

the war, of course, both services, in spite of this, held out on us and it was only toward the end of the war that we achieved really good understandings.

Now having taken this point of view, I've ever since said that I had clearance from the President of the United States and that I would not submit to any further inquiries or the like. So I've never filled out a questionnaire on clearance and I've never applied for formal clearance on anything. Yet I have, I suppose I still have, all the clearances there are.

There was one instance, I guess it was when Bedell Smith was head of CIA, when he asked me to review a report that was going to the President which had some technical things in it and I agreed to do so. Then he said, "Well, of course, we'll have to go through the regular clearance procedure." I said, "To hell with it. Review your own report; I'll do no such thing." I added to Bedell, "I don't know whether you've been cleared by the regular procedure." That was the end of that particular discussion. The next morning three men from the CIA were in my office with their highly secret document and nothing more was mentioned about clearance.

Another instance was when I lunched with the AEC board. They had some stuff to discuss with me and in the course of the discussion it was quite obvious that they were pulling their punches. So I proceeded to ask them two or three very direct questions, such as the size of the stock pile. They looked horrified and said nothing. I said,

- 1) WWII
- 2) BUSH's POSITION ON HIS CLEARANCES
- 3) BEDELL SMITH's CIA REPORT AND BUSH's CLEARANCE
- 4) AEC LUNCHEON and "I THINK IT'S GOING TO RAIN."

"Gentlemen, I apparently have a partial clearance with you. I do not work under those circumstances and we'll talk about the weather." And we proceeded to do so. They'd ask me a question and I'd tell them I thought it was going to rain, and we ended the lunch that way. [X-REF BACK TO P. 275.]

- 1) WWII
- 2) AEC LUNCHEON and "I THINK IT'S GOING TO RAIN"
- 3) BUT FOR HITLER THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE SUED FOR PEACE EARLY

Nothing more was ever said about this either, although later on somebody took something up with me in regard to AEC's affairs and remarked to me casually that I had a Q Clearance. I don't know how I got it; I suppose by direct vote of the Commission. I've taken that point of view throughout and I think it's had a salutary effect in a few places. This is quite a digression from your question but I think it's a pretty good place to bring it in.

* * *

Now your next part of this question is about the Germans and why they didn't fold up sooner. I think it goes very simply back to the fact that Hitler held his control by his terroristic methods right smack up to the end of the war and it didn't make any difference what the military thought. The critical point on this, of course, was the time when there was the attempt on Hitler's life which failed. Undoubtedly the very ruthless steps that he took immediately after sealed himself in his position long enough so that he could hold out a desperate resistance after the Germans well knew that the war was gone. I think the Germans would have sued for peace way back before the Normandy invasion if they had been allowed

to do so. About the attempt on Hitler's life, you may be interested in this:

There were some tests on the coast of California; in fact, right off the land owned by the great Hearst. These were tests on ways of taking tanks ashore through the surf. They had flotation tanks on the sides to buoy them up and these had charges to release them after they got to the shore --blow them off.

I was out on the Pacific Coast anyway for some reason or other. I was with, I guess, General Moses. At any rate they persuaded me to go look at these tests. We rode down the coast in a Navy craft, small one, and they held the tests--in which some of the tanks sank, but fortunately the men escaped through the hatches. The tests were highly unsuccessful.

Then that night after the tests were finished we started back up the coast. We were all very thoroughly tired out. I was sitting in a little cabin and there were two men with me. One of them was General Dempsey, the British general who later became quite famous. [EH NOTES: REFERENCE.] I've forgotten the third man's name, but he was also British. We were sitting in wicker chairs and I think all three of us were either asleep or pretty close to it. The radio on the wall was going but very low, so that we hardly noticed it until suddenly it began telling the story of the attempt on Hitler's life.

- 1) WWII---
- 2) TESTS IN PACIFIC OFF HEARST ESTATE WHEN VB HEARS OF ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE

We all three came awake with a bang. The radio's volume was so low that we could barely understand it -- only catch snatches. But we didn't dare touch the dials for fear we'd tune it out completely. So we listened to what we could get and it finally quit. Then we sat down and very much awake, discussed the thing. Discussed what would happen if the attempt was successful and what would happen if it was not -- for we did not at that moment know the end of the story at all and didn't until we got to shore. It was quite a dramatic affair.

Of course that was one of the saddest things that happened through the war. If they'd really got Hitler at the time the war would have very soon been over.

This argument that the "unconditional surrender" terms prolonged the German struggle does not impress me at all. There was only one man making the decisions on the German side as to whether to continue the struggle or not and that was Hitler. He knew he was finished no matter what the conditions of the peace were. For if he wasn't bumped off by the Allies he most certainly would be by the Germans the moment he lost his control. So I haven't taken much stock in that argument that the words used at the time made a difference. If one's going into negotiations or anything like that, the first thing that one does in every case of course is to make demands beyond what one thinks the other fellow will accept. The unconditional surrender affair might easily have been just that. At any rate I don't think it made any difference.

- 1) WWII
- 2) BUSH HEARS NEWS OF ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE
- 3) "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER" TERMS

Question B37: Differential Analyzer in Norway not Used by
the Germans; Story about Pike

In Norway there was a chap named Rosseland who was an astrophysicist and fairly early in the differential analyzer affair after Hartry had built a machine at Manchester, Rosseland also constructed a machine in Norway for his purposes. Now it was pretty well done and pretty well assembled I understand when the Germans invaded Norway. The group in the laboratory disassembled it in a hurry and when the Germans came in, it was in pieces all over the place. The Germans evidently had been told about the machine and told to get it. But Rosseland and his crew managed to convince the Germans that it was no good, and the Germans went back to Berlin without it. It's just another case of German stupidity of course and German unwillingness to believe any other race but the Master Race could make machines which were any good.

Throughout the war the ballistics work in the United States was done on the differential analyzer principally and the Germans didn't have that particular aid. Rosseland, incidentally, escaped to Sweden and then got over to this country. The machine was not highly important of course. One could compute ballistic tables in various ways and it wasn't essential anyway -- ballistics tables not having the importance they were once thought to have. But the story's interesting as a case where the Germans fell down flat on their faces.

- 1) WWII
- 2) ROSSELAND OF NORWAY
CONVINCES GERMANS
HIS DIFF. ANALYZER
WAS NO GOOD

The other story that you have on this question is quite a long one and that's about this chap Pike who was a child psychologist (I believe) and who after the war committed suicide. He had no standing with British science but in some way got at Lord Louis Mountbatten and sold him all sorts of bills of goods. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 138]

One thing that he sold him was the idea of an invasion in Norway and we were pestered with this thing and so were the British and the Canadians. [EH to VB: STAVANGER, NAMSOS & TRONDHEIMER WERE ALL IN 1940 WEREN'T THEY? WHAT PIKE DATES ARE WE DISCUSSING HERE?] [VB to EH: '42 or '43. PUTNAM KNOWS AND LETTERS SHOULD SHOW.] In fact one of my section that worked on the Dukw actually built a snow machine which later became the Weasel and is still used. That was started because of the idea that troops were going to be dropped with snow equipment in Norway and were going to overrun the whole place.

It was a fantastic sort of an idea. Another one that caused all sorts of trouble is one I've told about somewhere else I think and that's the story of the iceberg that was to be a landing field in the middle of the Atlantic. This one sold to Mountbatten resulted in the conference that I've already told about where Mountbatten let Pike run along until I finally shut him up. [EH to JK: NOT PREVIOUSLY FAMILIAR TO ME. CHECK.] [JK to EH: SEE MARCH 1965 ATLANTIC MONTHLY ARTICLE (IN FILE).] [X-REF FACK TO PP. 138-139-A]

- 1) WWII
- 2) PIKE SELLS MOUNTBATTEN ON INVADING NORWAY
- 3) IDEA OF INVADING NORWAY RESULTS IN THE WEASEL
- 4) ICEBERG FOR A LANDING FIELD

Pike was running all over Washington and pulling off all kinds of things. He was such a nuisance to my outfit and such a threat that finally I issued orders that anybody who had a conference with Pike on technical matters was to write down the substance of that conference afterwards and get it into my files. I soon had quite a collection of this stuff.

It was fortunate I had, because Pike finally brought charges against a very good American general -- I think this was General Moses. [VB NOTES: IT WAS.] In other words he went direct to the American Secretary of War and complained that an American general was blocking British efforts, and so on. [X-REF BACK TO P. 468] Since it was technical stuff, Stimson's aide called me up and told me that the Secretary wanted to see me and told me the subject was Mr. Pike. I went over to the Secretary's office and when he brought up the subject, I said, "Well Mr. Secretary before you go on with this matter, I have a file here that I think you ought to read. It's a record of the conversation that Mr. Pike has had with men in my organization." I handed him the whole thing and that's the last that I ever heard of the thing, and the last that Moses ever heard of it, I feel quite sure.

Anyone reading that record would see at once that the guy was out to make trouble in any way that he could. He was so much of a nuisance around the Joint Chiefs that it became fantastic. Finally the Americans got sufficiently

- 1) WWII
- 2) PIKE'S TROUBLE-MAKING AND BUSH'S FILE ON HIM.
- 3) PIKE ATTACKS GENERAL MOSES

annoyed so that I think right in the Joint Chiefs themselves the Americans said that they'd had enough, and Pike was ordered out of the country.

I know the day he left I dropped into Bedell Smith's office (he was then the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs) and said to him I understood that a great friend of his was about to leave for Britain. He looked puzzled for a moment and then he said, "Oh yes, yes, yes. I'm going to get on my heavy boots." [X-REF BACK TO P. 468]

Well, that's principally the story of Pike. What it illustrates is that if there is a man in high places, as Mountbatten was, who has no judgment in regard to highly technical matters he can be made into an awful nuisance by some promoter who's got a lot of wild ideas. It certainly happened in this case and I've never, of course, had great admiration for Mountbatten since; a man in his position certainly ought to know enough when something wild is presented to him to get opinions on it from people who are in a position to have good judgment on it. [X-REF BACK TO P. 139]

I've only mentioned two things that Pike furthered. I suppose there probably were a dozen in all, many of them I didn't even hear of probably. [EH to VB: IDEAS NEED MORE SPECIFICATION.] Why did Pike commit suicide after the war? I never found out and I'd really like to know. It would be

- 1) WWII
- 2) PIKE IS ORDERED OUT OF COUNTRY
- 3) MOUNTBATTEN'S POOR JUDGMENT IN USING PIKE AS ADVISOR

Reel 11-A
Page 697

interesting to wonder whether his conscience troubled him;
I doubt it. There must have been something else. But at
least out he went. [EH to JK: EDIT RESEARCH POINT re
PIKE'S END.]

1) PIKE COMMITS
SUICID

* * *

Question B38: Amplification of Experiences with
Congressional Testimony

This is question B-38. Why, I think I told you about my general experience in appearing before Congressional Committees and the fact that when I started in I was scared and I got finally so that I didn't mind and then I got so I enjoyed it. Also with that I think at first I did it very crudely and finally learned how to do it well enough not to get into trouble.

The first time I ever appeared before a committee of Congress was when I was representing NACA. I kind of think you'll find something about this in a reel somewhere. But before the House Committee I know I made a couple of errors in the way I presented things and went home and told Phoebe that I had made an error and I thought it cost me five million dollars, or rather cost the NACA that. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 71 & 262]

Now the worst one was [over ?] [even ?] [the worst one ever was ?] before McKellar which was the Appropriations Committee of the Senate where they interrupted me and balled me up or tried to. I finally got mad and told them I thought they didn't intend to have a hearing. They all jumped on me at once and I'd insulted the Committee. We finally cooled down and agreed to cancel all the record that had been made and to start all over again.

- 1) CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
- 2) FIRST TESTIMONY ON NACA MATTERS
- 3) APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE BRAWL

That's the kind of thing that happened at first and it wasn't good at all. Later I learned that with a committee which really wanted to get at the facts, one could get along pretty fairly well if he merely gave them the facts that he knew they wanted in a simple way and without elaboration. The best way to handle a Senator or Congressman trying to raise the devil was merely to ignore him or to look amused or something of the sort and certainly not to get heated. So I learned after a while.

The thing that jars me is that many of the people who go before Committees of Congress don't take the trouble to learn at all. It's the same way with people who make speeches. Very intelligent men never learn the simple tricks of making a speech. I suppose they think it's beneath their dignity or something. At any rate the ways in which intelligent men ignore, neglect simple things of that sort has always appalled me. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 147 & 149]

Oh, the story about appearance before Kefauver is this. Well, I sent you a reel of tape the other day and sometime when you can project it I think you'll enjoy it.

[EH to JK: WHERE IS?] [X-REF FORWARD TO PP. 769 & 770]

It's all about the hearings on the pharmaceutical affairs and you can skip most of it but here and there through the thing I appear and looking it over you can get an idea of how I handled Kefauver and why I enjoyed doing so.

The next hearing on that subject was before Celler in the House and when I got through with that I didn't like

- 1) CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
- 2) SIMPLE SKILLS FOR TESTIFYING AS FOR MAKING SPEECHES

the result at all merely because I thought I hadn't done a good job. The trouble was this: I had studied Kefauver. Of course I'd appeared before him before, but before I appeared before him this time I got clearly in my mind where he was vulnerable, what his general approach was, what his attorney who asked questions was like and so on, so that I was prepared. I didn't do the same thing when I went before Celler, and I should have. If I'd had Celler's characteristics in mind much better than I had, I would have done a good job over in the House also.

I don't know that other people thought I did a bad job, but I know I did and I know the reasons for it. It was merely because I studied the subject and did not study the man. In appearing before any Congressional Committee where anything serious is up, one of the important things is that the witness should know something about the people on the other side of the table. It's fundamental and elementary. I neglected it in that case and I didn't like the result a bit. Although, as I say, in general people thought it was all right, I guess. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 147 & 149]

- 1) IN CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY YOU MUST DO YOUR HOMEWORK: THE SUBJECT AND THE MEN
- 2) TESTIMONY BEFORE KEFAUVER A
- 3) TESTIMONY BEFORE CELLER

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Question B39: Radar: Its Origins; Watson-Watt; Merle Tuve

- 1) PRE-WWII
- 2) ORIGINS OF RADAR
- 3) WATSON-WATT

The origins of radar have been written up in various places and I won't try to reproduce the whole thing here. [VB ADDS: THE TIZARD BIOGRAPHY GIVES THIS STORY WELL.] As usual, and as is to be expected, a large number of people had important parts in the final development of radar. I think the earliest experiment that really amounted to anything was the Tuve and Bright affair [X-REF BACK TO P. 131] that I've already mentioned where they got reflections from airplanes flying overhead although they were trying to do something quite different. The British and the Americans independently were developing radar for military uses before the war and, as you know, the fact that the British had done this had a great deal to do with their success in the Battle of Britain. What I want to emphasize is first that this was not a one-man job anywhere. Those things never are. Dozens of people were involved.

Now about the position of Watson-Watt. Watson-Watt I think was more of a promoter than anything else. He certainly promoted Watson-Watt plenty and has been very successful at it. [VB ADDS: This is not quite fair. He at least did a good job as the head of their radar lab.] But now let's give the man his due. Before the war, it was pretty hard to get the British going vigorously on anything and there isn't any doubt that Watson-Watt's pounding on the radar affair

accomplished a great deal in getting the British to pay a little attention. [VB ADDS: But Tizard's pounding did more.] There's also no doubt whatever that the fact that they paid real attention and got their radar into pretty good shape saved their necks when the German Air Force attacked.

- 1) PRE-WWII
- 2) WATSON-WATT FORCES
BRITISH TO DEVELOP
RADAR

Remember that Charles Lindbergh before the war was saying in speeches that the German bombing forces would reduce Britain in a week or two; that the only thing that America could do was to stand aside and preserve its neutrality and look to its continental defenses because the fate of Britain was sealed. Lindbergh was listened to because he once flew an airplane across the Atlantic. [X-REF BACK TO P. 105]

In Britain there were men who did not think so and men who went hard to work at it in spite of the lethargy about them and the skepticism of the men in the military and so on. Watson-Watt deserves a lot of credit for this.

Of course, any man that puffs out his chest and claims to have invented radar and God-knows-what gives me a pain in the neck, and so does Watson-Watt. I give him the credit that he well deserves and at the same time say I have no particular use for him personally. If you trace the full story of radar if you feel like doing it, you'll find that his prominence I think is due primarily to his promotion, which was very important and very well done, and not to his inventions.

When Tizard came over in 1940 and before, of course, the U. S. had gotten into the war, when NDRC had been formed but was just barely getting started, Tizard managed to arrange for British-American interchange on radar. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 298 & 425] It was hard to do so, for one reason because the British thought they were well ahead of us, and our people thought they were well ahead of the British. That is, in military circles. But the interchange was finally accomplished; it was then found that the British indeed were far ahead of us. And they were far ahead of us because they had developed the magnetron and made it useful. [EH to VB: MORE ON MAGNETRON.]

[VB to EH: The Radiation Lab at MIT did lots of work on better and more powerful magnetrons. Their great work was on "centimeter" that is shorter wave length radar.

[One great improvement was the strapped magnetron. This was the work of Percy Spencer of Raytheon that I have written about.] [END ADD]

Strangely enough the idea of the magnetron appears in German patents well before the war and yet the Germans never developed it. The British developed it and used it. I don't know, but probably without seeing the German patent. In this country we developed it very rapidly and very thoroughly. But the British gave us our start on it.

When the interchange occurred however, it was not altogether one way. There was one problem that we had solved.

- 1) PRE-WWII
- 2) TIZARD AND ANGLO-AMERICAN INTERCHANGE ON RADAR

that the British hadn't, I believe. This was the problem of a good "gate". [EH to VB: CORRECT TERM?] [VB to EH: YES] When you're working a radar a very powerful transmitter sends out a brief, powerful pulse of radiation. And then the transmitter is turned off and a very delicate receiver is put into operation to listen to the echo. As can well be imagined it's pretty difficult to so shield a receiver that it can stand up in the immediate proximity of a very powerful transmitter and yet be delicate enough to listen to an echo from a little airplane miles away. The switching mechanism to do this was really quite important in the whole development of radar and I believe that the Americans were well ahead of the British on this and that hence the British received some help during the interchange.

At any rate there isn't any doubt that the two groups in collaboration went ahead faster than would have been the case if they'd continued to operate independently.

- 1) PRE-WWII
- 2) ANGLO-AMERICAN
RADAR INTERCHANGE
- 3) AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
OF A GOOD GATE

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Question B40: National Science Foundation

Caryl Haskins recently gave some lectures at Princeton which are now being published in book form. I reviewed two of them. They're not too satisfying. His first one in particular annoyed me because there was a lot more language than thought. The principal thing that he's doing or trying to do is to contrast two types of organizations in government. One, a pyramidal affair and a good example of that today is NASA where the head of NASA is appointed by the President, reports directly to him and in turn carries his authority into the full organization. The other type has a buffer which for one thing can protect it against political pressure and for another thing, and I think equally important, ensure that its moves are made in the light of the judgment of a board that is more than just an advisory board hung on as an afterthought. A good example of this is the National Science Foundation where the board has the opportunity to recommend the appointment of its director and recommend appointments for replacement. Of course this still leaves the power in the hands of the President but a President will not go around the recommendations of a board of that sort if he's got any sense whatever. In fact if he's got any sense he will welcome the buffer because it protects him as well as the director from political pressure.

- 1) CARYL HASKINS BOOK
ON GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATIONS
- 2) NASA A PYRAMIDAL TYPE
- 3) NSF HAS A BOARD WHICH
ACTS AS A BUFFER

This is the basis on which the National Science Foundation was set up. It was first set up in the bill in this form. The President vetoed it and said he wanted the form that is illustrated by NASA. The second time it was passed I managed to keep him from vetoing it because I pointed out to him the value of a buffer to him.

Now those are the two forms and OSRD was one of the first form. The first form is the best form to use in time of war when there's not time for mature deliberations and getting the committee together and compromises and so on, but there has to be action. One of the reasons for putting OSRD out of its misery at the end of the war was just that: it was not adapted to peacetime. Of course another reason for putting OSRD out of business was the fact that most of its personnel promptly lit out for the universities and left the place without any staff. [X-REF BACK TO P. 140]

The suggestion has been made many times that there ought to be a similar organization in peacetimes working on weapons. I disagree. The show could work in wartime first because it's much easier to get collaboration between civilian and military in time of war. It couldn't work in peacetimes for many reasons -- not in the same form. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 255-256]

- 1) NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION BILL:
BUSH PERSUADES
THE PRESIDENT
- 2) OSRD A PYRAMIDAL
ORGANIZATION--BEST
FORM FOR WARTIME

Question B41: Phinney Baxter and the Hornets

What? You don't remember the story of Phinney and the hornets? I'm sure I must have told it, and Phinney has told it a half a dozen times in speeches so that there is nothing novel about it.

- 1) PHINNEY HISTORIAN OF OSRD
- 2) PHINNEY & THE HORNETS

Phinney was the historian of OSRD and he did his best to be acquainted with the whole thing and to write up a good report. Incidentally he did it without making any money personally out of it which was quite a proper thing to do since people writing the history of the Radiation Laboratory for example were doing just the same thing.

During the war I had a rule that I'd take Sundays off. If I'd tried to work seven days a week I'm sure I wouldn't have lasted at the rate we were going. I didn't always succeed. Somebody'd call me up and I'd have to go over to the Pentagon. Hap Arnold was one of the worst of these and I remonstrated with him that if he kept up his pace he wouldn't last and indeed he didn't. [X-REF BACK TO P. 177]

One time Phinney arrived back in town and insisted he must see me on a Sunday morning. I finally told him to come out. It was in the summer and we sat out under the trees. There were some yellow jacket hornets flying about just a few inches above the grass. Phinney was a little nervous about them. I told him he needn't worry. that they were tame hornets. After a while about three of them tackled him at once. They left me alone because I was smoking, but they

went over and prodded him and he went two or three feet in the air. Then I told him that they were tame hornets all right but that I always sic'd them on anybody that made me work on Sunday. I pointed out to him that he'd been sitting right smack under a hornet's nest about ten feet above his head. These hornets were a different species, it's true, but that didn't spoil the story. Well, Phinney's told that all over the place so it's an old story to anybody that you might reach with it.

1) PHINNEY & THE HORNETS

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Question B42: The (Nelson) Rockefeller Board to Study
Reorganization of the Defense Department

I've already recited I think the fact that I appeared before Eberhart's Committee at the time of the Hoover second study of government organization and recommended reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and got nowhere because Eisenhower told them everything was all right.

[JK to EH: On Page 592 Dr. Bush discusses going before the first Hoover review of organization before Patterson Committee and here he talks about the Hoover second study before Eberhart Committee.]

About the time that Ike was on his campaign for the Presidency, I got together with Bob Lovett who was retiring as Secretary of Defense and he and I agreed quite thoroughly that there was no sense in the way that the Joint Chiefs operated. [X-REF BACK TO P. 593] We had in fact three war plans instead of one; there wasn't real coordination. The Joint Chiefs as a body never really reviewed the program of one of their members or objected to it and so on.

I made a speech or two on this subject or wrote an article or something, and of course I checked with Bob Lovett before doing so to be sure that I wouldn't embarrass him, and Bob in his final report to the President said quite flatly that something needed to be done. [X-REF BACK TO P. 390]

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) BOB LOVETT
- 3) REORGANIZATION OF
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
- 4) JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF

The papers picked this up and of course it was in the middle of the campaign so Ike, when he became President, did the thing that people always do under those circumstances: he appointed a committee. The chairman of the committee was Nelson Rockefeller. I was one of the members. (They couldn't very well leave me off.) General Bradley was also a member. It was a good solid committee. The only member who was a pest was David Sarnoff, but he quieted down. We had quite a lot of discussion, meetings, testimony, and we finally put in a report that had quite a number of recommendations.

The most important recommendation was for a re-organization of the Joint Chiefs plan. What we recommended was this: we prefaced it by saying there were various solutions and that we presented one only. We recommended the appointment of a planning body as a part of the Chiefs organization but made up of men of equal military stature to the Chiefs and reporting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense with the provision that the Joint Chiefs could comment on their recommendations but could not alter them.

Now this sounds like a small point but it would make all the difference in the world. Such a body, divorced entirely from its services, would take a unitary point of view to a very considerable extent. Men could be found who would do that. The Joint Chiefs have their loyalty as commanding officers to their services and just can't divest

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) ROCKEFELLER BOARD TO STUDY REORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
- 3) DAVID SARNOFF A PEST ON THE COMMITTEE
- 4) RECOMMENDATIONS OF BOARD FOR JOINT CHIEFS REORGANIZATION

themselves of this. Hence they can't unite in planning to any real extent. This other body could and it was very important that while they were in a sense subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs could review and comment on their reports but couldn't change them. That would mean that their thoughts would really get to the Secretary of Defense and the President. We would have had unitary planning for the first time.

Well, we visited with Engine Charlie Wilson and went over the report. He approved it all and we took it up with Roger Keyes who was the Under Secretary of Defense and who, incidentally, made the Department work. They both approved it so we took the report in. The President received it and approved the whole report as a unit, in some language which indicated at least that he had no quarrel with anything he'd seen there. So that was it, and it called for a very radical step. [X-REF BACK TO P. 390]

After a year had gone by, Engine Charlie called the Committee back to listen to what had been done about their report. There was a room full of people. I was sitting beside Nelson Rockefeller. Wilson went over what had been done about a half a dozen recommendations and never touched on the one which we considered to be our principle recommendation. Incidentally, before we had put the report in, we had gotten agreement with it, at least to the point of making no objections and so on from Marshall, Nimitz and Spaatz and

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) ROCKEFELLER BOARD
- 3) WILSON, KEYES & IKE
AGREE TO BOARD'S
RECOMMENDATIONS

Bradley on the committee had supported it. [?] So it had good military backing from people who knew about the Joint Chiefs.

Wilson never touched on this and when it was evident that he wasn't going to, I said to Rockefeller, "I don't think he's going to touch on our principal recommendation. If he doesn't, I'm going to bring it up." He said, "You bring it up and I'll back you up and we'll get some real light on this subject."

When Wilson had finished his story, I said, "Mr. Secretary, I've been waiting for your comments as to what has been done about our recommendation in regard to the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." He gave me a long, involved reply and in the middle of it Nelson Rockefeller said to me, "Van, I don't think the Secretary knows what the hell we're talking about." And I'm quite sure he didn't.

Now it was easy enough for the Joint Chiefs to sidetrack a thing like that. All they had to do was to tell the Secretary that they were doing something equivalent or something of the like. But Eisenhower knew what the faults were with the Joint Chiefs, knew perfectly well what they were, and never did a doggone thing to correct it. None of it ever got corrected until MacNamara came in under the Kennedy Administration and he put the Joint Chiefs in order. Of course he got attacked all over for doing it. [JK to EH: THIS STORY HAS NOT COME UP BEFORE--ONLY THE PROMISE TO TELL IT.]

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) CHIEF RECOMMENDATION OF ROCKEFELLER BOARD (JOINT CHIEFS PLANNING BOARD) IS IGNORED
- 3) VB BLAMES IKE
- 4) MacNAMARA CORRECTS FAULTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS

[EH to JK: THIS IS THE FULLEST AND CLEAREST TREATMENT OF THE JCS BIZ.] [JK to EH: THERE NEEDS SOME STRAIGHTENING OUT OF THE PATTERSON, EBERHART & ROCKEFELLER COMMITTEES.]

I have had all sorts of feelings about Ike.

Remember I knew him way back when he was a colonel and during the war I didn't have much to do with him but all of the relations I had were excellent. We were on a good basis which is shown by the fact that he and I discussed at length his going to Columbia and so on. After he became President I hardly saw anything of him. I only saw him once or twice. This I also understand because he'd got Lewis Strauss as his principal scientific adviser and I know perfectly well that Lewis Strauss would be much happier if I wasn't around talking to his chief. So I can understand all that. [X-REF BACK TO P. 590]

But it's very hard for me to understand some of Eisenhower's blind spots. One I've mentioned, the fact that in his books he barely mentions the proximity fuze or the Dukw and I don't think he ever mentions OSRD. Another one that bothered me terribly was when he really ducked his responsibilities in regard to the Joint Chiefs, presumably because he didn't want to take rugged actions against some of his old friends. Since then I've been worried still more by various things that he hasn't done, the latest one being the fact that he didn't really take the leadership of the Republican Party. It looks to me as though he sacrificed some of his principles for the sake of the Party. Inasmuch

- 1) BUSH ON IKE
- 2) BUSH's AMBIVALENT FEELINGS TOWARD IKE
- 3) IKE's "BLIND SPOTS" LARGELY SINS OF OMISSION

as he didn't know whether he was a Democrat or a Republican for a long time, I can't understand why a man would sacrifice his principles for that kind of a situation.

So I have two feelings about Ike. One of them is very friendly. I remember one time when he had one of his dinners for businessmen in the White House. [There were] about forty of them there and after dinner we gathered in small groups and Ike circulated around from one to the other. I remember that I was in the group with Owen Young. He was asking me questions about my early origins so I told him I worked with the General Electric Company at one time. He asked me why I left and I said, "I was fired." He said, "At least we have shown some sense at one time in the history of the company." [X-REF BACK TO P. 19] So we were having a good jovial time and then Ike would visit the group and we'd discuss seriously for a few minutes.

When that meeting started there was a heavy snow storm in Washington. I'd been in Providence and when I got the news that heavy snow was coming I got back to Washington in a hurry. I was met by my good old servitor who took me out to my house so that I could get dressed and managed to get me down to the White House through the tangle of traffic and so on. I got there after the drinks had been served and the waiters had left the room. I wasn't late for the dinner but I certainly was late for the drinks.

- 1) BUSH's AMBIVALENT
FEELINGS FOR IKE
(Continued)
- 2) IKE's FRIENDLINESS
AT THE DINNER MEETING

When I went in, Ike greeted me and promptly said, "You haven't had a drink" and instead of calling a waiter, went out into the kitchen or somewhere and got it himself and brought it in. Now that was the friendly Ike that I was very fond of. But what his internal thinking mechanism does under strange circumstances is more than I've ever been able to grasp.

1) IKE'S FRIENDLINESS
AT DINNER MEETING
(Continued)

[VB ADDS: I think I have told of my session with Ike concerning Groves. [[X-REF BACK TO P. 393]]

[Also of the time I briefed him on the buzz bomb threat. [[X-REF BACK TO P. 164]]

[Also of talks when he was headed for Columbia.]
[[X-REF BACK TO PP. 65, 590-592]] [END ADD]

This is quite a long answer to a very simple question.

* * *

Question B43: Henry L. Stimson

You are quite right. I never called Secretary Stimson anything but Mr. Secretary and he always called me Van. [VB ADDS: Five presidents have called me 'Van'. The sixth gave me a medal but didn't call me anything.] This recognized the difference of age. But when I say that he treated me like a son, it went much further than this. I was the only man practically that had close contact with him who was not a part of his organization. I didn't have an axe to grind, and it was a relief to him to get someone who didn't kowtow to him. Also he led a pretty grim life and when I put a touch of humor into it he appreciated it no end I'm sure.

Once in a while he'd call me up and say he had a matter to take up with me and could I drop around to his house after dinner. Then Phoebe and I would drop around and he and I'd go into the study for five minutes to take up the matter that he had in mind which usually didn't amount to shucks. He didn't have anything in mind; he merely wanted to relax in the evening. Then we'd join him and Mrs. Stimson and he'd tell us about some of his camping trips or he'd get an old album out and he'd really let down his dignity and become simply an old fellow thoroughly enjoying himself by reminiscing. That was the kind of relationship I had with him and it was enhanced, I'm sure, by the ways in which I handled him, the ways in which I dealt with him. Usually on

1) BUSH'S RELATIONSHIP
WITH STIMSON

2) THE CASUAL EVENINGS

a pretty light note. Let me give you an example.

One day I was going into the Pentagon just as his car drove up and we walked in together. He said, "How are things going, Van?" And I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary, they're going much as usual, the Bureau of the Budget's stealing all my money and the Army's stealing all my men but there's nothing unusual about any of that." He said, "Well, when you have trouble with the Army you bring it to me." I said, "Oh no, Mr. Secretary I couldn't do that. My people and yours are in contact at all sorts of levels. If I went to you with something and it became known, it would spoil all sorts of relationships which are really going very well indeed. So I can't do that." And he said, "Yes, yes I know, I understand completely. But when there's a really tough one, one that's got you down, why then come to me." [X-REF AHEAD TO P. 807] I said, "Well Mr. Secretary, you know I'm so cocky I think I could lick your damn Army singlehanded."

He loved that kind of comeback and needless to say he didn't get that kind of a comeback very often.

There was an after thing on this that was interesting for it occurred many months later. A new ruling was made over in the Army and if it had been put into effect it would have taken a lot of my people out of the laboratories. It would have interfered seriously, very seriously indeed, with the development of proximity fuzes and radar and God knows what, and the Army would have got a few more men. The nub of it

- 1) HENRY L. STIMSON
- 2) STIMSON OFFERS TO HANDLE BUSH'S BIG ARMY PROBLEMS

was that only contracts approved by the Army or the Navy carried immunity from Selective Service.

I started on the rounds to try to get this thing cleared up and I got nowhere. One morning I went over to the Pentagon and thoroughly insulted about everybody I came into contact with, poor old [Goldsweight Door EH to VB: THIS IS WHAT THE TAPE SOUNDS LIKE. HELP! VB to EH: GOLDWAITHE DORR -- NICE OLD GUY ATTACHED TO STIMSON.] Goldwaithe Dorr and Harvey Bundy and a few generals on this subject. By the time I got through I'd said that I was going to take the thing up with the Secretary and the President and the public in that order. Shortly after I got through some of these chaps, I imagine some of the Secretary's aides, went in to see him and told him that this guy Bush was on the warpath and that he didn't make sense and a few more things. The Secretary said, "What does he want?" They told him, "Why he wants the absolutely absurd thing that when he certifies a research contract the Army's certification will be automatic." And Stimson said, "Well that seems to make sense to me, I think that's all right, put it into effect." They got out before he made some more rules.

That afternoon some officers came into my office and by the way they approached the subject I could guess that the Secretary had made a move. When they suggested little modifications, I wouldn't agree to a doggone thing. I finally came out at the end with a system where my certification was just as good as the Army's.

- 1) WWII
- 2) STIMSON HELPS BUSH
KEEP HIS OSRD MEN
OUT OF THE DRAFT

The important point about this is that Stimson made this ruling without calling me in at all. In other words he knew: one, that I wouldn't come to him with it; two, that if I was really blasting people all over the Pentagon there was something decidedly wrong. So when he heard what it was, he corrected it without referring it to me or anything else. I learned of it, I guess, through Harvey Bundy, but indirectly. I knew about it just as soon as it happened of course because I took it from the attitude of the officers who visited me.

* * *

I haven't got any Huguenot strain in my ancestry, you're guessing from my strange front name, but that came by a side path with no relationship. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 1, 3, 638] The only ancestry that I've got that I really know about are a whole bunch of Yankee ship captains on Cape Cod plus a good Irish great, great grandmother. Yeah. Well my grandfather used to say he was a quarter Irish so that fixes it. She came from County Kerry and I suppose one of the captains got ashore there for some reason and brought her back with him. But there aren't any Huguenots that I know about. I don't know whether Stimson had any in his ancestry or not, perhaps he did. We never talked genealogy although we talked all sorts of things. [EH to VB: McGEORGE BUNDY "ON ACTIVE SERVICE" SAYS SO.] [VB to EH: GOOD.]

- 1) WWII
- 2) STIMSON HELPS BUSH
KEEP HIS OSRD MEN
OUT OF THE DRAFT
- 3) BACKTRACK--BUSH's
PROGENITORS

I got to know him very early in the show because as soon as we got NDRC formed I talked with him and of course with Mr. Knox (Secretary of Navy) about how we were going about it and what we planned to do. Stimson and Knox suggested at that time that a very small committee of three men be set up to coordinate the relationships between the civilian and the military; not to direct the program of research or anything like that, not to be a last court of appeal, but with the assignment of seeing that the people who were making the gadgetry and the people that were going to use it got together on a proper basis. I readily agreed to this, of course.

Stimson said he knew a man who would work well in that and he named Eisenhower. The committee was never formed. Not too long after that Stimson told me that he was afraid I couldn't have Eisenhower for this committee, because he had other more important things for him to do. He certainly did. He and Marshall and they did quite a job for themselves when they selected him.

* * *

One thing that I think has been truly said is that one of the greatest, maybe the greatest accomplishment of Marshall during the war was his uncanny judgment in picking the right military officers. I think the Army did a lot better than the Navy on this. [X-REF BACK TO P. 476]

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- 1) BUSH GETS TO KNOW STIMSON IN EARLY DAYS OF NDRC
- 2) EISENHOWER
- 3) MARSHALL'S UNCANNY JUDGMENT IN SELECTING THE RIGHT OFFICERS

I'll tell you many more stories about Stimson before I get through without doubt [no doubt ?] . Certainly I dedicated Modern Arms to him. I was exceedingly fond of him and really admired him. He was quite a fellow. He ran the War Department by bursts of righteous indignation. [X-REF BACK TO P. 471] When he really got stirred up the generals got under their desks; the word was passed around fast that the old man was on the rampage. The thing that would get him stirred up more than anything else was some hint of skull-duggery somewhere in his outfit.

I remember one time I went in to see him and he was furious about something. I sat down at his desk and he proceeded to bawl me out for business -- about something I've now forgotten; I don't even know what the subject was. But right in the middle of a sentence you could suddenly see him say to himself, "Why this guy isn't in my organization." Whereupon he stopped abruptly, and after some pause went on again in an entirely different tone of voice and on an entirely different subject. We never discussed the thing that he was really talking to me about in the first place.

When Stimson worked hard there were several things that happened. That's another story and if you'll remind me, I'll tell you about him. The things that occurred showed his character, I think, quite a bit. Among other things he

- 1) WWII
- 2) STIMSON RAN THE WAR DEPARTMENT BY BURSTS OF RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION

Reel 11-A
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wrote me a letter: it was a lovely letter. I have his picture and the letter is on the back of the frame and we can fish those out. [JK to EH: WANT THIS?] [EH to VB: WANTED, PLEASE.] [VB to EH: LATER. I HAVE A WHOLE BOOK OF WAR PHOTOS AND IT IS IN THAT.] It was as fine a thing as I obtained after the war and I think one that I treasure more than any other document in my possession.

1) STIMSON (Continued)

This seems to be the end of this tape so we'll leave the story of my last days with Stimson for some other time. [JK NOTES: GET THIS] [EH to VB: WANTED, PLEASE.] [VB to EH: LATER.]

* * *

END SIDE "A"

Question B44: Herbert Hoover: Fishing & Some Opinions

Certainly I went fishing with Herbert Hoover! Not once but a number of times when we were guests of Cameron Forbes on Naushon Island [X-REF BACK TO P. 84] or guests of Fred Wolcott up at his nice place in Connecticut where there is a beautiful trout brook. [X-REF BACK TO P. 413]

I got pretty well acquainted with the old man. The last time I saw him I presented him with a medal. Tufts gave him some sort of a medal and asked me to present it. I did this down at the Waldorf Towers. The old man and I had a nice reunion and some nice reminiscences for a time.

The first time I ever met him was, of course, when I joined the Carnegie Institute of Washington, for he was one of the trustees. The first time that I really got to know him was down at Naushon Island. For he and I were the guests of old William Cameron Forbes about whom I could tell many a yarn. [JK to EH: INTERESTED?] [EH to JK: FIRST OF ALL, X-REF BACK!] [X-REF BACK TO PP. 83 & 155]

It was a Sunday morning. I was sitting out on the porch. Hoover was in the front room and was working on a speech. Everyone else had gone to church. After a while he came out on the porch and said, "Look I wonder if you'd help me out a bit. I've been writing this speech that I've got to give in New Haven tomorrow, and there's something wrong with the ending and I can't make out quite what it is. I wish you'd look it over for me and tell me quite frankly

- 1) FLASHBACK
CIW DAYS
- 2) BUSH HELPS HOOVER
WITH A SPEECH

what's wrong."

Well, that pretty much flabbergasted me because here was an ex-President of the United States seeking advice on a speech from me. [EH to VB: i.e. THE YEAR MUST HAVE BEEN 1928 AFTER NOVEMBER OR 1929 BEFORE MARCH 4?] [VB to EH: I THINK SO.] I sat down and I read the speech and read the ending. Then I went back in and I said, "Mr. Hoover, I've got a suggestion. I think the trouble with this is so and so." Well I don't remember what it was but there was something about it that I'd detected and he immediately agreed and revised accordingly.

Before that, I'd thought Hoover was kind of a stiff stuffed-shirt sort of a guy, but that taught me differently -- if he'd ask advice in that way. We got acquainted in that strange way, but we got really acquainted sometime later at another visit to Naushon.

Old William Cameron Forbes had certain rules about the place. In fact the place was full of rules and he ruled the island like an old feudal duke. One of his rules was that there were certain places in the old manor house where you smoked and other places where you didn't. One fine morning I'll be doggoned if he didn't correct the ex-President of the United States in my presence for smoking in the wrong part of the house. Then he left, and I said to Hoover, "What am I supposed to do under these circumstances, go through the floor?" He said, "Oh you and I know the old man, forget it. We both understand him, I don't care what he says and I hope

- 1) HOOVER AND BUSH
FISHING AT
NAUSHON ISLAND
- 2) CAMERON FORBES'
SMOKING RULES

you don't. Let's forget he said it." That was that.

I think that's the first time I really got acquainted with Hoover. I was his guest at the Bohemian Grove twice and he was a grand host out there as he relaxed. There are lots of things I remember about it hardly pertinent to the story except just one.

In his camp there was an Armenian who did the cooking and who had some young Armenian boys helping him. The rest of the guests and I treated this Armenian just as we'd treat one of the other guests and so did Hoover. It was quite a while before I found out the story. That particular Armenian owned the string of Omar Khayyam restaurants on the Pacific Coast and was certainly worth several million dollars. It seems that he got over here after the first war. Then he later got his family over and they got started in business.

He was thoroughly convinced, and probably rightly so, that if it hadn't been for Hoover's job on relief after the first war he and his family would never have survived. So to him, Hoover was his great hero. Every year when Hoover went to the Grove he turned his restaurants over to some one of his brothers or somewhere [?], gathered up his trucks and some of his young Armenians and went out to take care of Hoover.

One more part of this story; a day or two after I'd arrived, Hoover gave a speech in the open air by the side of the lake. I gave one there I believe. They got guests to do

- 1) HERBERT HOOVER
- 2) BUSH A GUEST AT BOHEMIAN GROVE
- 3) HOOVER'S ARMENIAN MILLIONAIRE COOK

it quite frequently. While I was listening, sitting on the grass, I looked over and here was one of the Armenian boys leaning against a tree and listening. If I ever saw adoration in a man's face, it was in the face of that young Armenian.

There are plenty of stories of Hoover. One time he and I were fishing out on a so-called lake, rather a little pond, down on Naushon Island -- the pair of us in a little boat. We were fishing for bass, and we were plugging for them which means we had shrimp bait and were fishing on the bottom. We hadn't had a strike for a long time; I guess we hadn't had one all morning. Hoover was giving me a lecture on economics, a very good lecture by the way, and I was just sitting listening to him. He suddenly got a strike. He got the bass under control and he finished the sentence that he'd started just before the bass struck. Now I don't think there are more than one or two men in the world that could be in a middle of a sentence, catch a fish and finish the sentence. But that's what Hoover did.

Another time that I remember was up in Fred Wolcott's place. Hoover and I were fishing a brook and there was a thunderstorm. We both took refuge on the piazza of an old abandoned camp where we were sheltered all right; we sat on the floor and smoked our pipes. The storm lasted for quite a long time, and he was telling me about his early days as a mining engineer and how he was working out in Burma and so on. It was a beautiful story of adventure told in a perfectly modest and interesting way.

1) HOOVER'S ECONOMICS
LECTURE INTERRUPTED
BY A FISH

2) HOOVER'S ADVENTURE
STORY DURING THE
THUNDERSTORM

[EH to VB: The old boy could always tell you how many thousand tons of cocoa were stored in Austria Hungary in April 1913, too. But in 1940 I heard him say, "This war is going to collapse into the damndest famine the world has ever known!" Ever since 1932 he had been a Cassandra -- but I guess he had good reasons.] [VB to EH: -- an important one being Charley Mikelson [[? ILLEGIBLE]] .]

I had all sorts of relations with him and I got to be very fond of him although I don't think I ever over-estimated his capacities. I never felt that his economics were any too sound. I'm sure that he was no politician, but after all, he did make a success as a mining engineer. He did have the sense to make himself a lot of money; he did become President of the United States; and I think above all, by all accounts he did a magnificent job of relief during and after the first war.

One more story. One time (this was during the war) he was living up on S Street. Note that I was in a strange position because Hoover was very bitter about the Charlie Machaelsen episode when he was running against Franklin Roosevelt. Here I was with one of them as a trustee and reporting to the other one. So I had to kind of be sure I didn't get my wires crossed on that relationship.

But Hoover called me up to his S Street house one morning and I went in and the conversation went like this. "Van, I want you to be President of Stanford University. Will you take the job?" "No sir," says I. "Why," he said, "I

- 1) HERBERT HOOVER
A CASSANDRA
- 2) WARTIME RELATIONSHIP
AWKWARD FOR BUSH
- 3) BUSH TURNS DOWN
STANFORD PRESIDENCY

don't mean now, I mean when the war is over." I said, "The answer's still no, sir." And he said, "All right," and we went on to other things.

That's the only time the thing was mentioned between us. Now it was an utterly improper thing for him to do because as a trustee of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, he shouldn't go around trying to swipe the president of the Institution without the knowledge of the other trustees, which is just what he did. The reason that I could say, "No, sir," so promptly was because I knew about the situation at Stanford University. I knew that Hoover was running it from the back seat, and I knew that any president out there would have a very rough time indeed, except, of course, old Ray Lyman Wilbur who was Hoover's buddy and who was then about to retire.

Mrs. Hoover was a lovely person. One time Phoebe and I crossed the continent with the Hoovers in a train, spent a great deal of time with them, and had some very pleasant times. We became especially fond of her; she was a really grand person. When she died I thought Hoover would certainly go to pot, and he did for quite a while. Then he rallied and he had a second period of activity and consultation and so forth. I think in recent years he's had a lot of satisfaction as the grand old man of the American scene.

Did his luck run out? Let's say that I think he merely got into the wrong channels of activity. He was a success in many, many ways until he got into the political

- 1) WWII
- 2) BUSH TURNS DOWN HOOVER'S OFFER OF STANFORD PRESIDENCY
- 3) MRS. HOOVER CHARMING

Reel 11-B
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arena and he was no more adapted for that than a child.
There are not many that are. Of course many that are
fully adapted to the political life and do it well haven't
anything of the grasp and breadth and so forth that Hoover
had. But he didn't run out of luck, he just got in the
wrong pew.

1) HOOVER IN POLITICS:
LUCK DIDN'T RUN OUT
--HE WAS JUST IN
"THE WRONG PEW"

* * *

Reel 11-B
Page 721-A

Question B45: Air Marshall Portal's
"clever trick with the matchbox"

[TWO SMALL PARAGRAPHS CUT HERE: ONE DISCUSSES THE
NUMBERING OF THE QUESTIONS; THE SECOND REPORTS VB DOESN'T
REMEMBER DETAILS OF MATCHBOX TRICK AND THAT IT'S NOT WORTH
RECITING ANYWAY.]

* * *

Question B46: Tizard Mission

One of the easiest ways to talk about the Tizard Mission is to take the biography that has just been written about Tizard, which is being published in England and which the Technology Press published in this country in spring, 1965. [EH to JK: COPY NOW IN OFFICE 15 MAY '65] I'm sure you'd want to skip most of it as I did. The story of the Mission from the British point of view is there in good shape and it may be that you'll want to glance at this and then ask me some questions about the American side of that Mission.

[X-REF BACK TO P. 426]

In a nutshell, Tizard, with a great deal of difficulty, convinced the British that they ought to interchange with us on weapons. This was well before we got into the war. He had a great deal of difficulty before he finally got started over here. There was a lot of pulling and hauling as to who was to head the mission and so on. Over here he made his contacts principally with the military, but also with me and with Conant. The upshot was that the interchange was finally ordered by the President, much to the disturbance of some of the military. That was the beginning of really strong interchange.

It wasn't long after that that we established a London Office and Jim Conant went over to organize it. He was well known to the British and of course I wasn't. He had great success in getting it set up. The British established a mission in Washington. The interchange began; the

- 1) PRE WWII
- 2) TIZARD CONVINCED BRITISH ON ANGLO-AMERICAN WEAPONS INTERCHANGE
- 3) CONANT SETS UP LONDON OFFICE

Reel 11-B
Page 723

interchange of documents and so on was in the hands of Caryl Parker Haskins, now President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. The head of my London Mission was the now President of Stewart Warner & Company, Bennett Archambault. There are lots of stories along the way, but I think probably you ought to borrow my galley proofs and see whether there's anything in there that you want to take up. [EH NOTES: REFERS TO CLARK ON TIZARD; IN OFFICE.]

[PARAGRAPH CUT HERE ABOUT VB FORWARD TO ABOVE BOOK AND EH NOTES: SEE FORWARD.]

- 1) PRE WWII
- 2) TIZARD MISSION IN LONDON UNDER ARCHAMBAULT
- 3) CARYL HASKINS IN CHARGE OF DOCUMENT INTERCHANGE

* * *

Question B47: Cherwell: Oxford Dons' Poem About Him;
His Domain During War; Why Tizard Superior.

I didn't think that Tizard was superior to Cherwell from a scientific standpoint, that isn't the point. Tizard was by far the greater man in his concepts, his relationships, his humanity and so on. Cherwell had the real reputation as the scientist and particularly in connection with aerodynamics and things of that sort. He was a courageous chap too. He was one of the first fliers and he did some very hazardous things. He was also into atomistics, and generally well regarded as a scientist.

The trouble was, of course, that while Tizard tried to be the link between the Prime Minister and British science, Cherwell was simply the Prime Minister's Scientific Advisor period. There was all the difference in the world and out of this came most of the struggle and most of the distress. The British were never organized properly in science during the war. They had committees all over the place, so many that no one but a Britisher could ever have made them work.

[X-REF BACK TO PP. 176, 425-452]

But the committees were not coordinated at any point except at the Prime Minister's level and then by Cherwell. The thing was never written out. He didn't have control of these committees formally, he had control only as he swung the Prime Minister's influence. This was bound to bring

- 1) WWII
- 2) TIZARD'S AND
CHERWELL'S ROLES
- 3) NO PROPER SCIENCE
ORGANIZATION BY
BRITISH (Repeat)

about all sorts of strife. The fact that Churchill butted in with positive opinions about things that he didn't know much about didn't help a bit. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 176 & 427]

Cherwell was in a tough spot, no doubt about that. British science generally was very annoyed with him and quite rightly so. If he had merely taken the point of view that he was only one scientist among many, and that his job was to see that the Prime Minister got the benefit of the best advice obtainable throughout the scientific community in Britain, everything would have gone well. Cherwell was just a little too cocky to take that kind of point of view, I suspect.

[X-REF AHEAD TO P. 820]

When I was out at Oxford one night, one of the dons there recited to me a perfectly scandalous poem which was British pamphleteering of the old style at its worst. I can recite it. I hesitate to recite it into something that Patty's going to type, but I'll tell you about it some one of these days even though I may soften it down a little in the telling. I remember it all right. [EH to VB: NOW'S THE TIME! WE'RE ALL ADULTS!] [VB to EH:

"Now Cherwell, when the war began
Was plain Professor Lindemann
But now removed to higher spheres
He sits among his comrade peers
And from his most exalted perch
Cries silence from Lord Christ of Church.

The Church of Christ, that silly ass
Seeing such wonders come to pass
Gazing on virtue's just reward
Adores its newly risen Lord."

Footnote: Church of Christ means Christ College

- 1) WWII
- 2) CHERWELL ALLIENATED
BRITISH SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNITY
- 3) THE OXFORD DONS'
POEM ABOUT CHERWELL

Reel 11-B
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Question B48: EH Requests Confidential Copy of VB's Piece
on Churchill Written for Ted Weeks

[SHORT PARAGRAPH CUT HERE ON WHERE TO FIND THE
PIECE. IT IS THE SAME AS THE ATLANTIC ARTICLE AND A COPY
IS IN THIS OFFICE.]

* * *

Question B49: General Motors and the Dukw; Patent Relationships

I think I've already told the story of the patent clause in our contracts and General Electric's objections and what happened thereafter. [X-REF BACK TO P. 605]

General Motors and General Electric were the only ones that protested against the patent clause and we didn't need to use General Motors at any point. The people that were making the Dukw had some very interesting relationships with the automotive industry or the truck industry because the job that was being done in OSRD did not have any official backing from the army. In fact, it opposed it, so the relations were strange. [JK to EH: WANT THIS SPELLED OUT?]

[EH to JK: X-REF FIRST!] [JK to EH: X-REF BACK TO P. 454 BUT WE STILL DON'T HAVE THE STORY.] [VB to EH: WE CAN GET ALL THIS FROM PUTNAM.]

I think at some time it would be well worthwhile to get Hartley Rowe's story on all of this aspect of the affair. He is retired, but is doing a little consulting. He lives just outside of Boston and he's in good condition. [EH to JK: REF! MAKE ADDRESS NOTE.]

The other man that could tell and would tell the story in a far more interesting way would be Palmer Putnam and he's living on the Pacific Coast. [EH NOTES: AS OF 5/65 IN THE EAST. SEE VB LETTER 12 MAY '65.] I don't know whether he ever comes East but we could find out. I think

- 1) WWII
- 2) DUKW AND THE
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
- 3) BUSH SUGGESTS SEEING
HARTLEY ROWE
and PALMER PUTNAM

you'd have a lot of fun talking with Palmer Putnam because he's a very unusual individual indeed.

He's had a strange career. He's bright as he can be, but for some reason or other has not made out on his money-making schemes. He once developed a windmill for power generation. It was an excellent job. It was no toy -- it developed a thousand kilowatts or something like that. He went about it in a very sensible way as far as all of the technical aspects are concerned, but the thing never went over commercially.

He went down to Mexico and he set up down there a plant for growing broilers. The Mexican market was being supplied by people who grew only a few birds and he put in a factory where he could get them out in production and made it quite successful. Again, he made no money out of it so he was hard up and he's been in one job after another. But he's a brilliant, strange fellow that would be well worth having some conversation with if it could be arranged.

[EH REMARKS OF THIS PARAGRAPH: N.B.]

- 1) PALMER PUTNAM
- 2) HIS POWER-GENERATING WINDMILL
- 3) HIS MEXICAN BROILERS

* * *

Question B50: Getting the Messages to North Africa

I thought I'd told the story about getting the chaps to North Africa. But if I have there's no harm in repeating it. In fact, if I tell the same story twice it will give you a good chance to see whether I'm consistent in my accounts even though I may be inaccurate.

We were sending Dukws over to North Africa. Some of them were going to the British and this was after the Dukw had been pretty well accepted. It had done some good things out in the landings in the Far East and it had pretty well proved that it was a useful vehicle, for it would go through the surf when an ordinary boat would get swamped. Of course, the big point was that when it got ashore, it was a truck and a very useful one. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 408-409]

We were sending them over there, or the Army was, because they'd become converted by that time and some of them were going to the British. We wanted to send some men over to instruct the drivers how to use them. There were some real tricks about it. For one thing, the way in which you came into the surf made a real difference. We had some men that knew all about them. When we tried to do this, we were completely blocked by a general whose name I forget. [VB Notes: PUT COULDN'T REMEMBER IT WHEN I SAW HIM RECENTLY.] [EH to JK: MAYBE APPEARS IN PREVIOUS VERSION.] [JK to EH: IT DOESN'T.] He was in a position where you couldn't get overseas as a

- 1) WWII
- 2) GETTING DUKW
INSTRUCTORS TO
NORTH AFRICA
(Repeat)

civilian into Army territory without his O.K. and he wouldn't give any O.K.

However, the Hartley Rowe-Putnam gang handled all of this. It didn't get to me personally, of course. I could have cleared it by protest higher up in the Army, but I didn't have to. These fellows arranged through the British to send instructors over to train or teach the British drivers. They sent more men than were really needed for that purpose. The British in North Africa who had some of the Dukws loaned their instructors to the Americans and the job was done. This is one instance of many where our fine relations with the British helped a lot.

Again, this is a story where you could get the thing from Rowe or Putnam far more accurately and in more detail than I'm able to give it from just remembering.

[EH NOTES: REF]

- 1) WWII
- 2) GETTING DUKW
INSTRUCTORS TO
NORTH AFRICA
(Continued)

* * *

Question B51: Cabinet Meeting on Policy; Attlee Conference

The sequence of events, postwar in the handling of the atomic energy matter after the interim committee and so on was, first a Cabinet meeting at which the President decided to take the subject up with the United Nations; and then the Attlee Conference. Both of these need quite a lot of discussion and I won't follow your question; I'll take the Cabinet meeting up first because that came first. [X-REF BACK TO PP. 503, 553 and FORWARD TO PP. 728-730.]

This was the famous Cabinet meeting at which Truman made his decisions, or after which he made his decisions, on how to handle the affair. The Cabinet meeting considered only two things: one, whether to take the subject of control of atomic energy to the United Nations; and second, whether, before so doing, to confer with the British so that it could be somewhat of a joint approach; and also, in that connection, whether to take it up with the Russians before going into the United Nations.

This was a very important meeting, naturally. Stimson took me with him to that meeting. He took me with him because he and I had discussed the whole thing at length and, while we were pretty well in agreement, he preferred to have me there. In fact, at the meeting he asked me to present certain matters as the meeting went along.

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) CABINET MEETING ON HANDLING OF ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS

The interesting thing is that after this meeting there was a whole lot in the papers about what happened at the meeting and it told about the great plan that Henry Wallace presented to the Cabinet Meeting. As a matter of fact, Wallace did not present any plan. The other thing that happened somewhat later was the appearance of Forrestal's diary. I don't understand that diary at all. But I do know that the account given there of that Cabinet Meeting had no relation whatever as far as I can see to what actually happened. [EH NOTES: (re this sentence) N.B.] [REF]

In the press there was discussion about all sorts of controversy at that meeting on all sorts of things. It was made out to be quite a vigorous discussion, with a lot of ill feeling, perhaps. As a matter of fact, it was a very quiet meeting. The one thing that happened which was very striking to me was this:

At one time during the meeting, Forrestal made a remark which could readily be interpreted as meaning that this was a deliberative body which was going to take some kind of vote on the subject. Truman said to him, "Well, Jim, you forget this is a Cabinet and I want the advice of all of you. I want that advice fully and frankly and then I will make the decision." This was one of his noblest times. You know I acquired great respect for Truman -- his power of decision and his willingness to take the responsibility for it. His remark to Forrestal was not a rebuke. [SENTENCE CUT.]

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) CABINET MEETING ON HANDLING OF ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS
- 3) INACCURACY OF FORRESTAL'S DIARY
- 4) BUSH'S RESPECT FOR TRUMAN

When we got to the end of the meeting, Truman said, "Now I want each one of you men to write me a short memorandum summarizing your opinions on this matter and then I'll study them and make a decision." And he adjourned the meeting.

Since I was not a member of the Cabinet, (and I guess I was the only non-Cabinet member present) I went to him as the thing was breaking up and said, "Mr. President, do you want my opinion also?" He said, "You're damn right I do. What the hell do you think?" Or something of that sort in his characteristic approach to such matters. I wrote out my opinion and sent it in with the others. He made the decision to go to the United Nations and also the decision to take the subject up with the British first.

* * *

That brings us to the Attlee Conference and the Attlee Conference was quite a show. Let me say this. After the Conference and many times since, I've said to myself, and at times to others, that it was the worst conducted international conference I can imagine. I'm not so sure, as I look back on it now, that it was crude. It was certainly the limit in informality and confusion. As a conference among friends perhaps the utterly informal atmosphere was better. However it certainly went to extremes.

Attlee came over and Mackenzie King came down from Canada, and they both brought quite an entourage, of course. A few days before the conference was to convene, I'd been

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) TRUMAN'S CABINET MEETING (Cont'd)
- 3) EXTREME INFORMALITY OF ATTLEE CONFERENCE

trying to find out what preparations were being made and so forth, and I went to see Jimmy Byrnes (then Secretary of State). I said, "Mr. Secretary, I'm disturbed about this coming conference. As far as I can make out we have no working committee on it in the State Department and we have no American program. The British will undoubtedly come over here with their ideas very thoroughly fixed, and with a definite program in hand for it. If we meet them and we have no American program there may be quite a lot of confusion."

Byrnes said to me, "What do you mean by an American program?" I outlined what I meant: a statement of how we would present the thing to the United Nations; what we would do to prepare it to go to the United Nations, whether we would present it as a joint proposal from Britain and the United States, and so on. I wrote my ideas out that night and I took the memorandum in to Jimmy Byrnes the next day. Then he and I went over to see Truman. They looked it over -- and that became the American program, as far as there ever was one.

I promptly went around to see Ben Cohen in the State Department to explain to him and to ask him to explain to his colleagues that I was not trying to horn in on them, that I was really trying to get the Secretary to utilize their services. I think Ben Cohen believed me and there was no hard feeling on it. But when the Conference met there was no Secretariat present; none of the State Department people were

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) EXTREME INFORMALITY OF ATTLEE CONFERENCE
- 3) BUSH COMPOSES AMERICAN PROGRAM FOR CONFERENCE FOR JIMMY BYRNES

there as far as I can remember at all. And we had our discussions.

The next thing that happened was that we had dinner at the British Embassy and just before that dinner they set up a committee to draft the resolutions of the Conference. That committee consisted of Sir John Anderson, Pearson of Canada and myself. They told us that we had all evening to work since they were going to reconvene at ten o'clock the next morning.

We started in, got a bit of dinner, and then John Anderson and I retired to a room and went to work. Somewhere, Pearson got lost. I suspect he never knew he was appointed on the committee. At any rate, John Anderson and I began to draft the declaration of the conference, thinking we were working against a deadline of ten o'clock the next morning and that we'd probably work all night. Well, about nine o'clock or so they told us that the conference was going to reconvene at ten o'clock that night. So we hustled up what we had. We had some typed sheets by that time and some drafts. Not very much, but something that John Anderson and I were agreed on at least.

We went and joined the show at ten o'clock and he and I each had a copy of a tentative draft of the declarations of the conference. [EH to VB: WHERE ARE WE? WHITE HOUSE? BRITISH EMBASSY? NOT CLEAR.] [VB to EH: WHITE HOUSE NOW, YES. BRITISH EMBASSY FOR DINNER ONLY.] So they started discussing them, and they made changes, wording changes and

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) ATTLEE CONFERENCE
- 3) BUSH & SIR JOHN
ANDERSON DRAFT
CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

so forth. I'd put them into my copy with my lovely longhand. After a while, John Anderson, who was more used to working with a secretary at his side apparently, got lost, so that I had in my hands the only copy that was revised and that kept being revised for the next hour and a half. About midnight they said to me, "Read it back." I read it with all of my interleaving and so forth and when I finished they said, "That's it." The Conference adjourned and we all had a drink.

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) BUSH-ANDERSON
DECLARATION OF
THE ATTLEE
CONFERENCE

* * *

A little after midnight that night I left the White House to go home. I had in my hands the only existing copy of the Declaration of that Conference. The next morning at eight o'clock I was in the White House and went to work in the room next to Truman's. The stuff was being transmitted to Britain for approval over there, or for review over there at least, and Truman said, "If there's any difficulty, just come in." After a bit I walked into his office and I said, "Mr. President, we've got this same phrase in two places in the Declaration." Truman said, "All right, take it out in one place, and I'll explain it to the Prime Minister." So I did.

At ten o'clock the two Prime Ministers [EH to VB:
WHICH TWO? PEARSON WAS CANADIAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
THEN.] [VB to EH: THERE WERE ONLY TWO--ATTLEE AND KING.]

came in and they signed the declaration. While this was going on, some of the Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee and so forth were present and Senator Connally proceeded to bawl out Truman in the presence of the Prime Ministers for carrying on a very important conference without consulting the Senate. It was a pretty crude sort of a thing to do. I don't think that Truman seemed to mind it particularly. But the Prime Ministers must have been a little startled at that way of doing things.

They signed it, and the press took pictures and so forth, and the show was over. I was standing in the corner of the room somewhere watching this thing and when it finally broke up, Truman came over to me and took hold of my arm and said, "Van, I want you to know that I realize that this would have been a balled-up mess if you hadn't taken hold of it." (Which I think it would have been, as a matter of fact.) Incidentally I think somewhere I've got that longhand corrected copy, probably in my vault. I know I saved the thing after I'd gotten the formal copies typed that morning in the White House. [EH to VB:THE SORT OF THING THAT DESERVES PHOTOCOPY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, YES?] [VB to EH: I'LL LOOK FOR IT WHEN I GO TO THE VAULT.]

As I say, I've thought since, what a way to run an international conference! Maybe that is the American way when there's really no controversy and when it's merely friends

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) SIGNING OF THE BUSH-ANDERSON DECLARATION OF THE ATTLEE CONFERENCE
- 3) SENATOR CONNALLY BAWLS OUT PRESIDENT TRUMAN

getting together and making a plan. Maybe that's better than all the formality. At any rate, that was certainly Jimmy Byrnes' way of doing it.

I've already recited how Byrnes left the White House that night with his straw hat on the side of his head, jaunty, and not in the least worried about anything, apparently. [X-REF BACK TO P. 488] There was a lot of controversy in the papers about that conference, very naturally.

* * *

After the stuff appeared about Wallace's plan which didn't exist. [?] No one, apparently, among the people that were writing about it knew that I was there, and of course I didn't tell them. Except for Arthur Krock, who tackled me one day in the club and said to me, "Van, weren't you at that Cabinet meeting?" I said, "Yes, I was Arthur, but I don't think it would do any good to say so now. This controversy has pretty well died out and I certainly don't want to reopen it." He rather agreed with me and he never mentioned it.

It gave me an entirely different idea of Henry Wallace because I'd liked the man. I'd known him pretty well. But either he or someone at his side certainly got the press stirred up on a thing on the basis of utterly confidential information that never should have been revealed. I don't condone that in anyone.

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE NON-EXISTENT WALLACE PLAN AFTER ATTLEE CONFERENCE
- 3) BUSH CHANGES HIS IDEAS OF WALLACE

One final point on this thing. When I went over to Salisbury Plain for some exercises of the Royal Air Force somewhat after that, Tooley Spaatz and I were the American guests although there were a lot of American officers there besides. Incidentally, there are some nice little stories about that and the British. [EH to VB: Q: FOR EXAMPLE.] [VB to EH:

[My story of the fake spy.

[Story of Slessor and the guided missiles.

[My fishing expedition with Tizard after the meeting, where I fished a chalk stream.

[Lincoln College and the soap.

[The gal that drove me to London who had never driven to London.] [END VB ADD]

They had a dinner and Attlee came down from London to that dinner and seated me on his right hand and we had a nice discussion. I've always thought that that was a very fine gesture on Attlee's part. No doubt he was coming to the dinner anyway as a courtesy to the American guests, but the fact that he wanted to chat with me about that and some other things was thoroughly nice of him and I appreciated it.

Now the preparations for taking the thing to the United Nations were, as I have already said, put in the hands of the committee that Acheson set up. This was transferred to the Baruch crowd and I think I've recited about this affair. You know the outcome in the United Nations. [X-REF
BACK TO PP. 490-492]

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) THE DINNER WITH
ATTLEE ON THE
SALISBURY PLAIN
- 3) BARUCH CROWD PRESENTS
ATOMIC ENERGY MATTER
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Reel 11-B
Page 736-A

I think what was done postwar on atomic energy made a whole lot of sense. We put it up to the United Nations on a basis where we'd studied hard and felt that the Russians could properly agree to what we were proposing. I don't think we could have done anything else properly at that time. The fact that the Russians would not agree to anything whatever, of course, had to be found out.

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) ATOMIC ENERGY
MATTER GOES TO
THE U. N.

* * *

Question B52: Truman's Annoyance with Bush;
The Conferring of Medals

The story of the medals after the war -- this is quite a story and has very many facets. One, the British got up a list of American scientists and engineers, of course, [?] that they proposed to honor in connection with war weapons. The list was a terrible one. When Jim Conant and I looked it over, we felt that it badly needed revision in order to be just and sensible. We told the British so and when we got no really good response, Jim and I told them, "Well look, if you stick to this present list we will have to decline because, if we did not, our people would never understand our going ahead with it as it stands." This caused quite a lot of consternation, quite properly. The list was revised; Britain made a good list and Jim and I said that it was a good list. The thing went through and the honors were conferred.

A side issue is that there were a number of little things that happened. One was this: in the original list, Jim and I were put down for C.B.E.'s, Commander of the Order of the British Empire. When the new list came through, I didn't know what they'd done to it. I called up Jim and said, "They've revised the list and I think you and I ought to get together."

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) BRITISH BESTOW
MEDALS ON AMERICAN
SCIENTISTS
- 3) BUSH & CONANT
PROTEST LIST

When we did get together it looked like a good list, but then we found out that they'd moved me up to a K.B.E. As we were talking, we assumed, or I assumed at least, that of course Jim was moved up also. I told Jim, "Well look, apparently you and I are going to get promoted." He said, "Apparently it pays to hold out on these Britishers," and we made a good joke of it. But when the list finally got put through, I was the only K.B.E. on the list. If it'd been anybody but Jim Conant he might have been annoyed. We continued to make a joke of it, of course; he didn't care.

I was still in government service, so I couldn't receive a British honor without going through a lot of rigamarole. All the rest of the British honors were conferred in ceremonies at the British Embassy and so forth. I attended and the British put that kind of a thing on very nicely. I didn't receive an honor. Nobody seemed to think much of that.

After I'd gotten out of government service, about '49, the British, who hadn't forgotten it, had a little private ceremony at the embassy. Only Phoebe and I were present, and Oliver Franks, who was then the British Ambassador, proceeded to confer a K.B.E. on me. Nobody knew anything about this. There was no publicity of course, so that it wasn't particularly noticed. I have had it noticed plenty when I was in Britain. In fact, the only time I ever

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) BRITISH MEDAL LIST
--BUSH GETS MOVED
UP TO KBE
- 3) POSTWAR PRIVATE
CEREMONY AT BRITISH
EMBASSY CONFERS KBE

wore a Knight's Cross was at a beautiful dinner where Cambridge University gave me an honorary doctorate. A bunch of my British friends came down for the affair, including Lord Halifax (Ambassador to U.S. 1941-46).

For the ceremony one wore his cap and gown and also his medals on his dress suit underneath, which was quite a bit of stuff to wear around at one time. I wore a Knight's Cross for the only time I ever will in my life. It was a beautifully conducted dinner and after it was over, we joined the ladies out on the lawn where it was still light at ten o'clock. There were lanterns in the trees and it was an enjoyable affair all around.

There were several queer things that happened on this. [The following is] one of the fascinating ones which certainly shouldn't be told but which has given me an awful lot of amusement. At one part of this affair, Mrs. Karl Compton was talking to Phoeb one day and said to her, "What a lovely thing the British have done for Karl. Why, they've made him a Commander of the Order of the British Empire." She went on quite a time with this, during which, of course, Phoeb kept entirely quiet on the fact that I outranked him. I don't think Margaret Compton ever found that out: if she did, I didn't know it. I guess the only way that anybody'd ever find it would be to look up in Who's Who's and nobody does that -- looking up one's friends. [EH REMARKS THIS PARAGRAPH: N.B.]

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) ONLY OCCASION VB HAS OR WILL WEAR HIS KNIGHT'S CROSS
- 3) VB'S HONORARY DOCTORATE FROM CAMBRIDGE UNIV.
- 4) MRS. B. DECLINES OPENING TO TOP MRS. COMPTON

Well, that's the story of the British honors, and the story of the American honors is also a complex one. Let me give just a couple of brief ones, first.

Henry Stimson got together a list of people that had served under him, civilians that he was going to give D.S.M.'s to. He had my name on that list and when he came to the final point of it he suddenly remembered that I wasn't in his organization. Being a stickler for proper form, instead of conferring the medal himself he wrote to the President and recommended that the President confer it. Before the President got around to doing so, that particular medal was abolished. So I never got the D.S.M., not that I care of course.

Another little interesting sidelight. Groves was passing some medals around and one day he said to me he was going to give me a medal for merit. I told him, "Now Leslie, you forget yourself. I was your superior officer. If any medals are going to be passed around, I ought to pin one on you." Whereupon we both laughed and had quite a show over it and enjoyed it thoroughly. That was just a little passing thing and of course Groves actually knew a whole lot better than that.

We still come to the story of the American lists. Again, the Army and the Navy had got out a list of civilian scientists and when they got it out, it wasn't very good. Again Jim Conant and I said we must delay this, and we

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) DSM ABOLISHED BEFORE IT COULD BE CONFERRED ON BUSH
- 3) GROVES' MEDAL FOR BUSH
- 4) BUSH & CONANT OPPOSE AMERICAN MEDALS LIST

delayed it by the simple business of saying again that we couldn't join in that list unless it was made better.

It was, but it took quite a little while to do it. In the course of the time that we were waiting and getting it revised, one day the White House called me up and told me to be down there at eleven o'clock that next morning to get decorated. [X-REF BACK TO P. 465] I told them, "Unfortunately I can't do so. I have the influenza." I didn't have any more influenza than a cow out in the field. But that was about the only basis on which one could refuse to go to the White House.

I think somebody told Truman that I ducked a ceremony of that sort and I think that may have been why, or one reason why, he got mad at me. He certainly sounded mad the next time I saw him. [EH REMARKS THIS PARAGRAPH: N.B.]

They got the whole thing revised again and it finally made sense. The thing was put through and various people got their medals.

I had one very pleasant thing about this. I was at that time in government service as chairman of the Research and Development Board. Hence the Secretary could delegate to me the job of pinning on medals. With the first group of men in OSRD that were thus honored, I conferred the medals in the office of the Secretary, which gave me a great deal of satisfaction. There were hundreds of medals, I guess, before they got through. Of course I didn't go through with all of them,

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) AMERICAN MEDALS LIST
- 3) VB FEIGNS THE FLU TO AVOID MEDAL CEREMONY
--TRUMAN SEEMED ANGRY
- 4) BUSH CONFERS MEDALS ON OSRD PERSONNEL

but I did do the first batch, and that included, for example, Carroll Wilson. I don't know when I've had any more satisfaction than in pinning a medal on that fellow.

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) TRUMAN PINS MEDAL ON BUSH & ALL IS PEACEFUL AGAIN

Finally I got another medal from America, an oak bar on the thing or something. I did show up at the White House and the medal was pinned on by the President and everything was again peaceful. This was the time when John Steelman went through the room and Phoebe wondered at the way I addressed him, which I think I've told you about. [X-REF BACK TO P. 465] It was also the time that I took my grandson with me. The President took him on his knee and he gave him a pen which said "stolen from the desk of Harry Truman" which Ted still has. It was a pleasant affair. It was also the time when the photographers told me and the President to talk to each other and we proceeded to talk about the photographers. It was a good show and everything was again peaceful and so on.

This business of medals can make about as much trouble, I suppose, as honorary degrees can in universities. Fortunately, MIT has no honorary degrees. But I've seen it working at Tufts and it's a good thing to keep away from.

The relations with Truman at that particular time seemed to be very pleasant indeed, and he can be a very genial chap.

I don't remember anything more about medals that's worth recording certainly. We had a lot of certificates that I signed that went around to OSRD people and I see them all over the place on the walls, or I used to. [AM to VB: I saw one

last week on the wall of Jim Britton along with a lovely letter from you saying you hoped he'd recovered well from "the accident near Camp Edwards" (he drove the Dukw in that Coast Guard rescue) and got himself concussed in the process); and he treasures your expression of pride in him.]

At the end of the war I had a picture that I used to exchange with various friends, so that I have quite a collection. One of them is by Harry Truman and the way I got that was that I went into his office for something and he was just signing a lot of photographs. I said to him, "Well Mr. President, while you're signing those won't you sign one for me?" He proceeded to do so on the spot and passed it over. And I gave him one of my pictures. I've been told since by people that visited there that this hangs in the corridor out at his museum. I suspect that it's the only one I'd like to go out and see. [?] [X-REF BACK TO PP. 343 & 465]

That picture had an interesting history. One time a photographer came in who wanted to get a picture of me in a laboratory. He was a press photographer. I told him, "Heck, I haven't been in a laboratory for years, not working in a laboratory at least." But he insisted, so I went down to the photographer's room in the basement of the Carnegie Institution, put on a smock and took a graduate in my hands. The photographer had the bright idea of getting me to move over so that the light from a place where prints were examined fell on my face from below.

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) BUSH PHOTO IN TRUMAN MUSEUM (Repeat)
- 3) BUSH HAS HIS PICTURE TAKEN

It made rather a striking sort of a thing and the picture was decidedly a good job. A little while later, a magazine out in Chicago proceeded to publish a drawing, made from that photograph, which looked like an etching and which was almost an exact copy of it. They put it on the front page of their magazine and they gave no credit to the photographer who did the job. I wrote them and insisted that they give him credit. It hadn't been copyrighted and so forth, so that's all they needed to do. I think it was squared up between them quite amicably. At any rate, later I thought that would be a pretty good thing to use instead of an ordinary photograph. I arranged to get a bunch of copies made of that, this time with everybody's permission, I judge.

[EH to VB: I DON'T THINK I'VE EVEN SEEN...]

[VB to EH: WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN, THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF THEM AROUND.]

Instead of sending photographs to people at the end of the war, I signed these things and sent them around to OSRD people and so on. I see those on the walls everywhere, or used to, as I roamed around. I think it is a much neater thing to do than to just send a conventional photograph.

Of course the chemists in my outfit, when they took a look at it, promptly accused me of trying to pass myself off as a chemist. I told them that I wasn't passing myself off as a chemist; I was passing myself off as a photographer,

- 1) POST WWII
- 2) THE BUSH PHOTOGRAPH
(Continued)

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and that I was a damned good photographer. We had lots of jokes about it, of course, but I think it was a more interesting thing to do than just a staid photograph.

In my collection I've got photographs signed by an awful lot of interesting people that I worked with closely, and one from Newton Richards. There was one that I had a lot of fun about, for he signed it "with dog-like devotion". That was characteristic of Newton.

Well we're pretty nearly close to the end of the reel and I notice that B-52 is going to take a lot of talking. So we'll close this reel out and start question B53 on Reel Twelve.

* * *

1) BUSH & PHOTOGRAPHS

END REEL #11