colonial subject is privileged with potency, whereas the agency of others is effaced. For the colonizer, one theory of the subject, for the colonized, another.

The same kinds of questions arise at other moments. We hear at one point that certain "politically active" Jordanians were able to resist Glubb's "ideological influence" (p. 169). If so, then surely consciousness-raising and political activisms have some causal status in Massad's account. But if this is the case, then the theoretical edifice is compromised, because the overarching thesis is that postcolonial activists continue to reproduce colonial 'epistemology' regardless of their activism, which in the main is theorized as involving an active appropriation and internalization of some form of colonial hegemony ("subjectivation"). Is it that Glubb's 'ideology' is not the same as his 'epistemology'? If so, why do we hear so much about the former, and how is this distinction drawn? As we later hear "colonial repressive and productive techniques had *elicited* nationalist resistance [emphasis added]" (p. 198). But if political activity was a causal factor at some point at least, then surely this eliciting was more complicated and less top-down than we are led to believe.

All this is in the service of my own prejudice that the active subject does matter (from the Marx of the *Theses on Feuerbach*, to Gramsci to Bourdieu), and so too does the mass of the population, who barely get a mention in Massad's account, the key subjects of which are the 'Great Men' of Jordanian history. It is not clear to me, for example, what disciplinary practice had to do with the fact that "republicanism never became part of the anticolonial nationalism of any group in the army" (p. 168). And one is perhaps permitted to suspect that *had* republicanism indeed emerged, disciplinary practices would have been invoked to explain it. There is an issue of falsifiability here. In fact, what did disciplinary practice have to do with the popularity of Nasserism in the 1950s, or women's activism and the possibilities such currents indicated? Or, to go further, how exactly *is* essentialism the product of disciplinary practice?

We may no longer find what Ella Shohat calls "immaculate sites of resistance", but the emphasis on 'colonial effects' embraces a theory of discourse, which works to rule out the possibility of even discovering and pursuing those "germs of subversion that can 'sprout' in an altered context".[1] Resistance needs a definition and a history. And nobody ever laid down their life in service of a strategic essentialism.

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[1] Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism*; *Multiculturalism and the Media* (London, 1994), 11.

Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (editor)

Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens
Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002. 292 pages + Bibliography, and Index.

Reviewed by Sean Monaghan[1]

Recent world events have served to place Muslim communities in Western Europe and North America under intense and often-unwanted scrutiny whilst framing their place within these societies in terms often wrought with suspicion, fear and blanket presumptions. Though the writing of the individual essays that make up *Muslims in the West; From Sojourners to Citizens* predates some of the more spectacular events identified with "Islam" that have been beamed out of television screens and continue to be endlessly debated in op-ed pieces, they offer a timely and measured overview of emerging Muslim communities in both Western Europe and North America, highlighting how these communities have had long histories of penetration into Europe and North America and how the legacies of colonialism define the perceptions and attitudes of "host countries." These pieces remind the reader of daily hurdles to overcome, and the small victories of the quotidian that define and shape the lives of ordinary men and women who make up a minority population. It also reveals how inter-Muslim identity and discourse resist temptations to see Islam as a monolithic, one-dimensional group of people and underscores the plurality of Islam as a truly global religion.

For every second or third generation Muslim in the "West," fluent in German or Dutch, and confident and comfortable in their place within a non-Islamic country, there is the inescapable presence of a socio-cultural *pentimento*. The forms and shapes that outlined the lives of "guest workers," who arrived in post-war France or England to fill jobs in the industrial sectors would establish "bridgeheads for 'chain' migration flows"[1] of family and co-religionists often from similar backgrounds and communities in South Asia or the Arab World. If family is home then this transition from a "temporary" worker to community creator and member would be the initial catalyst informing a movement which has sought to establish Islam as an integral part of the socio-political cultures of non-Islamic lands. As Jane I. Smith notes in her Introduction, "[t]he reality that Islam is now second in number of adherents only to Christianity in almost every western country presents a very new set of challenges, both to the Muslims who have chosen to make this move and to the host cultures that are increasingly feeling the pressure to accommodate their new citizens."[2]

Part I of the book, entitled "Carving Up Muslim Space in Western Europe," addresses the Muslim communities in Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands. The diverse political and social histories of Europe reflect the myriad challenges faced by Muslims "carving up" their place within these societies. Yet, there remains a stubborn consistency in certain areas of contention and attitudinal uniformity in these environments. Emerging communities are confronted with the public debate about the wearing of the *hijab*, fears of extremism, religion in school, and concern for gender equality. "Islamophobia," as noted by Steven Vertovec in his essay on the Muslim communities in England, might apply to most of the countries dealt with in this work, and a sign of an "Us vs. Them" framework that informs often-irrational public debate.

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The perceived liberal immigration laws and generous social safety nets in northern European countries offer of course fertile ground for right-wing political platforming. However, if one of the cornerstones of political development and modernity in "Western democracies" is viewed as the separation between church and state then the growth of Muslim communities offers a cogent and dynamic *contrepoint* to long-held assumptions about theoretical political frameworks and strongly challenges their seemingly unassailable claims to equality and fairness. For example, the cries for "integration" that ring throughout Europe belie any attempt to formulate a working understanding of what "integration" really means, leaving echos of confusion and dissonant expectations. As noted in the case of Denmark, "Muslims perceived the conversation about integration to be strictly in the hands of the majority and its institutions, formulated without inviting the Muslims to participate in the dialogue."[3]

The extent to which contemporary Muslim societies are presented with challenges in "the land of unbelief" draws attention to latent and long-held assumptions on the part of host countries as to the nature of the "freedoms" that are purportedly held out to newcomers – and endlessly extolled – and demonstrate the fallacy of constitutionally enshrined denominational liberty. The strength of this work is to demonstrate that the interpenetration and cultural hybridity present in these countries necessitates compromise, dialogue and exchanges of ideas. It is this hybrid dynamic that has led to a "European Islamic culture" that offers a middle road between fears of integration into non-Islamic Europe, and separation from "home" cultural practices and assumptions. As Tariq Ramadan notes in his excellent "Islam and Muslims in Europe: A Silent Revolution toward Rediscovery" "[p]racticing one's faith within a community is one thing; isolating oneself from the surrounding society is another."[4] The growth of indigenous social groups and student associations of second-generation Muslims has forced the *ulama* to reassess some intellectual positioning and opened up debates that demand answers to the role of religious doctrine and jurisprudence in a Western European context.

The division of the book into a continental divide reflects historical and political divergence between Europe and North America. Oddly, the essays in the section dedicated to the United States, Canada, and the tiny Muslim population in Mexico entitled "Muslims in American Public Space" focus on the impact of contentious issues of racism, forced marriages, and policies on political Islam, and perhaps reflect a political landscape that is based more on individualism. The myth that North America might be more accommodating to religious and cultural differentiation due to its immigrant past is shown to be just that, a myth. It is to be remarked that American policies toward the Islamic world in general and the Arab world in particular, that have informed perceptions of Muslims in the United States, predate the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington. Mamoun Fandy in his "Interface between Community and State: U.S. Policy toward Islamists" notes that "[b]y espousing simplistic foreign policy agendas framed in stark, adversarial language, the U.S. government alienates many of these Muslim-Americans and indirectly reinforces anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments and actions."[5] Yet, the essays strive to resist easily formed images of the Muslim community and "drill down" into the less dominant narratives: Shi'ism, interfaith dialogues, the African Muslim communities, and of course the presence of Islam as a strong component of the African American population, all testify to Islam as the fastest growing religion in North America.

The overall broad-brush effect of this collection is both a strength and a weakness. Though the reader is well informed and the Muslims of the West well represented, some questions that inform the quotidian are often only alluded to and excite the reader's curiosity and merit further investigation. How do traditional familial power structures alter when children are empowered through language skills? Citing positive signs of adaptability helps to counterframe Muslim minorities, but are they indicative of general trends? Further, more detailed analyses of the

exclusionary and inflexible role of state policies in schooling, most notably in France, might help to offer insight into some of the difficulties in forming political platforms and putting forth genuine concerns in the public sphere. The paradox at work in some of the Northern European countries and attested to by the often shrill reaction to the presence of a growing Muslim community exerting itself socially and politically, is the broad challenge that integrating a growing Muslim community offers to these near homogeneous societies. However, though often the fastest growing religion, a community of 1.5% of the population as is the case in Norway, hardly seems to merit a "threat" to deep-seated values. Yet, the visual identity stigmata, - clothing, mosques, calls to prayer - serve to highlight a ubiquity of Islam that artificially inflates its presence in supposed secular spaces. Over-arching culturally dominant national narratives are often mobilized to create the "other" and show how traditional models of identity – language, religion, territoriality, nationality –falter in such a hybridized context. That stated, *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* offers an opportune investigation of the diverse social spaces occupied by Islams in the West and brings to light how emerging communities defy societal constructs and in turn are challenged by them.

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[1] Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Edited by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, (Oxford University Press), p. 19.
[2] Ibid p. 3.
[3] Ibid p. 124.
[4] Ibid p. 162.
[5] Ibid p. 209.

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Gregor SCHŒLER
Écrire et transmettre dans les débuts de l'islam,
Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2002, vii + 171pp. incl. glossary, bibliography and index.

Reviewed by Andrew J. Lane[1]

In *Écrire et transmettre*, Gregor Schoeler ties together various lines of research that he has been pursuing for a number of years. In this book, his main question could be formulated as: what did it mean to publish a book during the first four centuries of Islam? Modern ideas on what books and publishing are can very easily distort the picture; a misrepresentation made easier by the fact that Arabic texts frequently refer to written material simply as 'books' (*kutub*). Throughout *Écrire et transmettre* the author returns to a number of fundamental pairs that act as the lattice on which he builds his book: *hypomnēma*/*syngramma*, oral publication/written publication, (Arab) traditional religious scholar (*ÝÁlim*)/(Persian) man of letters (*adÐb*). Each of these elements is a thread that runs throughout part or all of the book, independently at first but then intertwining as they move from the earliest (the JÁhiliyya and the early Islamic period) to the latest period (the ninth and tenth centuries). Schoeler's approach, then, is essentially – though not rigidly – chronological and throughout his book he supports his assertions with convincing references to numerous primary sources as well as to the secondary literature in the field.

This book is based on the reworked version of a series of lectures that the author gave in the spring of 2000 at the École pratique des hautes études in Paris. The basis for these lectures was a series of studies that represents the fruits of about twenty years of the author's research into the appearance of Arabic literature and the relationship between its oral and written transmission during the first four centuries of Islam. As such, this book is of major importance and one can only hope that an English translation will soon be available so that an even wider readership can benefit from its insights. *Écrire et transmettre* is easy to read both as to presentation and to style, and errors in transliteration and H/CE dating are rare. Furthermore, the author's discoveries or clarifications as regards the appearance and transmission of Arabic literature during the first four centuries of Islam, will be of benefit to scholars working in later periods, for Schoeler's results will be seen reflected there as well.

In the introduction to this book, the author states that he is not one of those hypercritical scholars who have maintained that nothing can be known of the Muslim tradition as passed on from the earliest generations. While distancing himself from some of the opinions held by proponents of a more moderate position, the author nevertheless believes that it is possible to establish a method to discover what is credible in the tradition. He maintains that one can be sure that a number of accounts will reflect in a fairly accurate way, if not in their details then at least in their general characteristics, the facts or practices to which they refer, even if a single account may be altered or even false.

The first study in Schoeler's series led the author to reject an oral/written dichotomy in the transmission of early Arabic literature and to accept the conclusions already put forward by Alois Sprenger in the nineteenth century, which conclusions were unfortunately eclipsed by the ideas of later scholars. Sprenger held that it was necessary to make a distinction between personal notes

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[1] Andrew J. Lane has just successfully defended his Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilisations at the University of Toronto.

used simply to help one recall something, course notebooks and published books. The second study dealt with the first true book of the Arabic-Islamic sciences in Schoeler's estimation, SÐbawayhi's (d.ca.180/796) *KitÁb*; this study led the author to introduce into his plan the Greek pair *hypomnēma-syngramma* (notes/rough draft/*aide-mémoire*—literary work/real book). The third study looked at the debate among traditionists in the eighth century and even later, concerning the writing down of traditions (*ÎadÐth*s). The fourth study dealt with the distinction between 'writing,' which did not necessarily imply a publication, and 'publishing,' which for a long time was done orally. The fifth and final study examined the question of the modification of traditions on the life of MuÎammad in the course of transmission and the authenticity of this tradition, which already appeared in the author's *Charakter und Authentie des muslimischen Überlieferung über das Leben Mohammads* (Berlin and New York, 1996). To these studies, the author has added a final in-depth study of the ninth century, during which an important number of books appeared.

Because of the depth and breadth of Schoeler's research it is not possible to delve into everything he has said. Only a few main points from his seven chapters will be pursued here, to give the reader an idea of what this book has to offer and to encourage her/him to read it. In the first chapter, which deals with the JÁhiliyya and the early Islamic period, the author looks at the two ways in which texts were published: written documents of an official or formal nature were published by being placed in a shrine (e.g. the KaÝba) or some other honoured place while poetry was published orally, that is, through recitation. With respect to poetry, oral transmission did not exclude written materials. This written material was not, however, polished, published books but rough drafts and notes for personal use that served as an *aide-mémoire*. It is in this first chapter that the author introduces his *hypomnēma*/*syngramma* distinction that will reoccur throughout the book.

The second chapter deals with the QurÞÁn and its variant readings (*qirÁÞÁt*) and builds on the distinctions presented in the first chapter. The author puts the codex of ÝUthmÁn into a new light as he shows how this text is to be understood as an official written document, comparable to a pre-Islamic treaty or contract. This fixing of the official text reduced the role and liberty of the qurÞÁnic readers (*qurrÁÞ*), whom Schoeler considers to be comparable to the poetic transmitters (*ruwÁt*), but did not put an end to the variant readings. In fact, written copies of the QurÞÁn had to be copied and corrected through personal contact with a reader who recited the text. The importance of hearing a text began here and would last for centuries in the Islamic religious sciences.

The third chapter looks at the beginnings of the Islamic religious sciences (*sÐra*, *ÎadÐth*, *tafsÐr*), the systematic collection of information related to the life of the Prophet and his Companions, and the beginnings and organization of 'academic teaching.' Here Schoeler deals mainly with three early sources: ÝUrwa ibn al-Zubayr (d.94/712), first head of what he calls a "Madinese historical school," who began the systematic organization of material into books (*taÒnÐf*); MujÁhid ibn Jabr (d.104/722), whom Schoeler calls "an eminent representative of the school of Mecca" and whose *TafsÐr* was nothing more than personal notes; and Ibn ShihÁb al-ZuhrÐ (d.124/742). Schoeler also notes their introduction of new ways of transmitting knowledge: *mudhÁkara*, that is, the students repeating what the teacher has taught (Ibn al-Zubayr), and *munÁwala*, that is, the students making their own copies of the teacher's lecture notes and drafts (al-ZuhrÐ). Al-ZuhrÐ was also the first to undertake, at the insistence of the Umayyad court, an official collection (*tadwÐn*) of the ÎadÐth.

Schoeler devotes his entire fourth chapter to the court's role in the development and transmission of Arabic literature. There are two ways in which the court had an influence. First of all, there were the books that were written specifically for the caliph and the court; most of these have

disappeared. Secondly, there was the emerging class of secretaries of the state (*kuttÁb*). Schoeler notes that they were responsible for three types of works: letters (*rasÁÞil*), translations or adaptations of works written in PahlavÐ, and translations of Greek philosophic texts into Arabic. Again, Schoeler limits his study to a few important names: ÝAbd al-ÍamÐd al-KÁtib (d.132/750), who is associated with the beginnings of Arabic prose, and Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ (d.139/757), whose *KalÐla wa-Dimna* is considered the first masterpiece of Arabic literary prose. What is new here, Schoeler says, is that for the first time we are in the presence of true books that reflected the personality, tastes and talents of their authors; these works were written to be read and to be transmitted in written form. These real books coming from the court would also influence Arab religious scholars who also began to write their works and to give them a form that was accessible to a reader.

The topic of the fifth chapter is the *muÒannafÁt*, the systematic works that appeared in the middle of the eighth century; these works classified the material according to subject matter in systematic chapters (*taÒnÐf*). Such works were to be found in all of the Islamic sciences: history, exegesis, law, philology and even theology. These new compilations were published in accordance with the traditional aural method: recitation, either by the teacher or one of his students, or else dictation to a student within a circle of scholars. It is in this chapter that Schoeler incorporates his study of the debate among traditionists concerning the writing down of traditions (*ÍadÐth*s) and notes that there were massive amounts of written material available for the private use of the scholars when preparing their classes. He also studies Ibn IsÎÁq's *KitÁb al-MaghÁzÐ* and MÁlik's *MuwaÔÔaÞ*, lists a number of works in history and theology, and then asks as to the nature of these *muÒannafÁt*. He is of the opinion that most would be personal notes although some would be rough drafts or notebooks. In fact, here Schoeler indicates that between *hypomnēma* and *syngramma* there would have been a wide variety of types of books, ranging from an organized system of files to works that were practically complete books. He describes these traditional compilations as 'school literature destined for the school' and not for the wider reading public.

The sixth chapter deals with the birth of the grammatical and philological sciences, and in particular with SÐbawayhi's role therein. While *muÒannafÁt* were composed in lexicography and other branches of these sciences, his *KitÁb* on grammar is the first real book of all the Arabic-Islamic sciences (although it has no introduction and perhaps no title); Schoeler lists the characteristics that make it a 'real book' (*syngramma*), including cross-references and quotes from his sources (i.e. what they said, not what they transmitted). What is interesting to note, however, concerning the transmission of SÐbawayhi's *KitÁb*, is that it was transmitted from teacher to student like traditional material, with each manuscript copy having an *isnÁd* going back to the author; this method was to be extended to the other sciences as well.

The title of the seventh chapter, "Read or hear books," seems almost to be a question. It begins with a note on the introduction of paper into the Muslim world in 134/751 and its influence on the increased production of books and their spread among a growing and interested reading public. Such works were destined to spread in written form. One of the most notable examples of a ninth-century man of letters (*adÐb*) is al-JÁÎiÛ (d.255/868-9), to whom Schoeler devotes a few pages, noting that he continued the tradition of artistic Arabic prose begun in the preceding century by such writers as ÝAbd al-ÍamÐd al-KÁtib and Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ. In the ninth and tenth centuries more and more religious scholars (sing. *ÝÁlim*) began writing real books (*syngrammata*) also, either following the pioneering work of SÐbawayhi or copying the manner of the men of letters. Of particular interest in historiography are Ibn HishÁm (d.218/834) and al-ÓabarÐ (d.310/923), after whom the publication of many works no longer took place by recitation within the framework of a school but in written form. In the ninth and tenth centuries also, poetry, and

narrative and historical-biographical materials received their definitive shape and were transmitted in written form, as were the collections of traditions and the manuals of Arabic literature. However, religious scholars (*ÝulamÁÞ*) still continued to write and to publish in the traditional way what remained 'school literature for the school,' destined to be recited and to be published by being recited to and copied by students. Such works remained *hypomnēmata*. Even after works were transmitted in written form, the personal encounter with a teacher and transmission by recitation (*qirÁÞa*) and hearing (*samÁÝ*) were neither abandoned nor held in low esteem, for these guaranteed a degree of accuracy that simple copying could not.

In the conclusion, Schoeler looks for influences on the development and transmission of Arabic literature and finds: (i) pre-Islamic poetry; (ii) the Jewish schools of the Talmudic period (200CE-500CE), whose method of authentication by *isnÁd* was introduced to Islam by Jewish converts; and (iii) the late Alexandrian schools, from which recitation (*qirÁÞa*) and hearing (*samÁÝ*) would have been borrowed. Thus, the Islamic system of transmission of knowledge appears as a synthesis of elements coming from three cultures, Arabic, Jewish and Hellenistic-Christian. As for the post-classical *madrasa* period, the means of transmission by hearing continued as an ideal, as did the practice of exposing orally a (real) book to be studied. This method of transmission even found a new form from the eleventh century on, that of the certificates of hearing (*ijÁzÁt al-samÁÝ*, *samÁÝÁt*); these documents, which multiplied in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, showed that it was not the manuscript itself but the participation at a scholar's lectures that authorized the transmission of a book.

Ali Mirsepassi
***Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran*,**
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xiv +227 pages.

Reviewed by Mangol Bayat[1]

The publication of Edward Said' *Orientalism* in 1978 and, more recently, of Samuel Huntington's 1993 article "*The Clash of Civilizations*" in Foreign Affairs, has engulfed the scholars of Modern Middle East Studies into a merciless war of the pen that threatens to outlast the scholarly validity of their respective theses, as the Iranian Revolution, the rise of political Islam and the imminent military confrontation in Iraq keep up the heat. Mirsepassi's book is yet another to be added to the list of Said's advocates, waging another battle against the Orientalists and Huntington's proponents.

A sociologist teaching at Hampshire College, Mirsepassi is primarily interested in the question of modernity and the politics of modernization as they evolved in Iran since the early twentieth century. Critical of the established scientific discourse of modernization, including the Marxist, he denounces its Euro-centric narrative and its emphasis on economic activities as the "most meaningful aspects of life," to the detriment of native cultures deemed "self-delusional fantasy."(p.6) Mirsepassi presents Iran as an excellent case study of a modernizing society desiring material development yet insisting on preserving its local cultural identity. Thus, he rejects the idea of universalistic precepts of modernity, claiming that the Euro-centric conception rests on a western self- image distinct from the Other. Proponents of authenticity, he notes, refused to abide by this universal-modernist scheme, which "do violence" to local cultures; and local cultures "became natural and effective axes for politicization in any society" (p.11) undergoing the process of modernization. Here, the author admits that local politics, based on local identities, is the "invention of resistance against western power," (ibid.) but, he insists, it is not anti-modern per se. Colonial Powers, he further argues, have successfully applied their conception of modernization through the establishment of centralized authoritarian state apparatus, which subsequently facilitated the emergence of repressive regimes. Post-Cold War conflicts and, more specifically, the 1978 Iranian Revolution seem to reinforce the Orientalists' stereotypes. Both the academic and media perceptions of the non-western world are responsible for "unleashing a conservative modernist backlash which suppressed critical thought about the troubled genealogy of modernization in the Third World," perpetuating a "legacy of exclusion and domination."(p.17) Such an imperial power/knowledge frame of analysis, he states, forecloses the possibility of real "local" experiences and real "local" contribution in the realization of modernity. He therefore offers to "theorize carefully," in seven separate chapters, "the relations between the legacy of imperialism, modernity and modernization" (p.5) and, in the process, "lay bare...the other face of modernity," with its "brutal intrusions" spread all over the world. (p.10)

In chapter one, Mirsepassi endorses assertions attributed to Edward Said and Timothy Mitchell that "modernity created and preserved a conviction that the non-western world could exist only as modernity's other."(p.15) Like them, he points to the role played by the imagined "other" in the western self-definition of its modernity. Three sketchy discussions of Montesquieu, Hegel and Marx help him explain how the West has forged an identity "by means of contrast." A totalizing ideology, he writes, was "constructed upon the notion of...the other,…a prerequisite for the

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internal solidarity and durability of its own innermost structure."(p.18) Though he summarily acknowledges the historical fact that Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* targeted the absolutist monarchy and church hierarchy in France, he prefers to stress the French philosopher's legacy in creating "a totalizing dichotomy between himself and his opponents," which helps "fashion a cardinal tendency in the western paradigm of modernity persistent to this day."(p.24) Mirsepassi likewise sees the Hegelian system of thought, which places Asia, the Orient and the East in general, in a lower grade of development, as totalizing and racist, legitimizing colonialism as the only means to civilize the East. In contrast to the West, Oriental society is declared static, Oriental mind irrational, Oriental political structure despotic. Thus, the Oriental cannot attain freedom. "All the liberal, enlightened, and progressive triumphs in western modernity have had their interdependent counterpart in utterly illiberal, violently totalizing, and destructive assaults upon other peoples."(p.35) As to Marx, the author tells us, his materialist conception of modernity entailed a possibility for the colonized people to liberate themselves; hence his immense appeal in the Third World. But Marx' critique of western society was not accompanied by a change in attitude, for, influenced by the Orientalists' writings of his time, he viewed England's conquest of India as a necessary precondition for its social and economic emancipation. England was the "unconscious tool of history."(p.38) Having thus traced the Orientalist genealogy to the European philosophers, Mirsepassi exposes Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations," which rests on the same rational West/ irrational East divide, as "transcending the particularities of politics and history in the twentieth century."(p.43) Lewis' judgment of Islam as incompatible with the realities of the modern world since it rejects secularism and modernism, and Huntington's theory, built on Lewis' thesis, of the so-called "fault line," culturally divide the East from the West. Both carry on classic Orientalist rhetoric, he explains, except that Huntington breaks away from it with his renunciation of the universalistic characteristics of modernity. Modernization of the world, according to the latter, can by no means be equivalent to westernization. All other cultures are thus denied any constructive role in the making of modernity.

Mirsepassi condemns the impact of the Orientalist narrative, stereotyping and classifying intellectual currents in Iran under traditional/modern or Islamic/western dichotomies. Yet, nowhere in the book does he offer any definition of modernity, not even an historical account of its development. The reader is left without any concrete understanding of the author's meaning of the term. Consequently, his analysis carried through the next six chapters reflects the same essentialist characteristics as the Orientalists', adopting an identical polemical tone, though with a diametrically opposed ideological objective. He wishes to rectify the Orientalist approach by "seeking to explore Iranian efforts at localizing (reflexive) modernity within their own contemporary cultural experiences and contexts."(p.55) But he only ends up dismissing the 1905 Constitutional Revolution as merely an attempt at "reconciliation through capitulation"(ibid), having failed to "localize" western tendencies of modernity or even to lay the foundation for a viable democracy. He admits that the period 1941-53 indeed led to social and cultural transformation, yet makes no reference to the legislative and institutional legacy of the Constitutional period that had prepared the way for this brief democratic interlude. After the 1953 Coup, he writes, the shah destroyed any possibility for real modern secular politics to develop. Here, too, ideological polemics eclipse scholarly analysis. The currently conventional assessment of the rise of the mosque and bazaar as centers for underground opposition helps Mirsepassi to formulate a sweeping statement: "The locational transformation of political activities in the post-Coup period contributed to a process of desecularization of politics and public life in Iran."(p.71) The secular left, mostly then in exile, was too divided and paying too little attention to Iranian social and cultural needs to contribute significantly to national political development. Thus the

ascent of political Islam owes much to the fragile foundations of secular politics and the regime's repression of secular parties.

Mirsepassi carries further his uncritical acceptance of the conventional analysis with his statements on the Pahlavi's excessive modernizing-secularizing policies. He admits that the shah's persecution of the secular opposition "inadvertently worked to the advantage of Islamic politics,"(p.72) and Shi'i institutions enjoyed greater freedom. But he downplays the regime's most important religious programs that nurtured the theological discourse throughout the 1953-78 period. Thus, he does not inform the reader that the State had encouraged, even sponsored those very institutions and organs that provided a convenient platform for the Shi'i ideologists, lay and clerical, concerned as it was in undercutting the Left as well as contributing its share to the Cold War. Each university had its own on-campus mosque, religious assemblies and activities. The university of Tehran established a faculty of theology, where the Ayatollahs Motaherri, Tabataba'i and others played such a dominant role in rejuvenating Shi'i Islam, away from the conservative Qom seminaries. One cannot overstate the fact that religion formed an important part in Pahlavi secular politics, paradoxical as it may sound. Thus, the Islamic movement was not united, as the author claims;(p.84) Tabataba'i made no contribution to the conception of the *faqih* as a political leader, as he asserts;(p.86) the famous collected essays on *Marja'iyyat* could by no means be construed as aiming at forging a "Shi'i theory of Islamic government in the context of changing Iranian society and in the global context,"(p.87) a common mistake among writers with little or no knowledge of Shi'i theology and terminology; and Khomeini certainly did not belong to the *usuli* tradition of clerical leadership, neither before nor after the Revolution. The 1950s and 60s Shi'i revivalist movement was social and cultural, not to be confused with the later Islamic political protests and revolution, even though many of the members of the former joined the latter by the late 1970s. Before writing a more definitive narrative of the Islamic/modern "clash" in Iran, scholars have to wait for archival materials to be declassified, reliable primary sources to be accessible, and major players in these events to release personal information.

The segments in the book devoted to Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati are much more nuanced in the careful analysis of the two intellectuals' ambivalence toward religion and the ambiguities inherent in their political messages. Each offered a critique of modernization in its westernization form, and both, in their search for authenticity, articulated the call for a "return" to a "nativist" ideology, preparing the ground for an Islamic political movement. But here, too, the author errs in his unquestioning acceptance of Al-e Ahmad's condemnation of the secular Constitutionalists and defense of Ayatollah Nuri, the anti-Constitutionalist cleric who supported the reactionary Qajar shah. He also fails to warn the reader that Al-e Ahmad had no concrete program of political action, not even a clear definition of the so-called Iranian modernity. How does he understand Al-e Ahmad's vague statement: "Islamicize the machine by rooting it in Iranian culture?"(p.109) Shariati, on the other hand, was much less ambiguous in his call for the "return to the self," and the author has an easier task analyzing his thought, but, once more, fails to convince this reviewer that Islamic popular politics "articulated an alternative discourse to overcome western-centered projects of modernization...to accommodate modernity within the context of her own historical and cultural experiences and specificities."(p.94) As Mirsepassi himself shows both Al-e Ahmad and Shariati were thoroughly modern men, reared in Pahlavi Iran, products of secular schools at home and, in the case of the latter, in Paris. Their intellectual frame of references consisted of western schools of thought and not the traditional Islamic theology. Indeed, the author refers to their "anti-modernization romanticism,"(p.105) but reference must also be made to the "mood of the time" in which they wrote, the second half of the twentieth century, when secularism, closely identified with the Pahlavi regime, even though it

predates it, lost its appeal among the *revoltes*. Fifty years earlier, when the religious authorities controlled society and culture and worked together with the Qajar rulers to enforce the law, the young in revolt called for the separation of religion from public and state affairs.

Attempting to demonstrate his theory that "social movements based on discourses of authenticity are internal to modernity,"(p.129) Mirsepassi discusses three German intellectuals, Nietzsche, Juenger and Heidegger. He sees parallels in the social conditions of Germany in the 1920s and Iran in the 60s and 70s, without seriously demonstrating the validity of this assertion. His summary of the three Germans' thought in no way prepares the reader to perceive "abundant" parallels between them and Al-e Ahmad and Shariati. The longing for an authoritative tradition, the critique of the "absence of conviction under modernity," the search for a new dawn, the tendency to reinvent the traditions of their society, and the view of authenticity as a "third way through modernity,"(p.157) may indeed characterize the Iranians' thought, but do not sum up the German philosophers'. Nonetheless, these perceived parallels help the author's rejection of the Orientalists' categorization of the West/reason and the Third World/faith divide, and prove the irrelevance of Huntington's theory. "The experience of modernization," he concludes, "is inseparable from one of violent intervention."(p.158) In an earlier chapter he had even predicted that "radical mass movements were likely to emerge in modernizing nations based on ideologies of cultural authenticity," which must be seen as "significant forces of modernity for our time," and not as "religious fanaticism."(p.128)

In chapter six, which was originally published as an article in 1991, Mirsepassi discusses the "tragedy of the Left" in Iran. Despite its century- long rich history and experience in Iran, he argues, by the 1970s the various left-leaning groups lost their vigor, clinging rigidly to abstractions, while the Islamists "unabashedly appropriated large portions of leftist discourse for their own purposes."(p.160) The religious movement, he writes, was better prepared and more united to take over the course of the revolution. However, the return to Islam, the author ponders, is "hardly the solution to the political and cultural crisis in Iran...Who defines 'identity' and 'culture'...There is no consensus on the subject."(p.179) Citing Adam Ulam, the late Harvard historian of communist Russia, who wrote that the Bolsheviks brought an alien European ideology (Marxism) to power with the support of rural proletarians uprooted and disoriented in an urban setting, Mirsepassi writes: "One could actually apply Ulam's thesis to the Islamists rather than to the leftists."(p.214, footnote 21) This explicitly expressed view contradicts the main thesis of the book. The puzzled reader may ask the author for a clearer definition of the term modernity, if only to avoid the sense of confusion and the nagging, recurring impression that his thought may be closer to Huntington's than he realizes.

Marilyn Booth
May Her Likes Be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. xxxviii + 460 pp. Notes, selected bibliography, and index.

Reviewed by Antje Ziegler[1]

The last two decades have witnessed a remarkable upsurge in interest in Middle East women's studies. New approaches have been developed, particularly by scholars in North America, where the field is more firmly established than elsewhere and better represented through such lively forums as the Association for Middle East Women's Studies (AMEWS), and the Berkshire Conference on Women's History. Working with a broad definition of 'feminism', no more confined to the organized women's movement, and drawing much of their inspiration from poststructuralist and postcolonial theories, they seek to explore the transformation of women's lives within a multiplicity of contexts, namely those of state and nation-building, anticolonialism, concepts of modernity, and changing social and political orders. In so doing, they do not only challenge the assumptions of previous studies of women and feminism in the Middle East, but also gradually redraw the picture of Middle Eastern Societies as a whole from the late 19th century to the present.

If recent works have specifically focused on Egypt as a major country in the region with a long history of modernisation, one of their central concerns has been the analysis of gender and gender politics. Marilyn Booth, author of *Bayram at-Tunisi's Egypt* (1990), translator of Egyptian women writers, and currently visiting professor of comparative literature at Brown University, has long been interested in the link between sexuality and textuality, and gender and genre in modern Egypt. In her work since the early 1990s, she has demonstrated how women in late 19th/early 20th century Egypt set out to develop their own discourse through alternative forms of writing, e.g. biographies of famous women, and how they deployed this new sub genre to reformulate gender roles during a period of overall social and political reorganization. While Booth's book under review can be seen as the culmination of long-term research, it should also be recognised as the first study of its kind to provide a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the struggle over women's status in Egypt via biography during the past century.

Booth argues for "an approach to the writing of biography in modern Egypt that contemplates it as a gendered discourse of prescription by way of encouragement, a discourse of exemplarity through which women explicated and explored their situations and their hopes, a discourse of circulating texts in which women and men proposed and debated their ideas on social change and the pertinence of women's lives thereto." (p. xiv) Her key primary sources consist of "571 biographies published in eighteen magazines focusing on women as writers, subject, and/or audience from 1892 to 1939, plus selected additional biographies from other magazines and collections from 1879 to 1967." (p. xxxv) A number of further biographical sketches are taken from the contemporary Islamist press.

Booth's point of departure is Zaynab Fawwaz's *Scattered Pearls on the Generations of Mistresses of Seclusion*, a work, which in fact was not the first biographical dictionary of women authored by a woman at the time of its publication in 1894. Yet it was without precedent as it included non-Muslim and non-Arab subjects and was to serve as a source of inspiration and

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information for editors of the emerging women's press in which life narratives of "Famous Women" were soon to become an institution. As Booth illustrates, Fawwaz firmly situated herself within the centuries-old male-dominated Arabic tradition of life-writing and simultaneously counteracted it with her own practice. Whether by expanding the range of subjects to comprise women from both East and West, both modern and ancient, shifting emphasis to the female self, modifying the use of conventional diction of praise, or by overt editorial comment, Fawwaz significantly rewrote the classical genre to befit new visions of ideal womanhood and to carry new messages of female potential and achievement. Her portraits of notable women shaped a canon and set a pattern replicated and reworked in women's magazines to serve competing agendas in turn-of-the-century Egypt's intensified gender debate.

In Chapter Two, Booth introduces the range of journals featuring biography between 1892, when the first periodical for women in Arabic appeared, and 1939. She scrutinizes these journals' politics of address and choice of subjects to define target audience and purpose of their presentations of women's lives within the context of Egypt's shifting political scene. If journals, as Booth explains, diverged in both audience invocation and subject according to their distinct interests and the ethnic and religious differences that governed their orientations, they more or less unanimously articulated a didactic intent aimed at shaping the 'New Woman' of the rising urban middle class. This class-based definition of readership and exemplarity led to the construction of a collective female identity in biographies of the period that largely ignored issues of social fragmentation, conflicting nationalist ideologies and power relations under British colonial rule, while it firmly linked the woman's cause to the nationalist quest, especially after active participation by women in the nationalist demonstrations of 1919.

In Chapter Three, Booth turns to the rhetoric and internal patterning of biographies in the early women's press. She examines strategies that implicitly or explicitly signal the intention to give guidance through example, such as closing a biographical sketch with "The Lessons to Be Learned from This Life", or naming the subject a "paragon" and "fine model", the use of local precedents in different nationalist frameworks, or the deployment of conventional complimentary phrases that take on new meaning in their immediate publication context. One of these formulae of politesse is the multiplication formula from which Booth derived the title of her book. Female exemplary biography, as the author suggests, was by no means an Egyptian phenomenon only. In the North America of the mid-nineteenth century and earlier in Europe "Famous Women" profiles had been most popular, and since such biographical accounts were accessible to Egyptian writers, they may have provided a source of inspiration for their Arabic counterparts.

Chapters Four and Five trace the biographical construction of ideal female images as an integral part of the emerging nationalist, feminist and anti-feminist discourses. Booth demonstrates that throughout the period, "Famous Women" engage in a double move, when they celebrate women's professional or public careers, while asserting the primacy of domestic duty. If the domestic imperative in the presentation of women's lives became more insistent in the late 1920s and 1930s, Booth sees this, on the one hand, as a reaction to the growing criticism at the time of women's increasing political demands and career ambitions and a reflection, on the other hand, of a nationalist ideology that viewed the European-style nuclear family with the companionate wife-cum-household manager at its centre as the cornerstone of the nation and equated "motherly" duty with "patriotic" duty. Unlike previous scholarship on gender politics in Egypt, Booth argues through her study of biography that emphasizing the domestic as the woman's sphere served as much to constrict as to extend the frontiers of their movement into other spaces.

Booth then examines the image of Jean d'Arc as the most popular subject of biographies in Egypt before the 1952 revolution and especially during the anti-British fervour of the 1920s and 1930s, when writers expropriated the image of the French saint from its Western origins to celebrate her as the epitome of anti-imperialist struggle and turned her into an idealised representation of the peasant, the symbolic backbone of the nation. Booth follows this by a brief account of the sensationalist narratives in the entertainment press of the 1930s that were more likely to focus on criminals and beauty queens than on paragons of domestic virtue and preferred to turn life stories into love stories. If biography as a mode of imagining alternative lives waned in the women's press of later decades, the author ascribes this both to the growing presence of autobiography, letters and memoirs in magazines and elsewhere, and to the increased respectability of fiction. Booth concludes her study with a discussion of the wave of biographies produced by Islamist-oriented publishing houses in present-day Egypt, in which the pious wives, mothers and daughters of early Islamic heroes serve as proper models for imitation, while Western women, if at all, are relegated to the status of anti-exemplars. In contrast to the "Famous Women" of almost a century ago, she labels these texts "Famous Wombs", i.e. portrayals of women noted first and foremost for delivering Muslim sons, the future guardians of belief.

May Her Likes Be Multiplied gives fascinating insights into the manifold and often contradictory ways in which biography in Egypt was and still is utilised as a vehicle for defining and regulating social behaviour through prescribing norms for the modern female. Well structured, though occasionally overloaded by the wealth of details imported from the author's extensive reading, the book is captivating for the subtlety of its arguments, the remarkable sensitivity to contextualizing biographical sources, and the brilliant rendering into English of quotations from Arabic. It is rather a pity that the book is riddled in places with critical/cultural theory jargon, rendering it inaccessible for the uninitiated. Otherwise, a wider readership may have been able to benefit from this study at a time of tension between Islam and the West, when the need is at its highest to understand the complex interplay of the ideological concepts underlying public debates in Middle Eastern societies. Nor will it be out of place to point out here that readers acquainted with Booth's earlier work may find themselves treading on well familiar terrain, as various chapters of the present volume are merely expanded versions of previously published articles, reference to which is strangely absent. This having been said, there is no belittling the innovative quality of Booth's study. It is a stimulating and memorable contribution to women's and gender studies that should prove equally valuable to anthropologists, sociologists, and literary comparativists, not to mention historians of the Middle East, and especially those interested in the evolution and development of the Arab press.

Towards New Typologies of Muslim Society

Riaz Hassan
Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society
Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0 19 579633 0, pp. 276.

Reviewed by Reza Pirbhai[1]

At a historical juncture in which scholarly interest is particularly focused on Islam and its contemporary adherents, Riaz Hassan offers a timely work. *Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society*, explores Muslim views on the very issues currently under scrutiny by more than academics: piety, community consciousness, self-image, the state, gender and the 'other.' Hassan's conclusions are based on 4,500 interviews of urban, educated Muslim men and women from Indonesia, Egypt, Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Couched in a well-conceived methodology and a lively discussion of theoretical implications, the data gathered and the author's insightful analysis makes a substantive contribution to the sociology of Islam, while remaining accessible to a broader readership.

Hassan's methodology begins with the writing of questionnaires in the dominant vernacular of each area and fielded by local research institutes. The author's theoretical approach regarding the questionnaires is considered along with Hassan's theoretical approach below. The four states mentioned above were chosen, quite naturally, because of their large populations and contrasting geographical, historical, political and cultural characteristics. The restriction of respondents to the urban, educated 'middle' and 'working' classes, on the other hand, is dictated by the "sociological insight that the middle class plays an important role in shaping the social, economic and political conditions in modern societies."(p. 21) Thus, two-thirds of the respondents are from the middle class, equally split between "professionals" (university professors, medical doctors, army officers, etc.) and "religious activists" ('*ulama*', *imam*s, administrators of religio-political organizations, etc.).(p. 35) Whether or not this sample is sufficient to gauge 'Muslim' attitudes on the whole may be debated, but it is certainly broad enough for Hassan to further sociological discourse on the typology of Muslim society, which he identifies among his ultimate goals. The theoretical perspective from which Hassan approaches the writing of his questionnaires and the interpretation of the data gathered draws from various sources. On attitudes toward 'piety,' Hassan follows the approach of R. Stark and C.Y. Glock, covering core beliefs, rituals, devotionalism, and experiential and consequential religiosity. (pp. 41-47) M. Watt overwhelmingly influences the author's line of inquiry regarding 'self-image'. He divides the community into "traditional" Muslims, circumscribed by the unchanging finality of *Qur'an* and *Sunna*, and the need for a society based on *shari'a*; and, "liberal" Muslims, who acknowledges the need for periodic reinterpretation of scripture and the role of reason/empirical evidence in the definition of knowledge. (pp.116-119; 128-30) Attitudes toward the 'Islamic State' are approached under the influence of the historical writings of I. Lapidus and N. Keddie, dividing these socio-political institutions into two classes.(pp. 146-47) Hassan terms the first 'differentiated,' referring to the separation of religious and state institutions, and the second is 'undifferentiated,' in that religious and state institutions are integrated. Moreover, he interprets attitudes toward the state by the light of N. Luhmann's typology of the role of religion in modern societies - one in which 'religious' and 'secular' institutions compete for influence and are judged

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according to their performance in delivering social services.(pp. 161-65) Ultimately, the above variety is tied together by the writings of J.B. Tamney and E. Gellner, in so far as they argue that the relationship between 'modernization' and 'religious purification' is one in which 'purification' is not a reaction against 'modernity,' but a feature of 'modernization.'(pp. 6-15)

Given the self-conscious choice of diverse social spaces, it is not surprising that Hassan finds significant attitudinal variations based on local factors. For example, in his discussion of most attitudes, his findings show that the Soviet experience sets Kazakhstanis apart from all others, irrespective of the respondents, class, age or gender. In his discussion of 'self-image,' Hassan reveals that although age and class play a role in every area, the respondent's gender is not a great factor in assessing the degree of 'liberal' to 'traditional' attitudes in Indonesia and Pakistan, but plays a large role in Egypt. (pp. 122-35) In addressing attitudes toward the 'other,' he shows that the majority of Pakistanis are alone in their negative perceptions of India, while Egyptians alone think that Judaism will rise to new heights of influence in the future. (pp. 209-22) Nevertheless, Hassan also presents cause to argue that local conditions are not alone in determining Muslim attitudes.

Hassan observes that 'Islam' in general exerts a unifying influence that supercedes the local. He shows that attitudes towards "piety" and "community consciousness," as well as the segments of society in which specific variations occur, whether in Indonesia, Egypt or Pakistan, mirror each other. 'Piety' and "liberal attitudes" are calculated as inversely related in determining "self-image" in all states. Attitudes toward veiling and patriarchy are also hugely similar, as are attitudes toward the 'other.' For example, anti-US sentiment is universally dependent on its Israel policy, and anti-Russian feeling unanimously due to its war in Chechnya. (p. 217-20) The degree of uniformity and identification, in comparison with the manner of regional variation, ultimately prompts Hassan to declare that the "Muslim ummah is more a reality than myth."(p. 103) In his concluding remarks, the author adds that based on evidence of "strong religious commitment among a majority of Muslims from all walks of life…grounded in the traditions of scriptural Islam," one must acknowledge that the Muslim World is undergoing a "religious renaissance."(p. 223) In Hassan's final estimation, he offers his findings as validation of Tamney and Gellner's ideas in that 'renaissance' is occurring in the 'modern' social space of the middle class and is scripturally 'puritanical,' or in Hassan's terminology, "fundamentalist" Islam. Hassan's conclusions are coloured by the assumptions inherent in the theoretical framework he employs and do leave room for improvement. Apart from the glaring omission of any substantive discussion concerning the intellectual and institutional consequences of colonialism in this work – a point submerged in the concept of 'modernization' – a number of subtler concerns have not been addressed. For example, Watt's definition of the 'traditional' and 'liberal' Muslim, corresponding with Gellner's concept of 'High Islam' and 'Folk Islam,' (pp. 137-41) are themselves questionable means of characterizing Islam and Muslims. As Watt and Gellner describe 'High/traditional Islam' as elite, scriptural and legalistic, one is left to wonder whether Islamic philosophy, theosophy and other such 'elite' disciplines are to be considered 'Folk Islam'? Moreover, the definition of 'Folk Islam' as popular, syncretic and anti-legalistic does not leave room for the activities of scripturalist and legalistic Sufi orders among the masses. Nowhere does Hassan address such concerns.

The above particulars do not diminish the force of Hassan's reasoned agreement with Gellner, *et al.*, that 'puritanism' is a feature of 'modernization,' rather than a mere reaction. However, these particulars do suggest that the relationship between 'Islam' and 'Modernity' should have been taken into consideration if Hassan's findings are to be meaningfully utilized for further research on the construction of a typology of Muslim society. Putting this aspect of Hassan's argument

aside, however, one certainly cannot fault his methods or statistical analysis. The questions he poses are well conceived, insightfully presented, and the responses he reports make for fascinating reading. Assessing the work as a whole, therefore, one must conclude that *Faithlines* deserves the attention of any scholar whose field touches upon contemporary Muslim society.

Forget the New Historians: Here are the New Economists.

By Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler
The Global Political Economy of Israel
London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, pp. 407.

Reviewed by Markus R. Bouillon [1]

Since the eruption of the new Intifada in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in September 2000, Benny Morris' subsequent desertion from the revisionist camp of Israeli historiography and the attempts to remove Ilan Pappé from his position at Haifa University, critical scholarship in and on Israel has suffered one blow after the other. With the publication of Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler's *The Global Political Economy of Israel*, however, the challenge to the established discourse about Israeli society and history is not only renewed, but also taken further in a far more radical fashion than ever before. The account Nitzan and Bichler offer is not only a radical re-interpretation of Israel past and present, it is also a major contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon commonly referred to as "globalization," as well as a radical challenge to established disciplinary boundaries and our approach to the study of politics and the economy.

Nitzan and Bichler, one an economist trained at the University of Toronto, the other a political scientist educated at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, break down the boundary between politics and economists altogether, going beyond even those traditional perspectives of political economy, which argue that the political and economic spheres are intrinsically linked. According to them, the two realms are not only linked; they are one, and manifestations of an essentially holistic process of social change. The first key to understanding this process of social change is capital, which is nothing but social power, measurable quantitatively in monetary value, but encompassing important social and political dimensions. The second key element in this approach to understanding social change is the accumulation of capital: Capitalists, according to Nitzan and Bichler, do not seek to maximize profits, but really measure their success or failure against the average: As they argue, if the average growth rate is 30%, and an enterprise achieves a rate of 15%, the business falls behind. At the same time, if a business grows by 2% in a recession, it gains. Differential accumulation, as the authors term it, is the underlying feature leading to a commodification of power: Power is increasingly shaped by the dominant business groups; those that persistently manage to beat the average. Hence, power is both a means of- and the end to accumulation and becomes the driving force of social change. A positive rate of differential accumulation can be incurred in two ways, either in periods of "breadth" or in times of "depth." Breadth means simply to expand employment, while depth means to raise profit per employee. In other words, periods of breadth are times of general expansion, when dominant capital usually seeks to expand faster and more successfully than the average, while times of depth are crises, during which most suffer, but a few manage to remain more profitable (or to lose less) than the rest.

Politics, or the state, its policies, and the mode of social organization, then are shaped by this process of differential accumulation. Indeed, the outlook of the state is little but a reflection of the historical evolution and specific path that differential accumulation takes. Similarly, international

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relations mirror the global regime of differential accumulation and cannot be severed from their foundations in economic relations and domestic political economy. Having established this theoretical framework underlying social dynamics at large, Bichler and Nitzan turn to the case of Israel, which they investigate not as a unique case, but as a global political economy. The implications of this term are twofold: For one, it refutes the widely held belief that Israel is a unique case. Secondly, the analysis exceeds Israel geographically and involves global economic and political processes. Hence, Israel's emergence as a rapidly expanding, high-tech economy during the 1990s is not a sudden departure from the decades-long policy of statism and interventionism, but in fact a manifestation of its progressive evolution as a capitalist society, embedded in a larger global process of differential accumulation, which underlies the phenomenon of globalization. In this sense, the framework Nitzan and Bichler outline transcends the conventional dichotomies between politics and economics as well as between the domestic and the international, thus offering a perspective leading to an integrated, comprehensive account of social developments and transitions. This theoretical approach can be applied to other cases and will hopefully yield similarly challenging and interesting accounts of other countries' transformations as well as of conflicts between them, since conflict is often an accompanying feature of periods of economic 'depth regimes' of differential accumulation.

In what follows, Nitzan and Bichler tell their history of Israel, focusing on the dominant business groups and individuals, who have shaped the evolution of what was once called the "most socialist economy" outside the Eastern bloc towards a seemingly liberal, globally integrated economy and society. In Israel, they argue, the state provided a cocoon for the nascent business sector to develop, under the cloak of the Zionist movement's quasi-socialist ideology. Israel developed rapidly for the first two decades after the establishment of the state. On the basis of fast population growth, fuelled by immigration into urban areas, Israel skipped a stage in the developmental process where significant improvements in agricultural productivity underwrite urbanization and proletarization, and entered this second stage immediately. Like Hong Kong and Singapore, Israel was out of "sync" with the global dynamics of differential accumulation until the 1960s and then increasingly began to converge with the global cycle of breadth and depth regimes. Hence, together with the rest of the world, Israel entered a depth phase in the 1970s, which manifested itself in the economic crisis and hyperinflation that lasted until the mid-1980s. As the global cycle moved back towards a breadth regime of differential accumulation during the 1990s, so did Israel, and hence the emergence of the liberalized "high-tech" economy.

Throughout this evolutionary process, however, the dominant business groups – Bank Leumi, Bank HaPoalim, Koor, Clal, and the Israel Discount Bankholdings (IDB) – began to exert increasing influence and to shape the social institutions of the state. This process was accompanied by a social process of elite consolidation, manifested in the emergence of what Nitzan and Bichler call the Israeli "dynasties," which intermarried and cemented the bonds between them as well as between political, military, and economic elites. Until the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, the state and its collectivist institutions such as the labor union federation, Histadrut, which simultaneously represented workers' and big business interests, provided the umbrella, under which these business groups emerged in a 'breadth' period. These groups further consolidated their power in the context of a 'depth regime', despite the overall crisis. This was made possible by a deal under which the large core conglomerates of the Israeli economy manufactured defense equipment, while their profits increased ahead of inflation. This mechanism mirrored the global "weapondollar-petrodollar connection," as the authors term it, a group consisting of US arms suppliers, large oil companies, and their allies in the OPEC countries, all of whom expanded their power significantly in the years of crisis.

When the global economy switched back to a 'breadth regime', in the context of the neo-liberal discourse on liberalization and globalization, Israel followed swiftly. The core business groups had accumulated so much power that the cocoon could be dismantled; the Histadrut's influence was curbed, the state drove a massive liberalization program, which enabled the dominant conglomerates to link up with globally operating capital – and Israel became a developed and globalized political economy. *The Global Political Economy of Israel* is a highly challenging account of the Jewish state and argues that post-Zionism may not simply be a new ideological development, but may indeed be the logical consequence of Israel's evolution as a capitalist society. In many ways, thus, Nitzan and Bichler take further the work of scholars such as Gershon Shafir or Michael Shalev, who have earlier argued that political economy is the key to understanding Israel in the past and in the present. It is also an all-out, all-round attack on political scientists, international relations scholars, and liberal and neo-liberal economists, which invites a great deal of controversy. Although the evidence is sometimes presented in an anecdotal style (which may serve as an excuse to discard an inconvenient analysis for many) it is thorough and deserves to stir up controversy, not only with regard to the interpretation of Israel's past, but also with respect to the general theoretical understanding of what politics is and how social change occurs.

The sole disappointment with this book is the somewhat obvious editorial neglect it has been afforded, as typos are frequent. Nevertheless, Nitzan and Bichler deserve the attention of a larger audience. All those who read the New Historians and followed the debates on the revisionist historiography closely, as well as those interested in globalization and its implications for the social and political spheres, should study this book intensively and consider its interpretations and wider implications. Disagree one may, but ignore, one cannot afford. Forget the New Historians, these are the real revisionists.

Amin Maalouf
Ports of Call.
Translated from French by Alberto Manguel, London: Harvill Press, 1999. 197 pages.

Reviewed by Tony Cheung[1]

"Are you certain that a man's life begins with his birth?" The man asked of his interviewer. It was a rhetorical question, of course, but it was more. The *Ports of Call* by Amin Maalouf is a story of a man who lived, and loved during a turbulent period of the Eastern Mediterranean, when it underwent dramatic political and cultural transformations during the 20th century. This is the time and place from which the tale was to unfold. The novel is written from the point of view of the interviewer; he records the tale, as told by its protagonist, over a period of four days.

The question asked of the interviewer at the beginning is significant, because for our protagonist, Ossyane, life began a long time before his birth. Ossyane was born in Beirut to a Turkish father and an Armenian mother. His father was no ordinary Turk, but the son of an Ottoman princess gone mad, and her physician husband. As with many others, Ossyane's father wanted his son to accomplish great things. "Ossyane" means "Rebellion", because his father had wanted him to become a great revolutionary leader, one who can reshape the destiny of the East with an understanding of the West. That burden drove Ossyane away from his father to the study of medicine in France in 1938, but as fate would have it, there he became something closer to his father's vision than he had ever imagined. During the Nazi Occupation, he joined the Resistance, and became a minor hero. It was also during that time he met the love of his life, Clara, a Jewish resistance member. They parted ways the day after their meeting, but were reunited after the war when both had returned to the Levant; Ossyane to Beirut and a hero's welcome, and Clara en route to Palestine. Ossyane quickly proposed marriage and Clara accepted, but the times were not particularly favourable to their union, for the tensions between Arabs and Jewish settlers in Palestine were rising, with the potential of setting the entire Middle East aflame.

Ossyane and Clara enjoyed a short period of marital bliss, during which they resided in both Beirut and Haifa, their two ports of call, but their happiness were short-lived. Upon receiving the news that his father was on his deathbed, Ossyane had to leave the then pregnant Clara in Haifa due to deteriorating conditions of travel, and returned to Beirut alone. Within weeks the State of Israel was proclaimed and the first Arab-Israeli War erupted. Husband and wife found themselves on different sides of the border. Ossyane rapidly descended into madness. With his father's death shortly before, and his sister's absence in Egypt, his remaining brother Salem had him committed to an asylum. Ossyane spent the next twenty-three years of his life there. It was hopeless for him until a visit from Nadia, his daughter with Clara, sparked something in him and started him on the road of regaining his sanity. That road was long and torturous, but by the time civil war had erupted in Beirut, Ossyane was ready to leave. He walked to the French embassy and called on Bertrand, a friend from his days in the Resistance, for help; a passage to France was quickly arranged. In France he sent a message to Clara with a time and a place; it was during the three-day wait until their rendezvous that Ossyane ran into our narrator, and told his story.

Amin Maalouf's *Ports of Call* was above all else a beautiful story. The life and suffering of an individual during those turbulent years told with such moderation, and yet also with flashes of passion. Ossyane's tale is so moving in part because of how he told it, without polemics or

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condemnations, but nevertheless quietly bemoaning lost chances and missed opportunities. The pathos of the tale is perhaps best understood through Ossyane's opening question: Are you certain that a man's life begins with his birth? The life of Ossyane, and his father, and Clara, and countless others in the novel were shaped by forces and circumstances beyond their control, by the larger political and cultural transformation taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 19th and 20th century; the crumbling of Ottoman rule, the First World War, the French Mandate in Lebanon, the establishment of the Jewish state, the civil war in Beirut. These events have indigenous causes but they were also largely the results of happenings in Europe and in the wider world.

What is the significance of Ossyane in *Ports of Call*? What is Amin Maalouf trying to convey through his character? Ossyane represents the best of the cosmopolitan tradition of the Levant seaports, Beirut in particular, prior to its convulsions that gripped that city and the Arab world. Ossyane was comfortable in both Beirut and Montpellier, at ease in both East and West. He is fluent in French and German, the languages he used to correspond with Clara. Ossyane is representative of the cosmopolitan attitude of the people and the cities of the Levant. Yet as Nezar al-Sayyad rightly states, "[h]ybrid people do not always create hybrid places, and hybrid places do not always accommodate hybrid people."[2] The tragedies of the people and cities in the novel were so poignant precisely because they were hybrid places with hybrid people who, like Ossyane and Clara, have multiple identities. Yet neither Ossyane nor Clara could have done anything to prevent the destruction of their world. His 'madness' is therefore a powerful metaphor, for it is not a result of losing one's mind. As Ossyane had recognized himself, he never lost his mind completely. A small part of Ossyane, and therefore the greater number of individuals whom he represents, had too clear an understanding of the world around them. What made the civil war in Lebanon so unnecessary and tragic is the fact that the violence, the separation along confessional lines, stemmed from the very cultural diversity and pluralism that had defined Lebanon and Beirut for much of its history.[3] Indeed, as the episode in the book when Ossyane's father and his maternal family fled Adana, the decision to immigrate to Beirut was made precisely because Mount Lebanon was known to be a place of diversity and acceptance. Ossyane's madness is the result of knowing all too well the origins of the conflict and what it would do to the people and the world that so he loves; it stems from a sense of frustration and helplessness of seeing his world shattered.[4] This 'madness' was undoubtedly common among those who lamented the lost of that pluralistic world, and Amin Maalouf is certainly among them. Yet if there are those who grieve for the lost of that world, there are also those who rejoiced in the violence in its place. There was Sikkin, who grow more joyful with each passing day as violence escalates. The asylum in which Ossyane resided was in a sense a microcosm of the outside world, of Beirut perhaps, but also of the entire Middle East. In it there is Ossyane, of course, but there were also other inmates. These are the ordinary people, they cannot make sense of the world they live in, nor do they fully comprehend how the world got there; they do not share Ossyane's powerful sense of frustration of a cosmopolitan world shattered, but they share fully his sense of helplessness. These are the people who become "homeless" in the multiple existential senses of the word: dislodged, living as outcasts, and with only nostalgia as their

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[2] Nezar alSayyad, "Hybrid Culture/Hybrid Urbanism: Pandora's Box of the 'Third Place'," in his *Hybrid Urbanism, On the Identity Discourse and the Built Environment* (Westport, London, Praeger, 2001), 16.
[3] Samir Khalaf, "Contested Space and the Forging of New Cultural Identities," in *Projecting Beirut: Episodes of the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City*, edited by H. Sarkis and P. Rowe (Muenchen, Prestel, 1998), 144.
[4] Khalaf, 143.

reprieve from the anxieties of the present.[5] There is Lobo, an inmate who fully comprehends the world around him, but is beyond frustration and helplessness. He has fully resigned from that world, choosing to be the perpetual observer and keeping his sanity instead. Yet it was only with Lobo's guidance that Ossyane was able to live through his worst period of madness.

What are the wider implications of *Ports of Call*? It is a tale of a turbulent period in the Middle East, of course. It is also a portrait of life in the Levant seaports prior to its convulsions. It is a moving love story. It offers an opportunity to view the conflicts in the Middle East from a very personal perspective, beyond casual perusal or clinical objectivity, for as the narrator concludes at the end of the book, he is no mere passer-by. Yet most importantly, it is a tale of how individuals like Ossyane felt and lived during those times. It is a description of the cosmopolitan-minded individuals watching in disbelief, yet always with a sense of fatality, the destruction of their world.   Still, all was not lost, for Ossyane did regain his sanity and saw his Clara again. The world that Ossyane had known and loved may be has been destroyed, but it does not mean that it is gone forever. He lives still, and therefore Amin Maalouf holds the hope that a little part of that world may yet live on.

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[5] Khalaf, 144.

Marc Gopin
Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 269pp.

Reviewed by Markus R. Bouillon [1]

Marc Gopin's book *Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East* is a challenging book. Gopin, a trained rabbi and expert in conflict resolution, employs a wide range of approaches and perspectives from negotiation and conflict resolution theory, cultural anthropology, and psychodynamics, in order to illustrate the significance of cultural and religious factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its potential resolution.

Highlighting a usually neglected and understated field of conflict analysis and resolution, Gopin outlines the underlying tensions between Jews, Muslims, and Christians, which contribute to the conflict over the Holy Land. As he claims, culture and religion "unquestionably play a critical role in numerous conflicts," and "the challenge is to tease out the subtle ways in which religion and culture interact with conflict" (p. 4). Gopin rightly underlines the fact that students of conflict have generally neglected this subject. What follows is both an intriguing analysis and a highly personal account, drawing on Gopin's own experience and involvement in conflict resolution initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians. Particularly interesting is the perspective the rabbi and scholar offers on how religious leaders and actors can engage in dialogue and seek avenues out of the conflict. The examples of rabbis and sheikhs engaged in dialogue and the search for peaceful coexistence are impressive and provide initiatives through which to pursue peace and understanding between Jewish Israelis and Muslim and Christian Palestinians. Yet what makes this study an interesting and challenging read also implies its shortcomings and indeed, danger: Gopin bases his perspective on conflict resolution on the argument that inter-religious rivalry has played an important, if not crucial role, in exacerbating and prolonging the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given his neglect of a more thorough discussion of the historical roots of the conflict, the impression emerges of a clash of civilizations, between Jews on the one hand, and Muslims on the other. The interpretation Gopin puts forward is that the differing accounts of the Abrahamic family myth in Judaism and Islam have shaped Jewish-Muslim and Israeli-Palestinian relations.

This inevitably brings up the question as to whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is really this, a clash of faiths and civilizations or whether it has ultimately been a political conflict between two rivaling nationalist movements, between Zionists and Palestinians. Gopin's examples drawing on his personal experience illustrate his own, perhaps misleading, interpretation of the conflict. As he writes, "the role of religion in perpetuating the conflict hardly needs delineation: Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Jewish assassins, nationalist religious parties, aggressive seizing of land in the name of God, suicide mass-murder in the name of God, outside religious entities with vested interests in worsening the conflict, Jerusalem as an object of desire and conquest by all three religions, holy sites as burgeoning reifications of the conflict" (p. 6). Yet, are not Hamas and the Islamic Jihad essentially political movements, which employ a discourse drawing on religion in order to justify and attain their political goals? Was not Yigal Amir, the assassin who murdered Yitzhak Rabin, motivated by a right-wing ideology that was only cloaked in religious language? Is not the aggressive seizing of land an outgrowth of Zionist ideology, which in its beginnings was almost anti-religious and solely employed a religiously inspired discourse to further the

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nationalist project? Is not Jerusalem a symbol capturing the difficulties in resolving the political conflict between the two nationalist movements? It may be true that religious and cultural elements are used to exacerbate the conflict, to hurt the feelings of the respective "other," yet they are no more than accompanying factors in what is essentially a protracted political struggle. Similarly, if Gopin writes that religious and cultural factors need to be integrated into the analysis of the conflict in order to appeal to the moral consciousnesses on either side, he may be mistaken in assuming essential elements standing in the way of resolving the conflict on either side. Most Palestinians today recognize the suffering of Jews, which led to the emergence of the Zionist movement and the subsequent realization of its nationalist ambitions with the establishment of the Israeli state. However, is there not a universal, rather than particularistic, logic at play here in that the Palestinian people had no part in the injustices suffered by the Jews, mostly in Europe, yet had to bear the consequence?

When Gopin speaks of the "living memories of horrible abuse in Europe" that make it "absolutely jarring to hear a Christian call me brother" (p. 15), his perspective suggests an essentialization of this conflict in religious terms. But did the Holocaust really originate in the century-old Christian suspicion of Jews as "Christ-killers"? Furthermore, while Gopin goes on to demonstrate pathways of peace for the children of Abraham, his analysis unfortunately betrays his own cultural misconceptions of the "other:" Consider the following episode, which Gopin relates on page 25.

> *I remember that in one of my first street encounters with a Palestinian, in 1983, I actually was not afraid to look him in the eye. I had been to Israel several times before as a child and naturally never was allowed by elders to associate with Arabs. In the 1970s, fears dominated those who prevented me from talking to them, fear of terrorists or potential murderers, but somewhere in the 1980s this fear turned into racial and ethnic disdain, increasingly exhibited by both sides in various ways. I went to Israel in 1983 out of pain. The siege of Beirut, the slaughter at Sabra and Shatila, had shattered much of my self-conception as a Jew and as a newly minted rabbi, and I went to Israel to do peace work with fellow religious Jews committed to Arab-Israeli peacemaking. But I had no conscious plan to meet Arabs; I had many reasons to fear them. After all, significant groups of terrorists considered me – and still do – a legitimate target of warfare simply because I was born Jewish.*

Gopin tells with pride here that he was not afraid to look a Palestinian in the eye. He also tells that he went to Israel to do peace work, yet had no plan to meet Arabs. If this is the starting point for resolving the conflict, then indeed, overcoming the cultural and religious roots of prejudices and misconceptions may be important. Yet for many Israelis and Palestinians, encounters are a daily part of their lives and have little to do with religion, which in any case plays a minor role in the lives of the vast majority of people on both sides. However, while, in this sense, the analysis falls short of providing a convincing account, Gopin's real contribution lies in outlining the examples of inter-religious dialogue that may offer one method amongst others to overcome enmity and attain peaceful coexistence among Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, this should not disguise the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will ultimately have to be solved on the political level, as a struggle between two societies with their respective yet competing nationalist ambitions and ideologies.